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Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
“If we have one tradition it is this: 
Everything can always be done better than it is being done” 
Henry Ford 1926 
 
Henry Ford’s comment above (Ford, 1926) is perfectly rational and indicates that 
things do not stand still. With new knowledge, developing techniques, pure 
willpower and thirst for knowledge, there will always be the possibility that 
greater efficiencies can be obtained in any field within a given time. The research 
reflected in this Thesis is in recognition of this in that it recognises the possibility 
that a given process may provide significant benefit to an organisation, however, 
the perceived benefits that may be reaped within one organisation may not 
automatically be achieved by another. 
 
1.1 Background 
 
Today, many large companies are outsourcing functions that were normally 
conducted in-house in order to reduce capital overheads and gain advantages 
from utilising the expertise of external suppliers. In fact, outsourcing is a 
potentially growing phenomenon, according to the estimation of Lankford et al. 
(1999), every Fortune 500 company will consider outsourcing during the decade 
and 20% will enter into a contract by the end of the next decade. Some may even 
eventually achieve the status of a “virtual company”, outsourcing almost 
everything (Carson, 2004). 
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Looking back in history to Henry Ford, the founder of Ford Motor Company and 
one of the pioneers of mass production, one can see that the philosophy was 
entirely different. By 1915, Ford was almost totally vertical integrated, making 
cars from the basic raw material, reaching a peak in 1931 at the Rouge complex 
in Detroit (Womack et al. 1990). Many reasons justified this, not least the fact 
that the Ford had perfected mass production before his suppliers and therefore 
could achieve substantial cost savings by doing everything himself (Ford, 1926). 
Initially, Ford endeavoured to manufacture as much of the vehicle as possible 
under one roof but Ford, constantly looking at ways of improving things made 
the following observations; “When we began to make our own parts we 
practically took for granted that they all had to be made in one factory - that there 
was some special virtue in having a single roof over the manufacture of the entire 
car. We have now developed away from this. If we build any more large 
factories, it will be only because the making of a single part must be in such 
tremendous volume as to require a single unit”. Ford continued, “So now we are 
on our way back to where we started from - excepting that instead of buying our 
parts on the outside, we are beginning to make them in our own factories on the 
outside” (Ford, 1926), indicating a change from manufacturing a vehicle under 
one roof to having separate plants for major components. 
According to Bloomberg (2002), within the European Car Industry 72% of the 
car value comes from suppliers, up from 65% in 1990 and projected to increase 
to 80% by 2010 according to the Centre for Automotive Research. Today the 
emphasis is on outsourcing parts/services that have been traditionally conducted 
in house to a level that in 2000 Ford purchasing represented $91 billion of a $160 
billion turnover (Winter et al. 2000). Despite Henry Ford’s philosophy and 
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practices, one can see that he evolved an approach that was obviously 
appropriate at that time reflected by his success record. Initially Ford bought in 
engines and 90 % of parts (Ford, 1926), developing into a totally vertically 
integrated organisation manufacturing almost 100% of the parts (Womack et al. 
1990). The step to today’s outsourcing trend within Ford and other organisations 
can be seen as a positive view in Henry Ford's perspective through his words 
about his positive attitude towards the future; “Nobody anywhere can really do 
more than guess about the future costs of production. It is wiser to recognise that 
the future holds more than the past - that every day holds within it an 
improvement on the methods of the day before” (Ford, H., 1926) and more 
specifically a further related comment that could be related to Core/Non-Core 
competency; "Whoever does a thing best ought to be the one doing it. It is 
criminal to try to get a business away from another man - criminal because one is 
then trying to lower for personal gain the condition of one’s fellow-men, to rule 
by force instead of by intelligence”. 
In 2000 Ford Motor Company adopted the strategy identifying suppliers to 
design and develop commodities for fuel and other systems as "Full Service 
Suppliers" (Ford Motor Company Ltd, 2000b). At this time the Author was 
involved within the process, particularly within the aspect regarding supplier 
selection. In order to provide a deeper understanding of why this greater 
dependency upon the resources of the suppliers through outsourcing was being 
undertaken it was decided to utilise this subject as the basis for the following 
research. However, during the research period this strategy was ceased 
(Armstrong, 2003), therefore prompting Ford to drop the term “Full Service 
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Supplier” (Ford Motor Company Ltd, 2003). This came at a time when suppliers 
believed that Ford had lost technical competence (Automotive News 2002) 
This change of direction whilst being of minor disruption to the research did in 
fact provide a new facet within the research. 
 
1.2 Aims and Objectives of Research 
 
The following aims and objectives are listed in chronological order rather than 
order of importance in order to reflect the logical process steps of knowledge 
accumulation throughout the research. 
Prior to disclosing the aims and objectives of the research, a broad in-depth 
understanding of the subject of outsourcing would be necessary through 
literature review. This would not only include what to outsource, the reasons and 
methods of implementation but also potential negative aspects. This deeper 
understanding would then become the foundation for the following aims and 
objectives. 
 
1. To develop a “one stop” generic decision making matrix (Outsourcing 
Decision Model) that provides the necessary clarity into defining whether an 
organisation should proceed with an outsourcing initiative or not. This would 
be based upon a distillation of existing models and reviewed literature. With 
the recognition that there may be subsequent advantages following the 
process, the model will include not only these but a means of evaluation in 
order to ascertain whether or not an outsourcing initiative may be or was 
successful or not. This latter aspect must logically be viewed as very 
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important as an outsourcer must be aware of the benefits and also whether or 
not they were achieved. In addition, the model would include sufficient 
guidance with potential supporting metrics and their application. 
 
2. To validate the Outsourcing Model through specific case studies using 
a triangulated approach in comparing the selected automotive OEM with 
some of its major competitors. Within the context of the case study, the 
research would also attempt to understand how the subject outsourcing 
organisation compares to its major competitors in equivalent comparable 
products and whether or not this reflects in the success of these companies. 
This case study not only provides a means of reinforcing the remaining case 
studies by using a triangulated method of application to the research 
developed outsourcing decision model but also provides a deeper 
understanding of the context of the supplier and competitors within the 
industry. 
 
3. To test, via case studies the effect of specificity relating to the 
outsourced end product rather than the outsourced entity. This aspect provides 
the deepest application to the researched outsourcing decision model and 
therefore the most comprehensive validation. In addition, because the case 
studies are retrospective, they have the benefit of providing data to establish 
the level of success. This would be very important, particularly as it would 
enable a focus on particular criteria that failed to highlight a particular 
outcome and therefore provide a chance to make amendments. Low 
specificity is a well established criterion in defining an outsourced entity 
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which is reflected within the body of the research. The further extension of 
this theory towards the outsourcing of and outsourced entity related to an 
established previously outsourced commodity is a new concept with no 
identifiable literature or evidence relating to its importance. The fact that it 
provides an element within the research that is potentially unique and carries 
no extra task burden it has been captured as an added element within the two 
important validation case studies: 
 
4. To evaluate if outsourcing performance can be enhanced through the 
introduction of a second supplier into a single supplier sourcing situation. 
Subsequent to outsourcing, this aim and objective focuses upon the possibility 
of enhancing performance through the introduction of a second supplier. 
Particularly in cases whereby expertise may have been lost from an 
outsourcer, ultimate results relating to the outsourced entity may be 
compromised through either opportunism or diminished supplier 
performance. Whether these aspects are deliberate or unintended, an 
outsourcer should have some means of mitigating this risk. This mitigation 
may potentially be enabled through the use of a second supplier in order to 
provide a degree of competition. 
 
5. To identify a link between Specificity, Commonality and Platform 
Sharing. The Author's professional role was very heavily based around the 
modern practices within the Automotive Industry. Outsourcing, platform 
sharing and commonality are well publicised strategies that have been 
adopted by various car manufacturers in order to gain efficiencies. Research 
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was carried out in order to provide a better understanding of these strategies 
and to establish if there is any link between them. A confirmation of any 
linkages may then provide potential for establishing greater synergies between 
them. 
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Chapter 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Relationship between Outsourcing, Corporate Strategy and 
Environment 
 
Any strategy by definition is only a plan (Collins, 1992) and therefore 
theoretically has the possibility to be changed to meet new demands. 
Outsourcing, similar to any other organisational activity should be based upon a 
planned action for best effect and therefore can also be considered as whole or 
part of a strategy. 
Mintzberg et al. (1985) breaks down a strategy into four categories; either 
deliberate, emergent, intended or enforced. Whilst an enforced strategy or even 
one derived by accident (Harberberg et al. 2001) may arise, the following 
research is based upon a conscious decision regarding outsourcing which would 
be part of either a deliberate, emergent or intended strategy determined by the 
leadership of the organisation. 
The work of Lynch (1997) identifies that any strategy is influenced by the 
environments it works within and broadly falls into a response to one or both of 
two major environmental influences at a broad global level (Ansoff et al. 1990) 
and at an industry level (Porter, 1980). 
The principle of using the global and industry, level environments in order to 
investigate the topic of outsourcing of intellectual competence will become the 
basis for the following work. 
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From reading the work of Lynch (1997), Ansoff et al. (1990 and Porter (1980) it 
is clear that each environment provides unique forces that may influence a 
corporate outsourcing strategy. The global environment by its very nature is 
large and generic but whilst it may have influences on a corporate direction at a 
macro level it is highly unlikely to be reflected in a detailed analysis. Based upon 
this it will be investigated together with the industry environment within the 
arena of Corporate Strategy. 
 
2.1.1 Corporate strategy - Global environment 
 
Global influences are numerous and can be broken down into many elements 
including wars, trade barriers, data handling innovations, etc (Lynch, 1997b) and 
typically fall into a category that affects all industries at the macro level. Whilst 
in some cases they may affect industry competitors in different ways, there is 
very little that a given organisation can do to change the influence. However an 
organisation must consider a response in a given strategy. In Appendix 1, 
(Ansoff et al. 1990) both “Changeability” and “Predictability” are shown relative 
to a given environment. Appendix 1 clearly shows the potential complexity of 
forces that act upon an organisation with many forces externally driven and 
therefore beyond its own control. 
The extremes of turbulence, level 1-5, reflect situations that would require totally  
different responses. A low environmental turbulence at one extreme would 
enable the formulation of a strategy based upon high level of confidence whereas 
the other extreme provides very little predictability of strategic outcomes 
necessitating a flexible and responsive strategy in order to adapt quickly to 
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change. Whilst the global environment may always provide new scenarios that 
should be considered within the decision making process, it is the industry 
environment that must actually determine a new strategy. Under this 
circumstance the strategy whilst being influenced by the global environment 
would clearly remain within the industry environment. 
 
2.1.2 Corporate strategy - Industry environment 
 
Referring to Appendix 2, Lynch (1997), environmental forces at a macro level 
can influence a strategic change within an organisation but there must also be 
further forces involved within any given industry. Appendix 2 illustrates the 
nature of some of these forces related to the stages of the life cycle of a maturing 
industry. Going from the Introduction through to the Decline one can observe 
characteristics that are prevalent at each phase with clear strategic pointers to 
actions necessary to optimise the competitiveness. 
 
2.1.2.1 Industry life cycle 
 
Referring to Figure 2.1, Lynch (1997), Figure 2.1 illustrates that changes in 
industry sales occur as time progresses through the product life cycle. By 
observing this with Appendix 2 it is apparent that the likelihood of outsourcing 
as a potential strategy may develop in intensity from the “Maturity” through to 
“Decline” phases as the profitability from the product is weakening. Whilst the 
life cycle of an organisation provides a possible indicator as to when a company 
may adopt an outsourcing strategy it should not be viewed as a 
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        Industry 
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Lifecycle.doc 
Figure 2.1: Stages of the Industry Life Cycle (Lynch, 1997) 
 
particular criterion as it must really depend upon the product/service being 
outsourced and the relative risks/advantages associated to the business. 
 
2.1.2.2 Porter’s Five Forces 
 
In Figure 2.2, Porter (1980) provides a clearer picture that may be helpful in 
determining a strategy by analysing five forces. Whilst the industry life cycle 
provides some indicators of a maturing industry Porter provides some greater 
clarity on the real influences that may depict a situation at any time within an 
industry life cycle. For example, in a declining stage of an industry, the buyers 
power increases thereby increasing competition within the industry. At this point 
a company may be looking at reducing costs through its suppliers. Similarly if 
there are many suppliers the company may be able to strengthen its position, 
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however if suppliers are few then this may be more difficult as the supplier 
would then have greater negotiating power. 
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Figure 2.2: Porter’s Five Forces Model (Porter 1980) 
 
2.1.3 Global and industry environment: Characteristics of a potential 
         outsourcer 
 
The research within this chapter so far predominantly based upon the works of 
Mintzberg et al. (1985), Lynch (1997) and Porter (1980) clearly indicate some 
characteristics of an organisation that may be embarking upon an outsourcing 
strategy. In order to illustrate these characteristics and confirm parallels with 
each other these characteristics have been captured in (Table 2.1). Referring to 
the industry environment level, Porter’s five forces are clearly very prominent in 
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reflecting these characteristics. However the effect of the global environment is 
less compelling. 
Since level of turbulence whether high or low in the dynamics of the 
environment (Ansoff et al. 1990) show no particular guidance that would obviate 
an outsourcing strategy, it is easy to dismiss turbulence level as a factor in an 
outsourcing decision. The fact that outsourcing could be a potential strategy at 
both high and low levels of turbulence does provide some indication that it is not 
relevant in the case of outsourcing 
 
Table 2.1: Global/Industry Level Environment Characteristics of a Potential 
Outsourcer 
Characteristic of an organisation that is likely to 
consider an outsourcing strategy.
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Part of a Strategy decided in advance by leadership of 
organisation. X
Industry in Mature/Decline Phase defined by: X
   Customer Mass market X X
   Customer brandswitching X X
   Customer selects on basis of price rather than innovation X X
   Reduced expenditure on Research and Development X
   Company seeks cost reductions X
   Expensive to increase market share X
   Profits under pressure from continuing need for investment X
   Price competition may lead to losses or need to cut costs
   drastically in order to maintain profitability X X
   Company may be seeking to exit industry X
A potential threat of new entrants X
Characteristics.xls
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Likewise, the Industry life cycle shows no particular phase as to when an 
outsourcing strategy could be implemented. However the evidence does show a 
bias towards the mature/decline phase. 
The evidence provided so far shows that the industry environment provides the 
major driver for an outsourcing strategy. 
 
2.2 Definition of Outsourcing 
 
The work of Baines et al. (2000) as shown in Appendix 3, provides a 
comprehensive survey of literature with the conclusion that the overall viewpoint 
was somewhat confused. Lankford et al. (1999) provide a clear definition with 
Lonsdale (1999) providing a slight modification by referring to “transfer of 
previously in-house activities to a third party”. Lonsdale’s reference to 
“previously in house activities” is particularly important in that it infers that at 
some time in the past, the outsourcing organisation had a level of competence in 
the activity that is being outsourced. Whilst Lankford et al. (1999) refer to 
external third party sources, Arnold (2000) refers to another perspective whereby 
outsourcing can apply to internal independent business units or joint ventures 
known as Internal Outsourcing. 
In addition to those identified by Baines et al. (2000), Corbett (1999) 
summarises, “Outsourcing is nothing less than the wholesale restructuring of the 
corporation around core competency and outside relationships”. 
From the above summary of definitions, one can observe that the term 
outsourcing can be simply summed up as the provision of products or services by 
a separate organisation. 
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2.3 What to Outsource 
 
“I Keep Six Honest Serving Men. Their names are 
What and Why and When. And How and Where and Who…….” 
                  Rudyard Kipling (1900) 
 
Rudyard Kipling’s words also adopted by Plenert (2002) relating to strategic 
alliances provide a literary and entertaining check list to ensure that the major 
questions have been analysed regarding outsourcing. The questions what, why, 
when, how, where and who will be followed as a check list in order to capture 
the main elements associated with outsourcing. 
Cost and expertise in the form of core competency appear to be the main drivers 
for outsourcing and should therefore play a great part in determining what to 
outsource. This point has been made by Arnold (2000) where he focused on 
these aspects using a transaction cost economics and a core competency 
approach to aid the outsourcing decision but in order to do this the potential 
outsourcer must first of all ascertain its own core competency. The following is a 
review of literature conducted to understand what to potentially outsource 
through the identification of a company’s core and non-core competency. 
 
2.3.1 Generic perspective of core/non-core competency 
 
A review of literature uncovers many views on the definition of Core or Non-
Core activities: 
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Alexander et al. (1996) provide a list of four meanings commonly associated 
with a “core activity” 
(1)  Those traditionally performed in house 
(2)  Those critical to business performance 
(3)  Those that create current or potential competitive advantage; and 
(4)  Activities that will drive further growth, innovation, or rejuvenation 
 
"Those traditionally performed in house ", may be relevant and could be 
applied potentially to both Core and Non-Core competency. For example, Ford 
Motor Company used to manufacture almost 100% of the total vehicle at one 
time including the processing of raw materials associated with the products 
(Womack et al. 1990). Ford, however, would be unique nowadays if it continued 
with these activities which cannot still reasonably be considered traditional to an 
OEM. Whilst traditional activities may be relevant, they do not provide a clear 
direction in definition. 
"Those critical to business performance" provides a more tangible definition 
and is directly associated with "those that create current or potential competitive 
advantage" and "activities that will drive further growth, innovation, or 
rejuvenation". All of these performance characteristics are linked into the 
strategic direction of a company and are based upon activities that provide the 
impetus for future success. 
 
Kruger et al. (1997) stated that core competency combine three elements 
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1. In the eyes of the customers their characteristics must be relevant. They 
differentiate between the company and its competitors. 
2. To gain competitive advantage, resources and know-how for the product 
must be unique over time. It must be possible to protect it against imitation by 
competitors over time. So a competitive advantage must be sustainable 
3. Only if these resources are usable for multiple purposes, they are core 
competency and should remain within a company and should not be 
outsourced. 
 
Again, elements 1 and 2 are in accord with Alexander et al. (1996) but go a little 
further in associating the uniqueness of the core competency. 
Point three, associated with multiple purpose resource provides issues that may 
be in contrast to Kruger et al. (1997) and is not clear on why core resources 
should be usable for multiple purposes, especially if the competency is providing 
a sustainable competitive advantage. 
Quinn (1995) provided a more detailed breakdown of core competency: 
 
 “Core competencies are first and foremost skill- or knowledge-based, not 
product-based". 
 “Core competencies are defined as platforms and are therefore capable of 
evolving" 
 “Core competencies are limited in number" 
 “Core competencies must be in areas that are valuable to the customer"  
 “A Core competency must be in an area where the company can control 
and dominate through its resources"  
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 “A core competency should be embedded in a firm's culture, not housed in 
the heads of one or two of its leaders" 
 
Quinn’s points 4 is aligned with Kruger et al. (1997) with a reference to 
customers and 5 is in accord with both Kruger and Alexander et al. (1996) 
emphasising the importance of competitive advantage. Point 2, whilst appearing 
to be a new element, is in fact related to the "sustainability" and "growth" by the 
two fore-mentioned authors. Whilst points 1 and 6 should not be dismissed they 
emphasise the point that core competency must be real within an organisation 
and not assumed. A highly successful end product, highly desired by customers 
may not automatically mean that the internal organisational that realised the 
product may necessarily have the skills necessary to continue the success of the 
product. 
The three references provided by Quinn (1995), Kruger et al. (1997) and 
Alexander et al. (1996) provide an overview of researched viewpoints. Whilst 
not being totally identical, they do provide a clear indication that they are 
broadly in accord. Additionally, also in accord but providing a more concise 
description, Lonsdale (1999) provides a summation indicator stating that "the 
firm should draw its boundary around those skills and capabilities that are 
responsible for its competitive pre-eminence". 
An important factor, covered in all is recognised with a view to the future 
providing the possibility that core activities may need to change and evolve. 
Similarly, because outsourcing is seen as an opportunity for the future, one must 
also be aware that core activities may need to adapt to change in order to survive 
as a competitive company. 
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The last definition comes from Alexander et al. (1996), “those (non) critical to 
business performance” and “those that (do not) create current or potential 
competitive advantage", This latter scenario is exemplified in the extreme by 
Quinn (1995), citing the fact that Nike, the largest producer of athletic footwear 
in the world does not manufacture a single shoe! 
 
2.3.2 What to outsource: Specificity 
 
Williamson (1989, 1991) and Lonsdale (1999) introduce a further factor to be 
considered in outsourcing known as specificity. Specificity refers to either assets 
or human resource (capability) that are highly specialised i.e. with a high level of 
uniqueness to a particular organisation. This specialised factor being one where 
capital equipment or resource is highly tuned to a customer’s requirements and 
would need redesigning or relocating in order to function for someone else. Both 
Lonsdale and Williamson suggest that only goods/services with low specificity 
should be outsourced, retaining high specificity goods in house. This viewpoint 
could effectively become a block on other viewpoints in that product or service 
deemed non-core and suitable for outsourcing could be viewed as unsuitable 
from Williamson's perspective if specificity was high. 
Both Lonsdale (1999) and Arnold (2000) have elaborated on specificity by 
reflecting it as a key element in their respective outsourcing models. Arnold's 
model identifies the deep core aspects as having high specificity with non-core, 
correspondingly low. The example of Quinn (1995) relating to Nike not making 
shoes would comply with Arnold's model. A similar case of a total de-
materialized company was cited by Woodruff et al. (1996) with an example of 
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Volkswagen's Resende plant in Brazil, owned and manned by seven key 
suppliers. 
Arnold (2000) and Williamson (1989 & 1991) agree that the relationship 
between core and specificity is relevant and should be assessed in any core/non-
core decision. By definition, if something is highly specific to an organisation it 
must be aligned to the uniqueness of the company's final product and therefore 
more likely to be involved within a core competency. Alternatively a non-
organisationally specific commodity or service related competency would likely 
be a non-core and a likely candidate for outsourcing. 
 
2.3.3 What to outsource: Summary 
 
It is evident from the research that the “what to outsource” is clearly defined as 
services and products that are non-core to the outsourcing organisation (Arnold, 
2000) and although this is supported by other leading authors there is some 
disarray in their final definitions of either core or non-core. Whilst it is important 
to know both core and non-core competency within an organisation it is only 
non-core that would be outsourced and therefore it is the latter that would 
provide the basis for further examination within the Thesis. 
Table 2.2 shows a list of the resultant non-core competency identifiers from the 
reviewed literature. Each definition is aligned with appropriate references 
supporting inclusion. 
The identifiers are not in any particular order of importance at this point but 
provided to capture those within academic and industry literature. 
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Table 2.2: Literature Summary of Non Core-Competency Identifiers 
Non Core-Competency 
Identifiers 
Reference 
Low Specificity Williamson, (1989, 1991) 
Arnold (2000) 
Kruger et al. (1997) 
Lonsdale (1999) 
Greater External Expertise Quinn (2000) 
Expertise non-strategic Alexander et al. (1996) 
Kruger et al. (1997) 
Quinn (2000) 
Lonsdale (1999) 
 
2.3.4 Non-core competency: Principal criteria and potential metrics 
 
The non-core competency identifiers presented, whilst providing concise 
definitions need further clarification into understanding how they can be more 
clearly established. In order to accomplish this, the individual identifiers 
illustrated in Table 2.2 were further analysed to establish means of ascertaining 
absolute identification through quantitative or qualitative measures. 
 
2.3.5 Non-core competency drivers: Greater external expertise 
 
In order to ascertain quantitative metrics it is necessary to look at other aspects 
relating to expertise.  
Menzel, (2007) stated that innovations today require unique technical knowledge 
combined with social knowledge in order to be meaningful and useful. Within 
the context of modern industry whereby technology is moving rapidly it must be 
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reasonable to link expertise with innovation in that special skills or knowledge 
are being applied to provide new solutions. 
 
2.3.5.1 Research and development related to innovation 
 
Parasuramen et al. (1983), Franko (1989) and Morbey (1989) identify research 
and development (R&D) budget as the best measure of innovation as firms with 
their own development capability are likely to be more innovative. However an 
examination of product development resource metrics comparing US and 
Japanese suppliers ranging from system tier ones down to low-tier suppliers 
showed little difference in capability related to percentage of dedicated R&D 
heads compared to total company population (Liker et al. 1996). This is in 
contrast to Cozzarin (2006) who identifies a direct relationship between past 
economic performance and innovation. Despite the conflict of previous opinions 
it must be expected that innovative freedom will be greater in companies that 
have greater R&D budgets (Veerker et al. 2004). 
 
2.3.5.2 Patents related to innovation 
 
Pakes et al. (1984) provided evidence for patents as an alternative measure of 
innovation. Similarly Liker et al. (1996) identified a correlation between the 
degree of specialisation within companies and patent activity. Although patents 
appear to be a useful metric, it must be noted that regional splits are identified 
due to the relative high expenditure involved (Liker et al. 1996) and differing 
regional protection rights (Allred et al. 2007). 
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The conclusion that can be drawn from the analysis is that with regional 
variation playing a major part in determining a level of expertise (innovative 
advantage) patents can only therefore be used as a decision influencing metric if 
the suppliers and outsourcer are from the same regions in order to balance results 
uniformly. 
 
2.3.5.3 Benchmarking 
 
In cases of outsourcing whereby patents are not relevant it may be necessary to 
look at the benchmarking process to determine the relative level of expertise of a 
potential supplier to an outsourcer. 
Two definitions are provided in order to establish the relevance to ascertaining 
expertise levels within organisations: 
“Benchmarking is the continuous process of measuring products, services, and 
practices against the toughest competitors or those companies recognised as 
industry leaders” (Kearns, 1986) 
Benchmarking is the search for industry best practices that lead to superior 
performance (Camp, 1989) 
Both definitions clearly identify that benchmarking is relevant to the subject in 
that it can provide metrics of products and services in the context of establishing 
who and what is the best level. This process is very flexible and applicable to 
both internal and competitive organisations (Peterson, 1992), an important aspect 
in that an outsourcer should establish a performance comparison with its 
supplier. 
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Benchmarking appears to be a well recognised and used process with little 
variation shown between authors regarding its application and therefore it 
appears to provide the most appropriate measure of expertise to use generically. 
 
2.3.5 4 Greater external expertise: Summary 
 
Of the three potential methods of substantiating a suppliers greater expertise 
reviewed it appears that all are valid although some caution would be necessary 
regarding patent activity due to regional comparisons identified by Liker et al. 
(1996), Allred et al. (2007) and Pakes et al. (1984).  
Whilst Research and Development budget may be indicative of these 
characteristics (Parasuramen et al. 1993; Franko, 1989; Morbey, 1989) it can be 
misleading through company size differences (Cozzarin, 2006). 
Whilst the benchmarking exercise may provide the most comprehensive 
measurement of expertise, it would be potentially the most expensive of the three 
methods discussed. 
 
2.3.6 Non-core competency identifiers: Expertise non-strategic 
 
Whether or not expertise relating to an outsourced entity is strategic or not is 
very difficult to determine unless it is mentioned or reflected in a way that is 
made clear for all to see. It may be that a strategic direction relating to expertise 
may be indicated in the persona of a company within its core values, company 
mission statement or media releases. If a company is looking at outsourcing a 
particular entity the enablers for this are governed by the management who in 
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turn are also responsible for the company strategy (Mintzberg et al. 1985). It 
would therefore follow that this outsourced entity must by definition be non-
strategic. 
One characteristic that a potential outsourcer may exhibit is a reduced 
expenditure on Research and Development (Lynch, 1997). Therefore even if the 
company has not defined a specific strategy for an entity it may be evident in its 
Research & Development budget. 
 
2.3.6.1 Expertise non-strategic: Summary 
 
The following are two conclusions that may be drawn relating to expertise being 
non-strategic with respect to an outsourced entity: 
 
1. Company strategy is determined by its management and if it decides to 
outsource an entity, the expertise relating to the entity, by definition must be 
non-strategic. 
2. A reduction in R &D budget relating to a particular expertise may be an 
indicator that the expertise is non-strategic. 
 
A defined corporate strategy should provide the best indicator regarding 
“Expertise non strategic” although in the absence of any guidance relating to the 
specific outsourced entity, one must look into other high level corporate 
statements for evidence using mission statements as an example. Typically they 
provide an insight to the deeper corporate philosophy and indications of 
company strategy relating to a potentially outsourced entity. 
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2.3.7 Non-core competency identifiers: Low specificity 
 
Specificity criteria established by Lonsdale (1999), Arnold (2000) and 
Williamson (1989, 1991) are broadly in agreement with each other regarding 
potential guidelines for high or low specificity although perhaps the clearest 
descriptions and hence guidance for evaluation comes from Arnold (2000) and 
Williamson (1989, 1991). 
 
Low Specificity: Can be governed with an external outsourcing design with 
minimal information transfer between partners. 
 
High Specificity: Goods and services with high specificity cannot be used in 
other transactions without huge additional costs. Much information needs to be 
exchanged before, during and after exchange of service/goods. Limited, or 
perhaps even only one potential customer for service or product. 
 
Table 2.3 illustrates the fore-mentioned key characteristics with indicative 
proportions of each related to indicate whether or not a service or product has 
high or low specificity. It provides a very simple tool for quickly providing an 
indication of level of specificity and hence to whether or not a product is suitable 
for outsourcing. 
Using the automotive industry as an example, nowadays even the cheapest cars 
are built to a high level of quality (Reitzle, 2000). Related to this, Haberberg et 
al. (2001) make the point that buyers now have a very strong negotiating 
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Table 2.3: Key Characteristics Defining Specificity 
Outsourced 
Service/Product- 
 
High Specificity 
 
Low Specificity 
Costs to use for other 
purposes  
 
High 
 
Low 
Amount of potential 
customers  
 
Limited 
 
Many 
Data transfer needed 
partner to partner 
 
High 
 
Low 
 
2.4 Why Outsource 
 
position. In order to tackle this problem competitors are looking at operational 
innovation that effectively "passes value to the customer” (Cox, 1999). One of 
these ways is through outsourcing as described by Quinn (1995), Quinn et al. 
(1990) identify that competitive success necessitates a focussed organisation that 
concentrates on the essentials, based upon core skills to deliver maximum value 
to the value chain. By focussing on core skills, an organisation not only 
optimises its performance but also reduces its fixed overheads enabling possible 
re-investment into the company with resultant increased performance. 
Fill et al. (2000) endorses the views of Quinn adding the benefits of reduced 
investments, improved quality and efficiency with reduced internal 
administration problems. 
Beulen et al. (1994) go further by stating that a company has a limited 
investment budget which must be invested in core business activities, the prime 
activity with which the company generates its revenues. “All subsequent 
activities are mainly supportive and should be outsourced". He identifies five 
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main drivers for outsourcing: quality, cost, finance, core business and 
cooperation (Appendix 4). 
It is apparent that the outsourcing drivers are principally efficiencies based upon 
knowledge/expertise related to core competency with improved cost and quality 
providing the potential outcomes. 
 
2.4.1 Benefits of outsourcing 
 
A review of literature indicates the main reason to outsource is to improve 
efficiency with resultant financial advantage and reduced variable cost 
expenditure (Lonsdale et al. 1997). Lau et al. (1997) find a significant 
relationship between global outsourcing and profitability margin where they 
found that Chrysler’s profit margin is four times higher than that of GM due to 
effective global outsourcing strategies through strategic alliances whilst Higgins 
(2001) notes that suppliers are bearing 75% of cost cuts demanded by OEMs. 
 According to Chalos, (1994) and Branda, (1999) increased costs associated with 
conducting non-core activities are providing a driver for outsourcing. Reducing 
the need for high-level specialist knowledge in-house (Stephan, 2000) provides 
the potential opportunity of reducing headcount with a resultant reduction in 
expenses (De Vries et al. 1997). Winder (1994) in quoting Dennis Virag of the 
Michigan based Automotive Consulting Group Inc makes the point that a 
supplier, when given design responsibility is able to improve quality whilst 
reducing costs through the design process. 
The special skills within the supply base developed through broad experience 
with other competitors must provide some advantages but as Lewis et al. (1991) 
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point out, there is a trade-off between lower associated production costs and 
higher monitoring costs. Indeed, Sweet (1994) noted that many organisations 
with little control over their internal organizations see a legally enforceable 
contract with an external supplier as a way of keeping a lid on costs. 
Takeishi (1998) makes a valid point in that outsourcing would not necessarily 
provide a sustainable advantage to an outsourcer over its competitors, principally 
because the suppliers would have similar co-operative relationships with other 
competitors (Takeishi, 1998) 
Increased economy of scale provides a further potential advantage (Fill et al. 
2000) although this normally applies to standardised components although. 
Manion et al. (1993) noted that this was not the case in a survey relating to 
information systems. Where a high degree of customisation (specificity) is 
required it may be more advantageous to produce in house, a view further 
endorsed by Arnold (2000). 
In the survey of Elmuti et al. (2000) to establish the reasons to outsource 
(Appendix 5) followed by further analysis identifying achieved improvements 
over a one year period (Appendix 6), the highest ranking expectation of cost 
reductions provided some performance benefits for 63% of the respondents in 
the form of lower variable costs whereby percentages of actual improvements 
were in the order of 5-10%, less than half of their initial expectations of 20-25% 
savings. Within the survey, it was also reported that 69% of respondents 
indicated that savings and indirect benefits generated by outsourcing programs 
were greater than the cost of implementing these programs.  
Elmuti et al. (2000) also established that quality, whilst being a major expected 
benefit provided the lowest. Referring to Appendix 5 and 6, Quality 
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improvement was seen as the second highest expected outcome due to 
outsourcing and in fact 60% of respondents indicated positive quality effects of 
up to 5%, although this was below their initial 5-10% expectation.  
Confirming the above, Beulen et al. (1994) defined three of their five main 
drivers for outsourcing to include quality, cost, finance (see Appendix 4). Whilst 
this is included in Elmuti et al. (2000) respondents list it is not as comprehensive. 
Kakabadse, (2002) provides a very comprehensive list that provides overlaps to 
the above.  
 
2.4.2 Why outsource: Principal criteria and potential metrics 
 
In order to establish some key potential outcomes, the highest ranked positive 
outcomes by survey respondents provided by Elmuti et al. (2000), Appendix 6 
were used in the ranked order presented as the basis for those to be included 
discussed further and substantiated. The only exception to this is Elmuti’s 
highest ranked criteria i.e. Performance. Because the expected goals by 
respondents are all financially related it has been included as costs, further 
emphasising the expected economic aspects of outsourcing. In order to eliminate 
unnecessary words and descriptions within the ensuing text, the descriptions will 
be abbreviated and made more generic, however they will represent the same 
meaning Elmuti et al. (2000) originally intended. 
Since this survey was based in all major global locations and applied to both 
service and manufacturing organisations of varying size it provides a good 
representation of the likely benefits of outsourcing from a generic perspective. 
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In addition to this, it must be noted that many of the reasons are often 
interdependent, for example a presence in a foreign market may also provide 
new resources and also reduce costs. It is important therefore that no objective is 
looked at in isolation as it may carry advantages or disadvantages in another. 
 
2.4.3 Why outsource: Costs 
 
When establishing what cost should be included within potential positive 
outcome associated with “Why”, it is important to use only costs relevant to 
outsourcing with the exclusion of things that will have to remain in-house. An 
example of this is overheads i.e. items which may also be used for other things or 
sunk costs on things that may remain dormant (Dury, 2001). Typically costs are 
within two major categories; 
 Direct Costs: Assigned to a particular cost object 
 Indirect Costs: Shared with no specific allocation 
 
Using traditional cost accounting terminology these two categories can be 
broken down into the following; 
 Direct Materials:  Associated directly with product 
 Direct Labour: Associated directly with product (Not to include 
supervisors or similar as these are covered as indirect labour. 
 Prime Cost: Total of the above costs 
 Manufacturing Overhead: Includes indirect materials and labour. 
Manufacturing overheads normally cannot be directly linked to products 
and therefore they are typically estimated (cost allocated). 
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 Total Manufacturing Cost: Includes all the above. 
 
The definition of costs from Dury et al. (2001), adds the importance of 
considering time during the measurement of costs.  
 “The planned unit cost of the products, components or services produced in a 
period. The standard cost may be determined on a number of bases. The main 
uses of standard costs are in performance measurement, control, stock valuation 
and in establishment of selling prices”  
The above statement is very important as the costs of a product may vary over 
time due to demand, efficiency of manufacture or many other reasons. Figure 2.3 
illustrates an example of how costs change during the development and 
implementation of an information security system (Warren Axelrod, 2004). The 
development stages provide a significant financial burden on a company at the 
beginning of a project with benefits only coming later. Whilst the example is not  
 
Dev&BenefitsCosts.xls
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Cash 
Flow
Negative 
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Flow
System Use Benefits
System Development 
Costs
Time
 
Figure 2.3: System Development Costs and Benefits Related to Information 
Security System Development Process (Warren Axelrod, 2004) 
 43 
 
generic and actual cost variations may differ from other products or services, it 
does show clearly how costs can change over time, emphasising the point of 
Dury (2001). 
 
2.4.4 Why outsource: Quality 
 
In order to ascertain the benefits of improved quality one must understand what 
quality means. Quality means different things to different people. The 
ASQC/Gallup (1991) survey shown in Appendix 7 identifies a great variation in 
regional perceptions in quality and factors that influence their buying decision. 
Despite this variation it appears that consumers do each have a perception of 
quality that is important to them therefore it is important to establish the expert 
view in order to provide clarity.  
 
Within the definitions provided by Kolarik (1995), below it appears that the 
experts also apparently have different view from not only each other but the 
consumers as well. 
 Quality is fitness for use (Juran, 1989) 
 Quality is conformance to requirements (Crosby, 1979) 
 Quality should be aimed at the needs of the consumer (Deming, 1986) 
 Quality is the loss (from function variation and harmful effects) a product 
causes to society after being shipped (Taguchi, 1986) 
 Quality is the totality of features and characteristics of a product or 
service that bear on its ability to satisfy stated or implied needs (ISO 
9000, 1992)  
 44 
 
Bendell et al. (1998) sum up normal customers and experts with the following 
“Used in its traditional way, quality has often been used to denote excellence, 
beauty or high cost” – “A more useful definition of quality is meeting the 
requirement of the customer.” This summary is clearly in agreement also with 
Monroe-Faure et al. (1992); “To succeed in today’s competitive market place a 
company must supply products and services in accordance with customer’s 
requirements and at minimum cost”  
All experts without exception do agree whether in direct words or implication 
that quality is aimed at the end customer and therefore it follows that metrics 
used within an organisation to reflect end-customer quality should be used as a 
basis for measurement within an outsourcing decision. 
Whilst the definitions of experts and customers may appear different they are 
really in accord in that the expert definitions effectively aim to cover those 
provided by normal customers. The less obvious common definition relating to 
“Well known name” is really based upon direct or indirect positive past 
experience of clearer defined quality aspects as it is highly unlikely that a 
customer would rank highly a well known name associated with a product 
ranked lowly in other quality aspects. 
 
2.4.5 Why outsource: Exposure to technology 
 
The repetitive cycle of technology evolution depicted by Hambrick et al. (1998) 
identifies that technology is constantly changing with incremental changes 
potentially leading to major shifts. Simchi-Levi et al. (2000) when discussing 
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strategic alliances make the point that partnering with a firm that has an 
important expertise enables the parent company to address related technical 
issues in a more competent manner. As an example, Microsoft, in order to 
benefit from local manufacturing expertise, moved its research activities to 
Cambridge (Simchi-Levi, 2000). 
 
2.4.6 Why outsource: Delivery and reliability 
 
Late deliveries and poor quality can severely disrupt operations, driving up 
inventory, cycle times, schedule variations and associated costs (Ruffa et al. 
2000). An example of this is Boeing who in 1997 announced a “write off” of 
$2.6 billion due to shortages and productivity inefficiencies (Wall Street Journal. 
1997). 
Waters (2003) makes the point that suppliers should “deliver reliably, on time 
with short lead times” and using logistics as an example comes up with some 
potential benefits. Good logistics reduces stock levels (inventory) and related 
costs freeing up cash for other purposes and potentially increases sales by 
making product more readily available. 
 
2.3.7 Why outsource: Gain resources 
 
Elmuti et al. (2000) describes this as gaining the benefit of resources that are not 
available and uses the example of a way of countering an outsourcing company’s 
inability to hire employees. In fact resources and therefore potential benefits 
cover a greater array than those mentioned by Elmuti. Azzone et al. (1995) 
 46 
described critical resources as those that are “scarce, defendable, difficult to 
market and initiate and hence usable as the basis for long term competitive 
advantage”. He goes on further by categorising them into four groups and 
provides some examples of each; 
 
 Technology – patents, manufacturing processes, registered designs. 
 Brand – customer awareness ratings and customer retention rates 
 People and organisation – quantity of skilled employees  
 Capital – company assets. 
 
Whilst technology has already been mentioned as a potential outsourcing 
advantage by Elmuti et al. (2000), it is interesting to see it mentioned by Azzone 
et al. related to resources. This actually shows as mentioned previously that 
many of the elements listed are somewhat interdependent, further exemplified by 
Simchi-Levi (2000) who also make the point that strategic alliances do provide 
the opportunity to gain a particular expertise to overcome technological 
challenges. 
Using the Elmuti et al. (2000) example relating to employees it is clear that the 
most common perception of resources is related to people i.e. human resources. 
Macpherson (2001) breaks human resources down into three areas and provides 
some potential metrics; 
 
 Functional: Employment efficiency and effective turnover, cost per hire, 
grievances. 
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 Operational: Revenue per employee, operating cost/term, recruiting 
costs relative return on investment (ROI), results of benefits packages, 
diversity programmes 
 Strategic: Demographics, current staffing against future needs 
 
2.4.8 Why outsource: Access to materials 
 
Similarly to gaining resources or new technologies, an organisation may be able 
to gain greater access to materials by sourcing to a company that already has 
them. Materials could potentially fall into the realms of intellectual property or 
raw/final product materials although the latter would more logically be included 
within technology. 
 
2.4.9 Why outsource: Presence in a foreign market 
 
Simchi-Levi et al. (2000), when discussing strategic alliances makes the point 
that a benefit of producing in a particular region may be improved advertising 
with increased access to new market channels. A presence may also provide a 
way of overcoming the costs associated with import taxes/tariffs (Renert, 2002). 
 
2.4.10 Why outsource: Market flexibility 
 
Uncertainty in markets is prevalent in modern day industries. Customers are 
constantly changing preferences whilst brands are competing in a crowded 
market (Fassnacht, 2007). Product market flexibility: “The ability of product 
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markets to act as an adjustment mechanism to accommodate shocks and long 
term structural changes in the economy”, (Scopulus, 2008) is a potential 
advantage of outsourcing due to the enhanced independence resultant from 
divesting the organisation of non-core tasks. 
 
2.4.11 Why outsource: Skills/knowledge rationalisation 
 
Outsourcing or indeed any other strategic alliance allows the pooling of 
knowledge to overcome barriers and explore new opportunities (Simchi-Levi et 
al. 2000) which may be of particular benefit when associated with rapid changes 
in technology. 
 
2.4.12 Why outsource: Capital funding re-allocation 
 
Any form of change in business direction provides the opportunity to re-allocate 
funding previously associated with the task involved. Outsourcing does provide 
this opportunity also although there may be some risk in immediately re-
assigning all the associated capital as some may be required to mitigate the risk 
in future if the outsourcing goes wrong. It is therefore important that this is 
related to outsourcing “when risk intensity is low” (Quinn, 2000) 
 
2.4.13 Why outsource: Competitive position 
 
Plenert (2002) provides an interesting explanation of this aspect illustrated by a 
simple chart based upon “the law of comparative advantage”, Table 2.4. The 
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chart is the basis for his explanation and provides a comparison of the cost of 
labour and a simple product, an apple, in the United States of America and 
Mexico. 
 
Table 2.4: Chart to Explain the Law of Comparative Advantage (Plenert, 2002) 
Labour Costs Apples
United States $25/hour $0.30
Mexico $1.50/hour $0.25
 
 
Despite the example indicating that both apples and labour would best be 
provided by Mexico it also shows in real terms it shows that USA produces 
apples more efficiently. Plenert makes the point that international 
competitiveness is driven by technical considerations and that the United States 
is the leader in 11 of the world’s industrial sectors with Japan providing 
leadership in the remaining 2 and that the United States whilst being an excellent 
innovator is not so good as turning ideas into products. The Japanese however 
are the opposite and excel at manufacturing. Other advantages in competitive 
position may arise from sourcing in countries that have stable inflation rates, a 
foothold in emerging markets and lower trade balance obstacles or import tariffs. 
For example companies exporting to Europe must have European based 
production facilities in order to avoid tax tariffs (Renert, 2002). 
The conclusion from the fore-mentioned examples is that outsourcing can 
provide an advantage by capitalising on generic competency and governmental 
policy that may be available in other regions of the world. 
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2.5 When to Outsource 
 
Research has identified that external influences may dictate the optimal time to 
initiate an outsourcing initiative. The following indicators of "When to 
outsource” also illustrates some advantages and disadvantages. According to 
Quinn (2000), there are seven drivers as to when it is appropriate to outsource. 
These drivers will be used as a basis for further discussion in the following 
chapters. 
When supplier margins are limited Here, Quinn (2000) view seems to indicate 
that if a supplier is working on a limited margin, i.e. presumably less than the 
outsourcing company's it would be advantageous to outsource and therefore 
either capitalise on this and provide relief on internal resources tied up with a 
task providing little profit via sales. There is a contrasting view as shown in the 
following example; Taking into account 2000 Financial results of OEM Ford 
related to two key suppliers, Ford attained 3.7% (Morningstar, 2009) compared 
to 1.5% for Visteon, (Visteon (2000) and 8.3% for Textron (Textron, 2000). 
Whereas Visteon may possibly meet Quinn’s (2000) criteria, surely an 
alternative view may indicate that based upon equal cost submissions, Textron 
may be a much more favourable alternative on the basis that they are operating at 
higher efficiency as indicated by the higher return on sales. 
Arnold (2000) identifies that a lower specificity product typically means that the 
external purchasing opportunities are increased which. This in turn provides 
greater competition hence lower margins. Since specificity has already been 
discussed, this Quinn (2000) point is already been taken into consideration. 
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When Markets are efficient is backed up with a comment that "In truth, 
markets are never totally efficient, so the best outsourcing opportunities occur in 
the markets closest to this extreme where there are numerous suppliers in 
competition with each other" (Quinn, 2000). Again, market efficiency can be 
linked with specificity in that greater efficiency can be obtained when specificity 
is low. 
 
2.5.1 When to outsource: Volatility is high 
 
Tyson (1998) in talking about the 21
st
 century provides many examples of 
potential issues, commenting that rate of change will constantly increase with 
environment and energy becoming major issues. Hambrick et al. (1998) at an 
industry level states that the most important changes in industry are caused by 
the emergence of global competition, new technology and public policy. Both 
identify that volatility will effect many organisations over the coming years. 
Outsourcing when volatility is high is highly justified as it provides a risk 
sharing element with the suppliers. 
 
2.5.2 When to outsource: Fast moving technology 
 
Quinn's (2000) fourth point is exemplified by fast repetitive iterations of new 
technology in parallel with increased costs. According to Hambrick et al. (1998), 
technology constantly moves and changes through given cycles. Typically a 
product goes through a cycle of evolution that finally ends when there is new 
technological momentum caused by new architectural innovation with the 
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simpler moving at the fastest rates. This turnover of technology can provide a 
large drain on financial resources within an organisation and outsourcing or 
some other form of partnering may provide a way of reducing the burden of risk 
and development costs. 
On the basis of the above comments and assuming that the technological moves 
are in areas of non-core activity, Quinn’s (2000) opinion is valid. 
 
2.5.3 When to outsource: High internal costs 
 
Leuliette, (2002) stated that the "traditional Big Three" (GM, Daimler Chrysler 
and Ford) are “high-cost producers, and carry cost penalties in management 
overhead, labour and benefits”, further adding. “The big 3 cannot return to their 
past glory by having the supply community financially subsidize their inability to 
address their own problems" Quinn's (2000) point needs no further explanation 
other than that the cost must be high relative to the supplier to be fully justified. 
Quinn (2000) points out that most companies despite providing a large focus on 
externally sourced costs have little knowledge of their own internal costs. 
Despite this Quinn’s (2000) driver regarding when to outsource is clearly valid. 
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2.5.4 When to outsource: Risk intensity is low 
 
Quinn (2000) suggests the best time to outsource is when it is possible to 
outsource in steps, when there is a possibility to reverse the initiative or when 
there is a sound fall back plan. 
From the perspective that outsourcing like any other strategy has the potential to 
be a failure it is highly likely that an organisation would want to consider it 
without some form of backup plan. Therefore, the comment is justifiable. 
 
2.5.5 When to outsource: Chance of strategic block. 
 
Slack et al. (2002) makes the point that market forces that have made a supplier 
successful also typically make them more profitable. Outsourcing could 
ultimately have a negative effect on the outsourcing company to the extent that 
its long term sustainability may be weakened. Two examples of the Slack' et al. 
comment are provided by Simchi-Levi et al. (2000): 
 Toshiba manufactured copiers for 3M but is now a supplier of their own 
Toshiba branded copiers. 
 Hitachi once manufacturing under licence for Motorola now makes its 
own microprocessors 
 
Quinn (2000) defines the strategic block as an intellectual competency that is not 
available to the supplier, which effectively minimizes the risk of the supplier 
gaining any strategic ground over the OEM. Effectively this strategic block 
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would be an intellectual core competency that provides a direction for an 
outsourced non-core activity.  
A clearer definition here would be that the outsourcer should only outsource if 
key controlling competency are retained in-house in order to stop the supplier 
from becoming a potential competitor. 
 
2.6 How to Outsource 
 
Whilst some discussion regarding the “how” to outsource has been provided, the 
depth of investigation and field of expertise is not within the remit of this Thesis 
but it is clear that the control of the outsourcing process can play a major factor 
with the ultimate success of the outcome. 
Without going into the depths of how to run a business, the process how to 
outsource must be viewed as a combination of the key elements within the 
outsourcing process i.e. the elements relating to the managing of a business that 
are unique to the outsourcing process. 
 
2.7 Where to Outsource 
 
Dobler et al. (1990) suggest that “where” to purchase is potentially one of three 
geographic areas, each providing certain advantages and disadvantages. Dobler 
et al. (1990) logically covers buying locally, nationally and internationally, each 
of which carries potential advantages which have been identified in Table 2.5. 
Obviously for a potential buyer, the most desirable advantages would be selected 
although it is more likely that a company may capitalise on other synergies such 
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as similarly located production facilities in order to capitalise on reduced 
logistical costs. 
Table 2.5: Where to Outsource 
Where 
Buying Location: Potential Advantages: 
Local 
 
Close co-operation due to geography 
Delivery more certain as transportation effect is minor 
Lower prices can result due to consolidated transportation 
Shorter lead times (JIT – Just In Time) 
Rush orders likely to be faster 
Disputes resolved easier 
Implied social responsibility to community is fulfilled 
National 
 
Often higher quality/better price through economies of 
scale 
Often supply superior technical assistance 
Greater production capacity and therefore greater 
capability in handling fluctuating demands 
Less shortages due to broader markets 
International 
 
Much variability due to individual location’s 
performance but some advantages; 
Quality 
Timelines 
Cost 
New technology 
Broadening supply base 
Counter-trade 
 
Other aspects for buying internationally are financial incentives and the benefits 
of highly educated workforces as exemplified by Hong-Kong and Malaysia, 
possibly benefitting from a potential for the outsourcing organisation to learn 
from an educated workforce with a particular expertise for certain tasks (Plenert, 
2002). Alternatively, in order to capitalise on a technology change, sourcing to a 
region with a known reputation for rapid implementation of new production like  
Taiwan could be advantageous. 
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2.7.1 Where to outsource: Summary 
 
Table 2.5 illustrated a summary of the potential sourcing locations (Dobler et al. 
1990) with potential advantages. The list is logical and comprehensive and 
appeared to represent the body of literature reviewed. 
 
2.8 Who to Outsource to 
 
Globalisation has changed the world of business and increased competition 
amongst suppliers making them more aggressive for business (Chopra et al. 
2004). Within the research so far the “who” aspect has been partially answered. 
From the perspective of establishing greater external expertise and having a 
perception of the potential advantages one must already have a good idea who 
the potential suppliers are. One must assume that beyond these, it is within 
normal business practices and criteria not necessarily associated within 
outsourcing that should dictate who to buy the outsourced product or service 
from. At this point, the literature review becomes more directly associated with 
who to outsource to including some guidance as how to find potential suppliers. 
Riggs (1997) through case study identified that suppliers fell into three groups ( 
 Suppliers with clear competitive advantage in cost or product uniqueness 
 Suppliers with declining competitive advantage and products comparable 
to other marketplace offerings 
 Suppliers with questionable competitive advantage but acquainted with a 
senior officer in the business. 
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The first two groups appear reasonable observations with the third clearly 
indicating a potential corrupt element. This potentially corrupt element may be 
true but clearly a supplier should be awarded business on real competitive 
advantages that should have associated metrics. 
Bryson et al. (2004) describe difficulties in measuring expertise and offers the 
suggestion that an outsourcer should utilise suppliers that are known and trusted 
using repeat business and third party referrals as a good indicator, however if 
these are unavailable, another source of guidance would be necessary. Clearly 
the obvious choice to outsource to would be “Suppliers with clear competitive 
advantage in cost or product uniqueness”. In order to identify such supplier's data 
must be evaluated in order to establish who fits this description. Baily et al. 
(1990) provides a list of traditional evaluation criteria namely, quality, quantity, 
timing, service and price which whilst still provides insufficient detail into what 
to examine. England (1967) in his description of a good supplier provides an 
expanded list that includes a final note that a good suppliers interests are best 
served when he best serves his customers, an interesting aspect that is can be 
viewed as all encompassing. Baily et al.(1990) provides a more detailed and 
informative list of characteristics that should be measured to find a good supplier 
which also provides a great deal of alignment with England (1967) 
Lonsdale (1999) identifies examples of supplier accreditation and performance 
criteria used by Hewlett-Packard (Appendix 9). Lonsdale’s criteria are generally 
aligned with those previously discussed but introduce technology as a category. 
Whilst this appears new, when taken into consideration with definitions of 
quality by Juran (1989), Crosby (1979) and those of normal customers; 
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ASQC/Gallup (1991) technology is very much linked to quality because it aims 
at satisfying the needs of the end customer. 
It is apparent from the research that the fore-mentioned opinions relating to 
supplier selection are in accord both with requirements and potential metrics. 
Those criteria and metrics suitable to each outsourcing situation would comprise 
of a filtered list from those within this chapter. 
 
2.8.1 Where to search for potential suppliers 
 
Assuming the outsourcer has not had the benefit or experience of others to 
recommend potential suppliers (Bryson et al. 2004); there would be a 
requirement to use other search methods. Using the same criteria as for finding 
suitable competitors/suppliers for benchmarking purposes, Bendell et al. (1998) 
suggest using databases to find suitable companies, recommending particularly 
the Dialog service, “World’s largest” which has access to over 450 databases. 
Chang et al. (1995) provide a comprehensive list of potential search methods 
which covers the body of literature reviewed. 
 
2.8.2 Who to outsource to: Summary 
 
In order to clarify who to outsource to, Table 2.6 was developed. The first 
column simply provides a list of potential sources of information to find a 
suitable supplier, a fairly comprehensive list provided by Chang et al.(1995) 
Supplier requirements, provided in the second column come from a collective 
list provided by academic and industry level papers alike. 
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Table 2.6: “Who” to outsource to 
Who 
How to find Potential Suppliers: Supplier Requirements: 
Total quality orientation 
Trade magazines 
Industry publications 
Professional journals 
Market Research 
Government Studies 
Computer databases 
Telephone Mail Services 
Benchmarking experts and consultants 
Organisations specialising in 
benchmarking data 
 
Financially, Technically and 
Production viability 
Ability to act as a full partner through 
all phases 
Openly share information 
(Requirements, cost and quality 
targets) 
Active in cost reduction and product 
improvement 
Ability to develop prototypes and 
production 
Prepared to agree cost targets 
Works jointly to increase flexibility on 
parts delivery 
Sound business sense and attitude 
Good track record in supplying the 
buyer’s market 
Suitable technical capability and 
modern facilities 
Total quality orientation 
Cost effective management 
Effective purchasing (Acquisition and 
control) 
Good morale among work-force 
Effective logistical arrangements 
A customer service mentality 
 
2.9 Risks Associated with Outsourcing 
 
The outsourcing initiative requires a dependency on a third party, i.e. the supplier 
and therefore the supplier and related communication link may provide a new 
element of added risk. Importantly, as Arnold (2000) states, “the companies 
competitive advantage relies on supplier’s abilities" and Elmuti et al. (2000) 
“outsourcing usually reduces a company’s control over how certain services are 
delivered, which in turn may raise the company’s liability exposures". Their 
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survey identified that both with successful and unsuccessful outsourcing, poor 
choice of outsourcing partners was one of the highest reported problems 
(Appendix 8). This may be attributed to some suppliers being unready for this 
challenge and rather than formulating long term strategies they are adopting 
short term reactive responses to customer demands (Oakes et al. 1999).  
 
2.9.1 Loss of corporate knowledge and supplier opportunism 
 
Suppliers have conflicting interest in maximising profits (Lacity et al. 1995) and 
Lonsdale (1999) comments that many firms complain of supplier opportunism, 
explained by Vining et al. (1999) when one party, in this case, the supplier, acts 
self interestedly. This can happen in the case of multiple suppliers pointing 
finger of blame when respective products do not align as intended (Smith et al. 
1997). 
Another potential manifestation of opportunism may occur at the conclusion of a 
successful programme whereby an expiring supplier having gained superior 
knowledge will not be able to feed this knowledge into subsequent programmes 
unless reselected (Lonsdale, 1999). To gain maximum benefit from an 
outsourcing situation, the outsourcer must be clearly aware of the risks of 
suppliers absorbing knowledge gleaned from a programme with all its potential 
implications, thereby suggesting that there may be some advantage in retaining 
some corporate knowledge of out-sourced activities. 
Anderson et al. (2000), provide an example of a counter-opportunism force with 
the supplier's expectation of future transactions reputational consequences. 
Williamson (1979) suggests that opportunism is only a threat when there are a 
 61 
small number of available suppliers, hence reinforcing the Anderson et al. (2000) 
argument in that with a large supply base, the outsourcer would have many 
opportunities to resource if they were unhappy with opportunistic activity. 
Globerman (1995) introduces the relationship between complexity and 
opportunism whereby the supplier through in depth knowledge of task 
complexity will have an advantage over the outsourcing company. Similarly 
Arnold (2000) identifies high specificity in designs as a cause for high 
outsourcing costs due to increased communication level. 
Relating to this, Gamble (1995) in suggesting one of four questions before 
making an outsourcing decision asks, “What dependence on a third party will be 
created by outsourcing, and how vulnerable would the organization be if that 
third party somehow become unable to perform as expected?” Additionally 
(McCarthy, 1996) asked “If I outsource with a vendor, am I locked into that 
vendor or " how can I make a change in corporate direction and decide to in-
source at some point in the future, or change to a second vendor?" Lonsdale 
(1999) poses the question how can an organisation counter the opportunism 
threat of a supplier who has retained more competitive knowledge than the 
outsourcer at the end of a programme? (Lonsdale, 1999). 
To overcome the potential risk of supplier opportunism one must look at the 
potential of “contestability”, (Vining et al. 1999), within the outsourcing 
organisation, i.e. How to provide intelligent scrutiny of supplier claims and 
activities. The means to introduce contestability within the outsourcer is to either 
retain expert knowledge in-house, use external third party sources or admit 
defeat and revert to the initial situation by back-sourcing. Delaney (1999) 
suggests a company should retain an element of expertise in order to provide a 
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credible threat. Task complexity and difficulty in measuring task performance, 
two attributes associated with transaction costs provided by Milgrom et al. 
(1992) are clear examples whereby retained expertise could mitigate 
opportunism risks. Walker et al. (1984) observes additional factors that effect 
transaction costs are supplier market competition and uncertainty with final 
product volume and design changes. The first point, also made by Lonsdale 
(1999) recommends that great care be taken when outsourcing into a supply 
market that has a small number of suppliers in order to reduce potential for 
opportunism. 
Further mitigation of opportunism may be achieved through multiple vendors 
(Quinn, 2000) whereby no single supplier has all the appropriate capabilities. An 
example of this is the dual-sourcing as practised by Hewlett Packard, (Lonsdale, 
1999) whereby similar technologies are provided by competing suppliers such 
that each could be switched to or from at very short notice. 
Research identifies that supplier opportunism is a clear risk to outsourcing 
success, particularly where there are few competitive suppliers to choose from. 
An outsourcer must fully understand the areas where they may be vulnerable and 
take suitable steps such as retaining internal expertise or introducing competitive 
suppliers to counter this. 
 
2.10 Management of the Outsourcing Process: Contracts and Specifications 
 
Clearly the discussion on supplier opportunism provides a logical lead in to the 
management process associated with outsourcing. It is also clear that in any 
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business activity involving external resources that some form of contract should 
exist that involves incentives and penalties. In fact  
Burdon et al. (2005) with evidence from a survey saw that many companies view 
contract management is a core competency with further evidence supporting the 
view that management skills for alliance contracts were complex and hard to 
develop and implement. Fan (2000) in another survey identified that 
improvement of specifications and project management was the second most 
important factor following the supplier selection process. Sweet (1994) makes 
the comment, “When it comes to signing the contract, some companies are in 
danger of signing a blank cheque, they often feel it is too difficult to sort out 
exactly what should be provided in detail, and it is too easy for the suppliers to 
simply say trust the other side”. 
Contracts should anticipate all potential opportunism costs (Vining et al. 1999) 
and further reduce co-ordination costs (Williamson, 1979). Coase, (1937) goes 
further by stating that contracts should recognise strategies to address all 
potential contingencies. Crowley (1999) suggests that more planning that is done 
for risk factors prior to implementation provides a greater probability of success. 
Clearly, the drafting of a contract is potentially a daunting task exemplified by 
Lonsdale (1993) that contracts are often blank where uncertainty is greatest. 
 
2.11 Employee Relations 
 
Elmuti et al. (2000) reporting that even successful outsourcing companies 
identified that fear of change, including fear of job loss as the most serious 
problem facing global sourcing efforts. In accord with this, Malhorta (1997) 
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makes the point that global outsourcing can lead to a “decline in morale and 
performance of remaining employees”. Managing through communication and 
honesty was found to be very important in dealing with these fears (Elmuti et al. 
2000; Jones, 1997; Perrone, 1997; Quinn, 1999a; Fill et al. 2000).  
In contrast to the potential fears exhibited by the outsourcer employees, the 
perspectives of supplier employees are understandably much more positive often 
behaving as if they are employees of the outsourcing company (Curtis, 2000). 
Employee relations are highly effected by outsourcing and major cost factors 
should be considered as part of the decision (Quinn, 2000; Hall et al. 1995; 
Domberger, 1998). 
 
2.12 Critical Review of Existing Outsourcing Models 
 
Within the literature review, three models were identified that had potential to be 
used as a high level guide to outsourcing; however none was found that fully 
captured all necessary elements or could be used without additional detailed 
research. They all lacked a combination of comprehensive coverage of criteria 
identified within the literature and key characteristics that would enable their 
identification.  
Arnold (2000) provided the most comprehensive model (Figure 2.4) which 
although targeting the outsourcing of design, covers important elements of what 
to outsource as revealed through research. 
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Figure 2.4: Model for Outsourcing Design. (Arnold, 2000) 
 
 Clearly Arnold has captured core competency and its importance to a company 
in accord with the views Kruger et al. (1997) and Lonsdale (1999). He has also 
captured specificity in further accord with Lonsdale (1999), Williamson (1989, 
1991). Despite this the model overlooks the important aspect relating to risk 
mitigation through selecting the appropriate time to outsource (Quinn, 2000). 
Whilst reviewing industry life stages (Lynch, 1997) and the seven drivers 
(Quinn, 2000) it was identified that although the outsourcing option could be 
taken at any time in a corporate life cycle or set of conditions, it was likely that 
there were optimal times. Similarly the model lacks any reference to the 
importance of establishing objectives of outsourcing in order to understand why 
outsourcing should be implemented. In common with the other models, Arnold’s 
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did not provide a format that was easily followed to test specific cases and 
appeared to be more an overview of related criteria than a practical tool. 
McIvor’s model, Figure 2.5, "A practical framework for evaluating the 
outsourcing decision", provides a very high level overview of the outsourcing 
decision. 
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Figure 2.5: A practical framework for evaluating the outsourcing decision 
(McIvor, 2000) 
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For example whilst showing clearly that core and non-core activities are very 
important and must be established, there is no guidance as to how they should be 
defined. Similarly, although the important element regarding reasons to 
outsource is indirectly defined in Stages 2 and 3 through benchmarking of value 
chain activities, there is no guidance on what should be analysed and how. These 
stages also does not address that there may be other reasons to outsource. Elmuti 
et al. (2000) identified in a survey that other similarly important reasons to 
outsource were quality improvement and exposure to worldwide technology and 
delivery and reliability improvements, none of which are reflected n McIvor's 
model. 
The model of Lonsdale (1999), "A Risk Management Model for Outsourcing" 
(Figure 2.6) whilst included in this discussion is not designed as an outsourcing 
decision model but was included because it did appear to cover some important 
aspects within it. Although "Core, Non-Core" or "Specificity" remains 
unmentioned anywhere on the Lonsdale's model, they are implied within the 
definitions, however similar to the other two models it is very much an n 
overview and designed to clarify a route for risk managing an outsourcing 
process. 
Related to the models, further work provided by Beulen et al. (1994) and Quinn 
(2000) for example provided invaluable data for comprehensive guidance to a 
potential outsourcer; however the data was provided in elements as opposed to a 
total model and therefore was not suitable to be used for the case studies without 
the further work developed within this research. 
The above is not a criticism of the various authors referred to within this text. All 
inputs were invaluable sources of information, however, the comments clearly 
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show that they were not suitable in their entirety for the purposes of this 
research. 
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Figure 2.6: A Risk Management Model for Outsourcing (Lonsdale 1999) 
 
2.13 Statement of Characteristics: Outsourcing as a Corporate Strategy 
 
Some key points are captured here that were collected through the reviewed 
literature; 
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 Outsourcing is a potential strategy affected by the Global Environment 
but predominantly driven by the forces within the Industrial Environment 
it operates.  
 It cannot be viewed as a strategy that will provide a sustainable 
competitive advantage as it is a strategy that can easily be copied by 
competitors. 
 The strategy is one that can be utilised any time within the life cycle of an 
industry but it is more likely to be adopted in the Mature/Declining 
phases. 
 
2.14 The Link between Specificity and Commonality 
 
With respect to case study 4, it was necessary to conduct further research relating 
to the link between specificity and commonality and its relationship to 
outsourcing potential. The term “commonality” within the following discussion 
can be viewed as standardisation either at company or industry level. The review 
of literature relating to outsourcing poses many considerations regarding what to 
outsource and levels of specificity (Arnold, 2000), quantity of potential suppliers 
(Williamson, 1979) and the effect on final transaction costs relating to the 
potential pitfall of supplier opportunism. Additional considerations relating to 
use of outside suppliers are that of the push for component sharing and 
commonality of parts within an OEM all can have a bearing on the level of 
success in an outsourcing scenario. Commonality (standardisation) and 
specificity are very closely linked. One can only assume that reducing the 
specificity of a service or commodity can make it more applicable to an 
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outsourcing situation i.e. making it non-core. In reducing specificity, a service or 
commodity becomes closer to a standardised or commonised entity. 
Some of these aspects will be discussed in the following chapter followed by a 
further case study (4) related to outsourcing of intellectual competency regarding 
one particular standardised commodity to two competing suppliers. 
 
2.15 Commonality and Platform Sharing 
 
“The cost of non-standardisation has been put at about $10 billion to the industry 
or $200 per car” (Kimberley, 2000). Probably the most well known drive for 
commonality (standardisation) is that of Volkswagen which currently shares 
70% of parts across their platforms (Wards Auto, 2001). Peugeot are taking this 
further with a projected 85% commonality targeted for 2004 within their shared 
platform strategy (Automotive News, 2001a). Potentially the most efficient 
method of utilising the concept of commonality is to re-use existing components 
and reap benefits in reduced tooling, design, improved reliability efficiency and 
increased speed to market (Clark et al. 1991). 
"The first step to profit from economies of scale is to standardise the parts 
bought from the supply market, e.g. use the same door handles for all car 
models" (Arnold, 2000). Siddique et al. (1998) define standardisation as the main 
concept behind platform engineering. 
Economies of scale are beneficial particularly where tooling, plants and facilities 
are already available but this concept pushes one in the direction of a single 
supplier, in potentially one location. For large global OEMs, the likelihood of 
one supplier plant providing cost effective components for entire global 
 71 
automotive manufacturing facilities is severely limited particularly where 
components are large and unwieldy and shipping costs may be prohibitive. 
Where there is a clear financial advantage to increase manufacturing capacity a 
situation arises whereby one can consider alternative suppliers even if they are 
making standardised components identical to a competitor. 
The theory of outsourcing of lower specificity parts (Arnold, 2000) does lend 
itself to the theory of standardisation in that if an OEM requires a generic 
product e.g. a battery, tyre or roller bearing, should be outsourced along with the 
intellectual knowledge associated with the detailed design and specification 
albeit with some internal controls remaining. The components listed despite 
being of low specificity are in fact manufactured by many large well known 
suppliers to the industry. This identifies that standardised components can be 
effectively made by multiple suppliers and subsequently provide a competitive 
situation to the advantage of the OEM purchasing department. 
 
2.16 Summary: Subject Matter Literature Review within Chapter 2 
 
Chapter 2 has provided a broad overview of outsourcing with an investigation 
into the various environments it is influenced by and operates in. The effects of 
suppliers, customers and competitors as indicated by Porter’s five forces all have 
the potential to influence an outsourcing decision and ultimately decide its 
success. Clearly there are benefits and risks involved with outsourcing, there are 
no guarantees that it will succeed. This additional research will provide an order 
and structural elements necessary to build a generic outsourcing model that will 
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cover key considerations and guidance into making an informed decision taking 
into account the risks and potential advantages. 
The link between outsourcing, specificity and the modern trend of platform 
engineering, dependent upon commonality provides an added dimension to 
outsourcing that will not be developed further within this Thesis although the 
Author thought it important to point out the linkage. This linkage provides a 
useful hypothesis for further research in that by lowering specificity, 
commodities develop more commonality by definition which further lends itself 
towards platform engineering. It follows therefore that by re-engineering to 
decrease specificity in a commodity provides a positive edge to provide more 
competiveness through commonality. In addition the reduction in specificity also 
increases the scope for further outsourcing. 
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Chapter 3: METHODOLOGY 
 
This Chapter covers the methodologies employed within this research including 
associated new literature review where necessary. The methodology will be 
covered in two parts, the first based upon the research process methodology and 
the second covering the methodologies employed within it. 
 
3.1 Research Process Methodology 
 
The preceding Chapter 2 covered the literature review based upon the aims and 
objectives defined in Chapter 1. The review built up a comprehensive knowledge 
of generic outsourcing including What, Why, When, How and Where and a 
review of existing outsourcing decision models in order to construct an 
outsourcing decision model that provided comprehensive coverage of researched 
findings. 
 
3.1.1 Development of Synthesised Outsourcing Decision Model 
 
Within the following Chapter 4, an outsourcing decision model was developed 
which was based upon What, Why etc. Each criterion was evaluated theoretically 
based upon the literature and ultimately excluded or included based upon 
individual merit. In addition, relevant criteria were populated with examples of 
potential metrics based upon further research. Within this process, in order to 
provide an order of importance of either criteria or potential metrics, Kepner 
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Tregoe analysis was used. Chapter 3.2.5 provides an in depth review of Kepner-
Tregoe analysis. 
 
3.1.2 Validation of Outsourcing Decision Model 
 
In order to validate the developed outsourcing decision model it is important to 
establish that the selected means of validation is optimised in order to reflect 
academic rigour within the limited resources available to collect and analyse 
data. The model, in that it will be developed in the format that provide the basis 
for a workable "tool" with question/decision prompters and metrics provides a 
logical basis to be used within real case studies whereby the format can be 
followed and populated with real life data. This approach is supported by Stuart 
(2002) stating that case studies are much more likely to increase dissemination 
success. Nagel (1961), relating to operations management, further adding that 
they contribute to theory building in situations that have not been empirically 
tested, providing an approach that attempts to ground theoretical concepts with 
reality (Stuart, 2002). Potential criteria involved in an outsourcing decision 
provides many factors that could effect success over a period of time therefore it 
is important to consider as many as possible in order to understand those that 
may be most important. Voss et al. 2002 makes the point that in such 
circumstances retrospective case studies provide the means to provide evidence 
of success or failure. 
In recognition that the likelihood was that case studies would be bounded within 
the Author's parent company, in order to ensure greater access to relevant 
supportive raw data, it was important to ensure that this did not ultimately 
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provide sub-optimal overall conclusions. Voss et al. 2002, suggests that for given 
resources, fewer case studies allow for greater depth whilst Mukherjee et al. 
2000, make the point that single cases may allow several contexts to be studied. 
However, whilst few case studies may provide these benefits, Voss et al also is 
supported by Jick (1979) and Denzin (1978) in that triangulation with other case 
studies increases overall validity. 
 
3.1.3 Case Study Validation 
 
The following provides a summary of the main points derived from the reviewed 
literature above. It will provide guidelines to the selection and application of case 
studies as a means of validation within this Thesis. 
 
 A case study approach provides potential for greater dissemination 
success through empirical research based upon real situations (Nagel, 
1961 and Stuart, 2002) 
 Fewer case studies allow for greater in-depth research with the possibility 
to address a greater quantity of contexts (Voss et al, 2002 and Mukherjee 
et al. 2000). 
 Triangulation of results provides a means of strengthening results in 
situations where case studies are limited (Jick, 1979 and Denzin, 1978). 
 Retrospective case studies are particularly effective in situations whereby 
success or failure are critical outcomes (Voss et al. 2002). 
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Based upon a combination of the above evidence and availability of resources, 
the following cases will be used to validate the research derived outsourcing 
decision model: 
 
Case Study 1: Comparison of OEMs represented in case studies with 
three major competitors relating to the outsourced entity. This will also 
provide triangulation (Jick, 1979 and Denzin, 1978) with the findings of Case 
Studies 2 and 3 to consolidate validation. 
 
This case study is carried out first in order to provide a broad illustration of 
the environment the subject outsourcer is working in. It does not provide the 
strongest validation as it will be based upon a theoretical review of evidence 
available within the public domain in alignment with the criteria presented in 
the researched outsourcing decision model. 
 
Case Studies 2 and 3 provide the strongest validation as they provide the multi-
context validation element described by Mukherjee et al. (2000) combined with 
strengthening of theoretical concepts with reality (Stuart, 2002). These two case 
studies will be used retrospectively (Voss et al. 2002) in order to utilise the 
outsourcing decision model in ascertaining whether or not criteria presented are 
successful in identifying a positive or negative outcome following a real life 
outsourcing situation. 
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Case Study 2: Validation of Outsourcing Model through investigation of 
the outsourcing of fuel filler pipe intellectual competency (high specificity 
end commodity) 
 
Case Study 3: Validation of Outsourcing Model through outsourcing of 
fuel filler pipe intellectual competency (low specificity end commodity) 
 
Although Case Study 2 and 3 are very similar, the relevance of outsourcing a 
potentially low specificity entity that relates to an already outsourced high or low 
specificity final end commodity was not uncovered within the literature review. 
Since it provides a new interesting facet that is easily validated it is included 
within this research within these two case studies. 
 
Case Study 4: Investigate benefits of introducing a second competitor 
supplier into a single sourced outsourcing situation relating to case studies 
2 and 3. 
 
Subsequent to outsourcing Supplier opportunism provides an element of risk to 
the final outcome (Lonsdale, 1999 and Vining et al. 1999) which may be 
countered by the concept of "contestability" (Vining et al. 1999) countered 
through an additional supplier (Quinn, 2000 and Lonsdale, 1999). This provides 
the purpose of Case Study 4 where criteria identified within the researched 
outsourcing decision model are investigated in order to ascertain the potential 
benefits of bringing a second supplier into a single sourced situation. 
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Each case study was based upon real life fuel system cases within the Author's 
sponsor company Ford Motor Company. Fuel systems was chosen as it provided 
synergies with the Author's role enabling greater access to related data and 
expertise This further enabled a comprehensive validation of the developed 
outsourcing decision model. In some cases where information was not directly 
available, other methodologies needed to be employed in order to ascertain key 
criteria. These methodologies will be discussed case by case. 
 
Methodology Case Study 1: Comparison of OEMs represented in case 
studies with three major competitors relating to the outsourced entity. 
 
An indirect approach used in this case study to compare the outsourcing strategy 
of three OEMs (Volkswagen, PSA and Toyota) with Ford Motor Company with 
respect to the outsourcing of intellectual competency regarding fuel systems. 
Since in retrospect, this information was not directly attainable, other means 
needed to be employed. 
The resultant strategies were determined based upon a study of relevant patent 
activity to determine the level of expertise (Pakes et al. 1984) in each company 
as a reflection of a set strategy. This work was conducted using MicroPatent's 
PatSearch Full Text Database  whereby time based individual searches could be 
made at company or regional level using component or system key words as a 
basis for the search. These searches provided patent data at detail level such that 
they could be evaluated in-depth to establish their individual worth within the 
context of research.  
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This patent activity was also supplemented with an investigation into associated 
research budget as a means of identifying a strategy (Lynch, 1997). 
The final aspect was to determine if a specific outsourcing strategy was captured 
either directly or indirectly within corporate mission statements or core values 
normally found within high level company publications. 
 
Methodology Case Studies 2 and 3: Validation of Outsourcing Model 
through investigation of the outsourcing of fuel filler pipe and fuel delivery 
model intellectual competency (high and low specificity commodities). Both of 
these commodities are good examples and focal to a fuel system. The fact that 
they both provide customer interfaces means that they also have the potential to 
provide influence on resultant warranty data accessible through Ford's Analytical 
Warranty System (AWS) (Chapter 3.2.4) through fuel filling experiences or fuel 
level indication respectively. 
 
In addressing these two case studies, the developed outsourcing decision model 
is used in its intended application. Despite the decision to outsource had already 
been made the model can still be applied retrospectively to understand the 
potential outcomes. In its perfect form, the supportive metric/data necessary to 
address relevant criteria would be supplied directly by people within an 
organisation that have appropriate expertise and metrics immediately at hand. In 
both these case studies the Author not only had to learn appropriate systems in 
order to provide necessary metrics but also had to look at alternative solutions to 
gathering data. 
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Methodology Case Study 4: Investigate benefits of introducing a second 
competitor supplier into a single sourced outsourcing situation 
 
The self explanatory title of this case study provides an extension of Case studies 
2 and 3 but concentrates on the quality and costs aspects alone in order to 
ascertain improvements or detriment in performance. 
 
3.1.4 Discussion, Conclusions and Recommendations for Further Research 
 
Following the case studies, there will be a summary discussion and conclusion of 
the results of the case studies and their relationship with the developed 
outsourcing decision model to ascertain its validity and whether or not it needs 
further development. 
 
3.1.5 Research/Thesis Plan 
 
In order to simplify the understanding of the methodology, a plan of the research 
associated with the Thesis is shown below (Figure 3.1) depicting the elements 
described. 
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Case Studies 1,2 
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Model
Case Study 2:
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Case Study 3:
Validation of Model with 
Outsourcing of 
Intellectual Competency 
relating to a Low 
Specificity End 
Commodity
ResearchPlan.xls
Conclusions
Outsourcing Model based upon case studies
Outsourcing of Intelectual Competency
Single or Multiple Supplier Effect
Literature Review
Conceptual Development of Outsourcing Model
Case Study 1:
Comparison of Case Studied OEM with 3 major competitors
Case Study 4:
Effect of providing an additional supplier in an outsourcing situation 
relating to a Low Specificity End Commodity
 
 
Figure 3.1: Research and Thesis Plan based upon Methodology 
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3.2 Methodologies within Research Process 
 
The following provides an analysis of the potential and actually employed 
methodologies within the research. Method of application and associated 
literature review are included where relevant. 
 
3.2.1 Benchmarking 
 
Benchmarking has long been established as a means evaluating competitive 
performance (Watson, 1992., and Chang et al.1995 and Damelio, 1995). The 
application of this process in order to ascertain gaps in competitive performance 
identifies it as very relevant within the realms of outsourcing in that both are 
applied with the ultimate aim to increase performance. Benchmarking provides 
the tool that establishes performance shortfalls whilst outsourcing provides a 
potential means of increasing subsequent performance. Once an outsourcing 
decision model has been developed to identify potential performance gains, 
benchmarking methodology provides the logical process that can be applied to 
measure derived performance factors before and after an outsourcing initiative in 
order to ascertain if expected outcomes were met or not.  
 
3.2.2 Questionnaires 
 
The gathering of data in support of benchmarking can be achieved by various 
methods. Of the five listed by Damelio, 1995, existing data review as 
exemplified in the body of work covered in Chapter 2 is well known. Similarly, 
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questionnaires provide another well established method that could be used to 
ascertain whether or not a supplier has greater expertise. 
Literature identifies various methodologies applied to the process of formulating 
a questionnaire. Within this process it is very important to provide "closed" 
questions (Dukta, 1993) with potential answers pre-determined by the assessor 
(Gillham, 2000). The benefits are that they are more meaningful, and easier to 
answer (Foddy, 1993).  
Typical examples of each (Denton, 2005): 
 
Open-ended questions can be either: 
 Numeric ("How many hours do you spend at work?") 
 Text ("How can the company improve its working conditions?") 
Close-ended questions can be either: 
 Rating scales (rating a product from excellent through to poor or from 
1 to 10) 
 Agreement scales (strongly agree to strongly disagree responses to a 
series of questions) 
 
Scale selection: 
 
With reference to questionnaires and the favourability of closed questions, the 
question arises on what sort of closed questions. Typically as per the examples 
given, the most suitable is some form of rating scale. It must be pointed out that 
a ratings or ranking has a totally different meaning. To ensure this is understood 
they are both explained by Thomas (2004).  
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 Rating: A measure of frequency, intensity etc. 
 Ranking: A measure of relative standing.  
 
The importance of this within this Thesis is that although ranking is important 
i.e. who is best, there is greater worth in understanding how much better A is to 
B in order to appreciate performance gaps. 
Typically there are two types of ratings commonly used the Likert scale (Likert, 
1932) and simple linear scales. The Likert scale typically uses five increments 
but can increase to seven with typical ratings being two extremes e.g. extremely 
hot to extremely cold. Most questionnaires range typically between 4 and 11 
increments with usually the greater number producing most reliable results 
(Nunnally 1978) 
 
3.2.3 Benchmarking: Method of Application within Research 
 
In order to ascertain whether or not a supplier had greater expertise, the 
methodology employed was to benchmark both Suppliers and Ford using a 
questionnaire approach. The process of this benchmarking was carried out in a 
series of meetings. In the case of new potential suppliers there was a series of 
familiarisation meetings between various departments to build a degree of 
corporate familiarisation. This was necessary to provide as close a comparison to 
“known” suppliers as possible in order to optimise a feel for the knowledge and 
mindsets of individuals to be used later in assessing whether or not the supplier 
under review is over or understating their corporate competence. In short, the 
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familiarisation provided a basis to provide a degree of mutual trust and 
normalisation of results. 
In addition and contributing to these meetings there were visits to manufacturing 
plants and development centres by Purchasing and Engineering representatives 
from the OEM in order to further enhance base knowledge of the supplier. 
Prior to conducting the surveys, all suppliers were provided with an electronic 
copy of the assessment rating format and given instructions on how to fill the 
form in with a specified scheduled date for completion. The completion date was 
also established as a date where once again the OEM assessors (Purchasing & 
Engineering) would further visit the respective supplier’s development office to 
review the self-assessment inputs and agree areas where moderation may be 
necessary. This moderation at supplier development centre was seen as the ideal 
venue due to the possibility to immediately review areas of disagreement with 
aid of real evidence. In retrospect this may be observed as being over critical of 
suppliers and perhaps even being distrustful but in reality it was beneficial to the 
suppliers in that it provided a consistent approach and level of rating that in some 
cases boosted a suppliers self assessment rating. 
An additional dispensation that was offered to the suppliers in view of their 
individual historical product knowledge base was that if they could provide 
reasonable evidence of close co-operation with their Tier Two suppliers they 
could be justified in including the co-opted enhancement in competence within 
the assessment. In contrast to this, the surveyed supplier may also claim that they 
globally have expertise in a given field but within the assessment given a poor 
competency rating. Each case must be taken on its own merit but for a high 
competency level to be entered (and agreed) on the survey sheet the supplier 
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must indicate that the expertise is available on a regular work basis within the 
European arena and able to sufficiently support a programme. Whatever the level 
of expertise, if an individual is only available in the USA for infrequent 
communications on a European programme and unable to devote quality time to 
a designated programme the rating must be suitably lowered. This was 
specifically the case of one of the suppliers whereby much of the company's core 
business is focussed in the USA with minimal business or expertise in Europe. 
Similarly to using Kepner-Tregoe analysis in the development process of the 
outsourcing decision model, the analysis was also used to provide a ranking of 
the relative importance of the criteria within the overall benchmarking. 
 
3.2.4 Analytical Warranty System (AWS) 
 
In order to establish suitable quality metrics, the Ford Motor Company's 
Analytical Warranty System was employed to extract Repairs/1000. AWS is a 
computer based system that enables dealers to enter details of customer warranty 
claims directly onto a computer system. It allows users to access data and 
statistics of dealer claims based upon searches including specific vehicles, 
production dates, customer concern codes and many other options dependent 
upon specific investigations. Repairs/1000 provides a metric which is simply a 
statistical count of dealer repairs per 1000 vehicles produced. 
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3.2.5 Kepner-Tregoe Analysis 
 
Both Kepner Tregoe Analysis and the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) 
designed by Saaty (1980) were considered for prioritising criteria included 
within the developed outsourcing decision model.  
AHP did have some potential advantages in its suitability for aiding the 
resolution of complex decisions in elements that are difficult to quantify 
(University of Cambridge, 2007). This advantage is clearly exemplified in that 
under normal circumstances it may be difficult to compare something related to 
quality directly with costs. The process makes comparisons of all elements at one 
pair at a time ranking dependent upon importance of relationship on scales 
between 1 & 9 and 1/9 to 1. The process does however have some disadvantages 
in that results may be inaccurate due to or in arbitrary rankings (University of 
Cambridge, 2007) 
The Kepner-Tregoe analysis also uses compared data pairs in its analysis and 
effectively can be used similarly to provide hierarchical metrics. The essence of 
Kepner-Tregoe is that each parameter is directly compared with all others and 
awarded a score of 0, 1 or 2 correspondingly dependent upon whether or not the 
column parameter is of lesser, equal or more importance. The totals scores for 
each parameter are then compared to establish a relative ranking, the highest 
total score denoting the higher ranking. The technique is very simple, easy to 
scrutinise and can be used to simplify very complex situations. 
Due to it's simplicity of application, Kepner-Tregoe Analysis was selected as the 
appropriate process to be used within this research. 
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In order to ensure the result of analysis were not biased, where possible the 
ratings were conducted by groups of individuals to cover an array of opinions. 
This was applied to all cases with the support of available experts in the field of 
that being analysed. Team composition ranged between three and four 
individuals including the Author. 
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Chapter 4: OUTSOURCING DECISION MODEL 
 
Chapter 4 will provide the basis for development of the outsourcing decision 
model that aims to be used as a working tool by potential outsourcers in order for 
them to make the right decision prior to outsourcing. The model should also be 
self explanatory in that no further research other than specific case data gathering 
should be necessary to follow the process within the model. The discussion for 
this will fall into four main categories  
 
1. The construction of a conceptual model 
2. Finalisation of model by addition of detailed criteria relating to the 
elements within the conceptual model 
3. Relationship between the Outsourcing Decision Model and Corporate 
Strategy 
4. Application of the Outsourcing Decision Model 
 
Following the development of the outsourcing decision model a validation plan 
will be constructed based upon those already identified in Chapter 2.12. 
 
4.1 The Construction of a Conceptual Outsourcing Decision Model 
 
The layout of the conceptual outsourcing model will follow a pattern of steps 
based upon the research within this thesis. The categories for the three steps will 
be the following; 
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 Step 1: Investigate 
 Step 2: Action 
 Step 3: Confirm Results 
 
4.1.1 Step 1: Investigate 
 
The first and most logical step would be based upon investigating if there is any 
advantage in the company in outsourcing a product or service. In order to 
provide the answers to this, Step 1 will covered by the series of questions as 
described in Chapter 2.3 to 2.8 based upon Kipling’s What, Why, When. How, 
Where and Who, Although the questions will be used as a basis for the model, 
their final order and inclusion will be decided upon their individual merits and 
relevance. 
 
1. What to outsource is a key factor and must be answered first. Finding 
non core competency within an organisation is the key to outsourcing. If 
none are available then research suggests that the organisation should not 
consider outsourcing. Since core competency are related to the strategy of 
a company the question of establishing those competency that are non-
core should be a relatively simple task and therefore the first question to 
be answered. 
“What” provides a clear question that if answered clearly provides the 
basis of a decision whether or not to proceed further. If the product or 
service clearly meets the core criteria then there is clearly no need to 
proceed any further with the process. 
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Summarising the above; 
If the What to outsource is determined to be Core then the potential 
outsourcer should Maintain Current Status and the process should be 
halted. If it is Non-Core then the process should continue by looking at 
the reasons Why to outsource. 
 
2. Why outsource as discussed in Chapter 2.4 is the next key factor that 
must be understood early in the process. An organisation must have the 
knowledge of what the expected benefits are and therefore understanding 
of it own performance in order to ascertain later if it has achieved a 
significant advantage through outsourcing. This latter comment also 
suggest that “Why” should be addressed twice i.e. early in the process to 
set targets and at the end to understand if benefits have been achieved or 
not 
If in providing the answers to Why no potential benefits were identified 
(Zero or Negative) then there would be no point in progressing further 
and the potential outsourcer should Maintain Current Status. If on the 
other hand there were Positive benefits to be gained the potential 
outsourcer should continue by looking at When to outsource. 
 
3. When to outsource: Research suggests there are optimum times to 
consider outsourcing (Chapter 2.5) and therefore it is advisable that this 
is understood before a decision to outsource is made. If any of the criteria 
for When to outsource are met the potential outsourcer should proceed 
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and Outsource the product or service. However; if none of the When 
criteria can be met (Criteria not met) again the outsourcer should 
Maintain Current Status and the process within the model should be 
halted. 
 
4. How: This criteria is implicit within the model i.e. the steps within the 
process will effectively provide guidance in how to outsource. 
 
5. Where to outsource (Chapter 2.7): The advantages of buying from one of 
three global regions described by Dobler et al. (1990) are included within 
the “what to outsource”. By defining companies that possess “greater 
external expertise”, a key element associated with “what to outsource” 
(Quinn, 2000), the important elemental criteria within “where to 
outsource” are already covered.  
 
6. Who (Chapter 2.8): Whilst providing important criteria within the 
process, they are already included within the defining of non core 
competency (“what to outsource”). In order to define a non-core 
competence a factor that must be considered is that there must be in 
existence a supplier (who) who has superior competence. The “who to 
outsource to” is therefore based upon this question of superior 
competence and adequately covered within the question “What to 
outsource”.  
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Concluding from the discussion regarding the six questions above, Step 1 should 
include the questions What, Why and When in the given order. At the 
conclusion of any of the three questions within Step 1, when answered in the 
given order, if the criteria within are not met there would be no point in 
progressing further. 
 
4.1.2 Step 2: Action (outsource the product or service) 
 
If each question, “What” and “When” identify some criteria that are met and 
potential benefits are identified in “Why” it would follow that the next logical 
step would be to outsource. 
Step 2, Action would be based upon an understanding of the benefits and criteria 
gathered within Step 1. 
 
4.1.3 Step 3: Verify results 
 
Following a suitable period of outsourcing it would be logical and sensible to 
check that the benefits achieved have been realised. Additionally, it would be 
equally as important to ensure that in attaining set goals that other aspects of 
business performance have not been weakened by the outsourcing strategy. This 
is very important, if outsourcing has not been successful in improving 
performance the outsourcer should understand why in order to remedy. This 
point is reflected within the “When to outsource” criteria. The point “When risk 
intensity is low” identify that there should be a sound fall back plan with a 
possibility to reverse the initiative. Obviously it is not mandatory that an 
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outsourcer should adhere to this criterion, however a situation whereby 
outsourcing has not provided the expected advantages or indeed caused related 
negative benefits clearly highlights the importance of this it. 
Within Step 3 the logical approach would be to recheck the expected benefits 
based upon the metrics derived in the “Why outsource” question in Step 1. In 
addition it would be worth a further review of other related metrics within the 
organisation to ensure no other detriment to business performance has developed 
through outsourcing. 
In the assumption that things have deteriorated or that performance targets have 
not been achieved it would also worthwhile re-examining the other two questions 
in Step 1, What to outsource and When to Outsource. It may be that either the 
answers were incorrect or perhaps the ensuing time has changed them. 
 
4.1.4 Conceptual outsourcing decision model 
 
The discussion relating to steps 1 to 3 is fully illustrated in Figure 4.1.  
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Figure 4.1: Conceptual Outsourcing Decision Model 
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4.2 Analysis of Criteria Within Outsourcing Decision Model 
 
Following the development of a conceptual outsourcing decision model, the 
following discussion will be aimed to finalise the model by providing the 
potential outsourcer with the relevant guidance in order to make the model a 
stand alone tool. Other than the data necessary to support a particular application 
of the model it should provide the potential with all the necessary guidance and 
direction to make the correct decision to outsource or not. The following 
discussion will therefore be based upon the addition of detailed criteria relating 
to the elements within it. The discussion will endeavour to provide not only 
detailed criteria but potential metrics in order to provide greater clarity to the 
decision process and will address each of the four major steps in turn. The major 
steps reviewed will be covered by What, Why and When as identified in Steps 1 
and 3 as applicable. Whilst “Why” is seen within the conceptual decision in both 
Steps 1 and 3 its content does not change in each, its only difference being 
within its application between the Investigation and the Confirmation steps. 
 
4.2.1 Step 1, Investigate: What to outsource 
 
In order to establish some order of hierarchy to the finalised out-sourcing model 
the key criteria gathered through research in Chapter 2 was necessary to apply 
some form of methodology. The most suitable methodology identified was 
Kepner-Tregoe analysis (Chapter 3.2.5) as this provided the simplest and most 
effective way of analysing the hierarchical order.  
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In order to carry this out, each criteria was in turn compared to the other criteria 
and awarded a score of 2 if greater importance, 1 if equal importance and 0 if 
lesser importance. The accumulated results could then be added to give a total 
for each criterion. The final results for each criterion would then provide the 
basis for the hierarchy. 
Table 4.1 illustrates the results of this analysis. The resultant totals shown in the 
second from last column, Greater external expertise (5), Expertise non-strategic 
(3), Low specificity (1) provide a final ranking identified in final column. It can 
be observed that if there is externally greater expertise then an organisation 
should not look upon a competence as strategic irrespective as to whether an 
activity or capability asset specificity is high or low. The final ranking therefore 
appears valid. 
 
Table 4.1: Kepner-Tregoe Analysis of What to Outsource, Detailed Criteria. 
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The three criteria will now be summarised based upon the research carried out in 
Chapter 2.3 following the revised priority in order to concentrate on greater 
detail and suitable metrics. 
 
Greater external expertise can be measured through an examination of relevant 
patent activity as per research through Pakes et al. (1984) with the proviso that 
comparisons are only made between similar global regions. Additionally 
Research and Development Budget may be indicative of expertise (Parasuramen 
et al. 1993; Franko, 1989; Morbey, 1989) but is unreliable when comparing 
organisations of different sizes. By far the best way of obtaining metrics would 
be through benchmarking as discussed in Chapters 3.2.2 and 3.2.3. This is a well 
proven process that can be used to measure any required dimension within a 
company. Although Benchmarking would provide the greatest clarity, its 
disadvantage is the high cost to implement. 
 
Expertise non-strategic in a perfect world would be identified within a 
company defined company strategy and therefore would be the first thing to look 
at. However, in the case where an outsourcing strategy is being instigated by the 
same management that develop the strategy one must logically assume that the 
expertise associated with the outsourced entity is non-strategic. 
In the absence of a clear and coherent strategy, if relevant, a reduction in 
associated Research and Engineering budget may indicate that expertise is non-
strategic in a given organisation. (Lynch, 1997). 
Additional ways of determining a corporate strategy may be through other 
corporate statements e.g. Core Values or Mission Statements. 
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Low Specificity: Table 4.2, put together to illustrate the key characteristics of 
high and low specificity provides a clear picture of each. Because Low 
specificity is the object of outsourcing, the identifying characteristics have been 
reviewed in order to provide potential metrics. The detailed drivers, identifiers 
and metrics associated with Low specificity and the other drivers for “What to 
outsource” is shown in Table 4.2. This table represents the full detailed content 
of “What to outsource” in the conceptual outsourcing decision model Figure 4.1. 
 
Table 4.2: What to Outsource, Detailed Identifiers and Potential Metrics 
 
What to Outsource 
 
Non-Core Competency 
Drivers 
Identified by: Examples of Potential 
Metrics: 
Greater external 
expertise 
Suppliers have special 
skills or knowledge, 
greater innovation  
# Benchmarking rankings 
# Quantity of Patents (If 
in similar global region) 
Expertise non-strategic # Company strategy 
# Company strategy 
implied by management 
# Core values 
# Mission statements 
 
# Relative Research and 
Development budget 
Low specificity # Low costs to utilise 
entity for other purposes 
# Many potential 
customers for entity 
# Low data transfer 
needed to implement 
and run 
# Costs 
# Size of Market 
# Quantity of unique 
specifications, drawings 
etc 
 
 
4.2.2 Step 1, Investigate and step 3, Verify: Why outsource 
 
The detail for the “Why Outsource” criteria within the conceptual outsourcing 
model will use the prioritised list from a survey provided by Elmuti et al. (2000) 
as the basis for construction.  
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Costs: Clearly and logically lower costs are a leading driver for outsourcing 
including both direct and indirect costs defined and broken down by Dury et al. 
(2001). From Dury’s point that costs may invariably change over a given time it 
is important to gain knowledge of costs ideally over a protracted period, i.e. a 
given product/service cycle in order to provide an accurate assessment. 
 
Quality: Researched opinion is clear in that quality must be aimed at the end 
customer and therefore representative metrics must be used to reflect this. The 
selection of potential metrics provided is not necessarily complete as many 
organisations may have unique customer requirements. Despite this the list 
provides indicative measurements so that an organisation can develop its own 
potentially unique metrics importantly focussed on the end customer. 
 
Technology: Relating to “What” and “Greater external expertise”, outsourcing 
can provide access to new and improved technology (Simchi-Levi et al. 2000). It 
is therefore appropriate that similar metrics can be used i.e. does the supplier 
have access to advantageous patents and licences. 
 
Delivery and Reliability: As observed by Ruffa et al. (2000), late deliveries and 
poor quality are known to drive up a company’s inventory, cycle time and 
schedule variations. From this point of view it must be apparent that 
corresponding data from the supplier should provide necessary input to aid an 
outsourcing decision. 
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Gain Resources: The literature reviewed points to a list of potential resources to 
be gained in an outsourcing situation i.e. Technical. Brand, People & 
Organisation and Capital (Azzone et al. 1995) with the addition of Strategic by 
Macpherson (2001). The outsourcing model uses examples of metrics provided 
through research for each of the resource elements. 
 
Table 4.3 provides the detailed summary of the “Why outsource” within Step 1: 
Investigate of the conceptual outsourcing decision model identified by Figure 
4.1. Also included are additional but lesser reasons for outsourcing based upon 
elements provided by Elmuti et al. (2000) from Appendix 5.  
It must be emphasised that the “Why outsource” part of Step 1 within the 
decision process would logically be followed twice, firstly prior to embarking on 
outsourcing and secondly, after a period of outsourcing to ascertain if the 
initiative provided the expected (or none expected) advantages within Step 3 
(Confirm). 
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Table 4.3: Why Outsource, Detailed Identifiers and Potential metrics 
Why: Identified by: Examples of Potential Metrics:
Direct and Indirect costs determined over a period of time 
Direct: those that can be directly associated
Indirect: those that are shared e.g. line supervisor 
Must be relative to end customer’s perceived expectations of 
outsourced entity or its end product.
Repairs/1000, Things Gone Wrong (TGW), Things Gone 
Right, Consumer Reports, Calls/hour e.g. service call centre
Metrics are highly dependent on outsourced entity
Could include brand name and reputation 
When technology is rapidly changing. Patents, Licences
Supplier has superior technology either in products or processes
Efficient and responsive delivery Lead times, Inventory levels, Schedule variations
Technological Patents, processes, registered designs
Brand Customer awareness ratings, Customer retention rates
Capital Company Assets
People & Organisation: Quantity of skilled people, Employee efficiency, staff 
turnover, hire costs, grievances
                                         Functional Revenue per employee
                                         Operational
                                         Strategic Demographics, Current versus future needs
Materials Unique Material/Product availability Specialist Materials/Products
Presence in a foreign market Improved access to market, Improved local advertising/acceptance, 
Relaxation of import barriers
Import tariffs, Market penetration data (sales, turnover)
Market flexibility Less bureaucracy, overheads, capital expenditure to move faster
Skills/Knowledge rationalisation Reduced resources and  related administration Lower headcount, Lower data administration
Capital funding re-allocation Greater liquid assets
Competitive position Improvements in company advantage Superior inflation rates, Located to access emerging markets, 
Lower import tariffs, Reduced trade balance obstacles, 
Improved sales 
Why Metrics.xls
Direct Material/Labour, Prime Costs (Sum of Direct Costs), 
Indirect Materials/Labour, Total Manufacturing Costs (sum of 
Direct and Indirect Costs)
Technology
Recruiting costs relative ROI, Benefits packages, Diversity 
programmes
Costs
Quality
Delivery and Reliability
Resources
 
 
    1
0
2
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4.2.3 Step 1, Investigate: When to outsource 
 
Quinn (2000) provided the basis for the “When” criteria within the outsourcing 
model. In Chapter 2.5 his list originally comprising of seven drivers was reduced 
to five and using the same process as the criteria associated with “What to 
Outsource” the criteria will be prioritised through Kepner-Tregoe Analysis. 
 
The analysis and final order is presented again in Table 4.4 with the individual 
rankings identified in the last column.  
 
Table 4.4: Kepner-Tregoe Analysis to Prioritise “When to Outsource” Criteria 
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Risk Intensity is low 1 2 2 2 2 9 1
Volatility high 0 1 1 0 0 2 5
Fast moving technology 0 1 1 0 2 4 3
High internal costs 0 2 2 1 2 7 2
Chance of strategic block 0 2 0 0 1 3 4
Memo: 2=greater importance, 1=equal importance, 
0=lesser importance
ModelRankingKepnerTregoe2.xls  
 
The detail associated with the “drivers” as described by Quinn (2000) is 
discussed in Chapter 2.5 and summarised in Table 4.5. Metrics have been added 
where relevant. 
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Table 4.5: When to Outsource, Detailed Identifiers 
When to Outsource 
Timing: Identified by: Metrics 
When risk intensity 
is low 
Possibility to outsource in steps 
Possibility to reverse the initiative 
A sound fall-back plan 
 
When internal 
transaction costs 
are high 
Higher costs in comparison with 
competitors/suppliers 
Labour Costs 
Tooling Cost 
Overheads 
When technology 
is moving too 
rapidly 
Rapid change of product/service technology 
Associated changes are rapidly increasing in 
cost and complexity 
Patents 
When there is a 
chance of a 
strategic block 
An opportunity to isolate key control items: 
i.e. customer contact with resultant 
feedback, key technology or knowledge 
 
When volatility is 
high 
Emergence of global competition 
New technology 
Public Policy: e.g. Government 
deregulation, privatisation 
Market uncertainty 
Escalating labour issues 
 
 
 
The detailed criteria established now become part of the completed outsourcing 
decision model. The detailed criteria for When to outsource, Table 4.5 now joins 
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 to become an integral part of the outsourcing decision model 
depicted in Figure 4.2  
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What to Outsource
(Table 3.2)
Non-Core
Maintain 
Current Status
Why Outsource
(Expectations)
(Table 3.3)
xxx Positive expectations
Maintain 
Current Status
When to Outsource
(Table 3.5)
Maintain 
Current Status
Outsource
Why Outsource
(Verification)
(Table 3.3)
Positive benefits achieved
Reverse 
Initiative or 
Follow fall-back 
plan
Maintain Outsourced 
Status
Step 1: Investigate
Step 3: Verify
Step 2: Action
OutsourcingModelSep08.xls
Core x   
Zero/Negative 
expectations
Criteria met
Criteria not met
Zero/Negative
 benefits achieved
 
Figure 4.2 Outsourcing Decision Model including references to relevant detailed 
tables 
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4.3 Relationship Between the Outsourcing Decision Model and Corporate 
Strategy 
 
In Chapter 2.1 an initial review was made of corporate strategy and its drivers, 
however at that point the subject of outsourcing had not been discussed and the 
relationship between corporate strategy and outsourcing had not been covered. 
The outsourcing model developed represents a summary of the research and 
subsequent discussion which now enables the best opportunity to review together 
with the fundamentals of corporate strategy in order to understand if there are 
any particular strategic drivers associated with an outsourcing strategy. 
Table 4.6, illustrates a summarised review of how the key categories defined in  
 
Table 4.6: Relationship between Outsourcing and Corporate Strategic Drivers 
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Low Specificity X X X X X
Greater external expertise X X X X X
Expertise non-strategic X X X X X
Risk intensity is low X X X X X
Volatility is high X X X X
Fast moving technology X X X X X X
High internal costs X X X X X
Chance of strategic block X X X X X
Improved Quality X X X X X
Reduced costs X X X X X
Improved Efficiency X X X X X
Improved Competence X X X X X
Improved exposure to worldwide environment X X X X X
Reduced resources X X X X X
Relationship between Outsourcing and Corporate
 Strategic Influences
Strategic Influences
Detailed Criteria Within Outsourcing Model
Strategy-Drivers.xls
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the outsourcing decision model developed aligns with corporate strategic 
influences. The following discussion will address each of the two environments 
and industry life cycle in turn. 
 
4.3.1 Global environment 
 
One can see that the Global Environment, whilst massive in its potential is one of 
the lesser drivers for an out-sourcing strategy. Ansoff et al. (1990) identified that 
volatility closely aligns with a high turbulence level as illustrated on the 
Assessment of Dynamics of the Environment (Appendix 1) Obviously this 
volatility could be directly linked to an industry level environment; however, a 
major economical or political shift could have similar impact. Again fast moving 
technology may provide a high turbulence for example major new technological 
developments that may occur through wartime conflict. 
Whilst improved exposure to worldwide environment may appear to be a 
candidate for inclusion within the global environment, it is excluded however as 
the global environment in question is industry level related. 
 
4.3.2 Industry environment 
 
Clearly the Industrial Environment is included as relevant in all categories listed 
within Table 4.6. 
Table 4.7 identifies a further analysis comparing Porter’s Five Forces with the 
categories identified within the outsourcing model. The categories have been 
simplified in order to show subject headings more clearly. 
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The analysis proved to be more complex than expected. The initial assumption 
was that there would be a random broad scatter of crosses that identify an 
outsourcing model category to each of Porter’s forces; however a deep analysis 
proved otherwise. Each of Porter’s five forces can be reflected in any one of the 
categories listed. It may not be that each is directly related, particularly at face 
value, however each category has implications that can continue to the extreme 
of analysis to be affected by all of Porter’s forces. This is the case based upon 
generic principles with no particular organisation being used as a case study. It 
would be expected that a further analysis based upon a particular organisation 
with particularly defined boundaries on each category would provide a more 
random result. 
For the purposes of the Thesis, the analysis of Porter’s Five Forces does identify 
a close linkage between outsourcing as a strategy to the Industry Environment. 
 
Table 4.7: Relationship Between Detailed Criteria of Outsourcing Decision 
Model and Porter’s Five Forces 
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Expertise X X X X X
Supplier margins X X X X X
Volatility in Industry X X X X X
Pace of technology X X X X X
Internal costs X X X X X
Potential strategic block X X X X X
Quality X X X X X
Costs X X X X X
Efficiency X X X X X
Competence X X X X X
Exposure to worldwide environment X X X X X
Resource level X X X X X
Porter's Five Forces
Detailed Criteria Within Outsourcing 
Decision Model
Strategy-Porter.xls  
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4.3.3 Effect of industry life cycle 
 
Chapter 2.1.2 identified that there is no clear linkage between an outsourcing 
strategy and a particular phase in the industry’s life cycle. Despite this, it was 
also clearly evident that there was a gradual increase in significance on the 
categories identified between the Introduction and Decline phases of the Industry 
Life Cycle. 
The category of “Volatility is high” provided an exception with the view that it 
would be very unlikely that high a highly volatile environment at Industry level 
would be present in an Introduction/Growth phase. 
In all case though, a trend is shown that an outsourcing strategy is more likely to 
occur in the latter phases of the life cycle. For example (Lynch, 1997) in 
(Appendix 2) identified that at the Introduction Phase, customers will accept 
some unreliability and by the Growth phase both reliability and quality 
improvements are necessary. By the Maturity Phase, competition is based largely 
on Quality whereas by Decline, when Quality is firmly established as a qualifier, 
cost control becomes a priority. With this in mind it can be seen that with quality 
levels rising all the time the effect of outsourcing has greater impact and would 
therefore more likely take place during the latter phases. 
From the previous discussion it can be seen that whilst all key criteria within the 
outsourcing model are clearly influenced by the industry level environment, only 
two are influenced by the global. Whilst the global environment can ultimately 
influence the industrial environment the major factors necessary to be 
determined within an outsourcing decision are based upon those influenced by 
the industry level environment. 
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4.4 Application of the Outsourcing Decision Model 
 
The model proposed in this work has been clearly identified and described in this 
Chapter already. Within the descriptions there are some notes that go to some 
way in describing its application to real scenarios. For clarity the following will 
provide the detail of how the model would be applied. 
The first and most important point is that the model will always be based upon a 
product or service that the user expects to outsource and that this is the focus of 
all criteria, decisions or metrics within the process of using the model. 
Once the entity to be outsourced has been identified the user can apply it to the 
model. Following the steps one at a time, in the given order, the operator would 
begin the process through Steps 1 to Step 3 as identified in Figure 4.1. 
 
Step 1: What to Outsource (See Table 4.2) 
 
The three criteria identified are potential indicators of whether a potential 
outsourced entity is either core (should be retained in-house) or non-core (should 
be considered for outsourcing). Ideally, all three criteria would be either positive 
or negative in any given situation, identified by comparing given metrics, but in 
reality it may be that only one indicates a given direction. The important point 
here is that at least one of criteria must be positive with the remaining two being 
neutral before an entity can be considered non-core and potentially suitable for 
outsourcing. For example, it would be foolish to outsource an entity where 
expertise is non strategic when the only potential suppliers have inferior 
expertise. If the potential outsourced entity is determined as Core then the 
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decision process is effectively halted and the entity should remain in-house as 
indicated by the “Maintain Current Status” field on the outsourcing decision 
model. If the indication is that the entity is non-core the decision process can be 
followed further by moving on to the next field within Step 1. 
 
Step 1: Why Outsource (Expectations) – (See Table 4.3) 
 
Within this field, there are many potential expected advantages that may be 
expected through outsourcing. Each organisation will have different expectations 
of what is to be gained. Whilst this is an important focus it is also necessary to 
consider what advantages also are potentially lost. For example, the model 
indicates that improved quality is a potential outcome; however this may be at 
the expense of greater cost. Whilst this is not necessarily a corresponding 
outcome, it is possible and so it would be up to any organisation to determine its 
own expectations and select criteria that match them but also focussing on 
criteria that may logically be at risk. Some risks may be acceptable to an 
outsourcer and would not necessarily justify a halt to outsourcing. It would be up 
to the outsourcer to decide whether a trade-off between potential advantages and 
risks is acceptable or not. The importance of the metrics at this point may appear 
time consuming and non-productive. However, it does provide a focus on the 
opportunities and risks that can be further verified once outsourcing has been 
implemented. 
With this in mind, any user would need to customise their own expected 
outcomes to develop metrics for measuring performance before or after 
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outsourcing. The model provides a list of the more likely expected outcomes 
with associated detailed criteria potential metrics where applicable for guidance. 
At the completion of this part of Step 1, the potential outsourcer will have 
selected and evaluated the potential risks and advantages of outsourcing, 
analysed current and potential future status through suitable metrics and decided 
that the expectations are zero, negative or positive. A zero or negative 
expectation of benefits would suggest that the entity should remain in-house and 
therefore that there would be no further action required in the outsourcing 
decision. The path within the outsourcing decision model would therefore lead to 
the “Maintain Current Status” field. 
Alternatively if the perceived benefits do appear positive the operator would then 
progress to the field “When to Outsource” 
 
Step 1: When to Outsource (See Table 4.5) 
 
The elements within this field are not necessary mandatory in being co-ordinated 
within the outsourcing progress but they could potentially increase the likelihood 
of success. There is though one exception that the operator should consider 
carefully, both in general within this field or even if all other “When” criteria are 
met. The advantage of outsourcing when risk intensity is low cannot be over 
estimated. The purpose of the decision model indicating “Why to Outsource” in 
two separate steps both before and after outsourcing provides a clue that success 
may not be guaranteed. The opportunity to minimise risk by outsourcing when 
risk intensity is low by either outsourcing in steps, planning a possibility to 
reverse the initiative or having a sound fall-back plan appear to make good 
 113 
business sense. Without meeting any of the criteria the operator is free to 
continue to Step 2 and Outsource the entity but it would be advisable to re-
consider and at least incorporate one of the sub-criteria within the field “When 
risk intensity is low”. 
 
Step 2: Outsource 
 
Please refer to Chapter 4.1.2 
 
Step 3: Why Outsource (Verification) – (See Table 4.3) 
 
After a suitable period of time of outsourcing based upon a full cycle of business 
activity, the outsourcer should check the status of the expectations and accepted 
risks to see if they have been achieved. At this time also, a review of the 
potential risks should also be carried out in order to either make adjustments or 
reverse the outsourcing process. It is at this point that the importance of the 
metrics gathered before outsourcing is shown by comparing with the 
corresponding data after. 
 
Assuming the verified metrics are positive or acceptable to the outsourcing 
organisation, the outsourcing can deemed to be successful; however it would be 
a wise practice to continue monitoring performance. If contingency measures 
were taken in the outsourcing organisation to mitigate any risks of outsourcing 
then this would be a good opportunity to review them. 
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Alternatively if the metrics indicate an unacceptably worsened situation the 
outsourcer may wish to reverse the initiative or resort to a fall-back plan to 
improve the situation as identified in the model. 
 
4.5 Metrics applied to Outsourcing Model and Method of Analysis 
 
The objective of the metrics is to understand the current situation both before 
outsourcing and after outsourcing. This difference is the sum measurement of the 
success or failure of the outsourcing decision. With this in mind, the former 
situation (before outsourcing) would provide the basic array of metrics which 
should be equated to zero with any change to this as a result of outsourcing being 
an incremental change. This change obviously could be positive or negative. Due 
to the fact that various metrics are used and to provide the incremental changes 
in comparable data, it is proposed that resultant changes in performance are 
equated to percentages, the post outsourcing data being percentile increments, 
positive or negative relative to the pre-outsourcing data which was equated to a 
zero base-line. 
In the event that any metric value exceeds +/-100%, within the model any such 
value should be capped as 100% in order to maintain a sensible level of 
meaningful focus. Clearly any outcome of this nature is still important and needs 
to be considered, however for the decision making approach, the logical 
maximum of +/-100% is all that would be necessary in supporting a directional 
decision. 
Any performance change that is negative is obviously undesirable and may be 
potentially unacceptable but obviously there is a potential that counter positive 
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results make them acceptable. It would clearly be up to the outsourcer to decide 
whether or not the strategy has been acceptable or not.  
In order to clarify the handling of the metrics/conditional criteria the following 
Table 4.8 provides some simple guidance. 
 
Table 4.8: Method of presenting Metrics or Conditional Criteria for individual 
items within the Outsourcing Decision Model 
A B C
Conditional Criteria
Not 
Applicable 
or Neutral
Pre Outsourcing 
Status
(Base line) 
Resultant 
A1
Met = +100% 
Outsourced Status
(Potential or Actual)
Resultant 
A2
Not Met = -100%
((A1-A2)/A1) x 100% 
Better = (+)
Worse = (-)
Comparable Metric
0%
Metrics.xls  
 
Since all items fall into the category of a directly comparable metric, a 
conditional criterion, not applicable or neutral they must be handled to be 
comparable. Therefore the only options to be available for entering into some 
form of summary display for any case study would be either of the highlighted 
above in columns A, B and C. Regarding comparable metrics it may be that in 
some cases a higher resultant A1 compared to A2 may be an advantage whereas 
in others it may be a penalty. In each case the user would have to decide, 
entering either a positive or negative symbol as necessary. 
Whilst in the final analysis a deficit in a comparable metric, -100% for example 
may not necessarily be directly equivalent to a positive 100% met criteria they 
can still be viewed and compared at a later stage. 
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To aid analysis of resultant data when comparing pre to post outsourcing data the 
results could be displayed in a bar chart but where there are numerous metrics to 
analyse further, Kepner-Tregoe analysis provides a solution. The proposed 
display would be as shown in Figure 4.3. 
Figure 4.3 illustrates hypothetical results as an example with added notes to aid 
decision based upon the detail within Chapter 4.5 i.e. the note clarify the 
minimum acceptance levels for the “What” and “When” fields. One can see that 
the resultant criteria are clearly identified enabling the potential outsourcer to 
make informed decisions and trade-offs if necessary. 
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Figure 4.3 Suggested method of displaying data gathered whilst using the 
Outsourcing Decision Model 
 
4.6 Outsourcing Model Validation Plan 
 
Chapters 3.1.2 and 3.1.3 covered the theory behind case studies and the 
background to the case study philosophy used within this research. Chapter 4.6 
covers the application related detail to these case studies. 
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Maintaining an overview of efficiency relating to the use of case study research, 
the aim of any validation plan was to meet two key objectives: 
 
1. To validate the outsourcing model. 
2. To provide evidence that could be fed back into improving the 
application or accuracy of the model. 
 
Clearly, any other resultant evidence provided within validation that could 
enhance the wealth of knowledge on outsourcing or provide useful feedback to 
the owner of the specific case study would also be of added value to the research. 
Due to the nature of the model, it was clearly obvious that the use of real case 
studies would provide the most appropriate validation. From the perspective that 
the outsourcing model was developed in order to provide a “hands-on” decision 
making tool, real case studies would enable applicable criteria to be applied to 
the various elements within the outsourcing model in order to provide a 
comprehensive fit of purpose. 
Many considerations were taken into account when selecting specific case 
studies to be used within the research. The most important consideration was;  
 
(a) Do the case studies provide a broad and in-depth inter-reaction with the 
outsourcing model sufficient to provide a comprehensive validation? 
 
In addition to this, other considerations are broadly supportive and include: 
 
(b) Is the data to support the case studies available and sufficiently detailed? 
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Addressing the first consideration, various potential case studies were considered 
which included using evidence gathered through literature review. After an 
initial investigation into the viability of this option it was clear that much 
evidence did not provide the detailed evidence necessary to apply to the model. 
Whilst this validation methodology would provide a degree of validation it 
would be at too high a level and therefore somewhat superficial. 
It was clear that in order to provide a comprehensive validation with sufficient 
depth it was necessary to utilise case studies within the Author’s parent 
organisation. This not only had the benefit of greater freedom in the availability 
of necessary data and input but also provided totally new evidence on unique 
cases which at the time of implementation, the outcomes were unknown. The 
added contrast within this scenario compared to using available data from 
literature review was that the result was unknown and therefore provided a 
further element within the real application of the model. In real life no outsourcer 
would know the outcome before implementation. 
The following provides a breakdown of the resultant outsourcing model 
validation plan: 
An indirect validation of the outsourcing model used to triangulate with case 
studies 2 and 3, case study 1 will be conducted by comparing the relative 
sourcing activities of the subject outsourcing OEM (Ford) with Toyota, PSA and 
Volkswagen. 
Case Studies 2 and 3 will then follow based upon High and Low Specificity end 
products respectively.  
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Since all three case studies are based upon outsourcing of intellectual 
competency by OEMs, the resultant conclusions should strengthen or 
alternatively identify weaknesses in the model that would need further 
enhancement. 
Case study 4 adopts a different approach and whilst not being used as a total 
validation case study is added to identify if an outsourcing outcome can be 
revised in order to enhance performance i.e., if outsourcing has progressed and is 
not necessarily providing the expected outcomes, should the entity be back-
sourced or are there other alternatives? This case study is somewhat prompted by 
the potential of supplier opportunism (Lonsdale, 1999 and Vining et al. 1999) 
and using countermeasures of using multiple suppliers (Anderson et al. 2000 and 
Williamson, 1979). This case study establishes the effect of adding a second 
supplier in a stable single sourced situation and determines if this is a potential 
means of enhancing performance. 
 
The following Figure 4.4, based upon the elements of the outsourcing model 
identifies the elements to be investigated and their respective chapters. Because 
there would be much duplication of data presentation if each case followed the 
outsourcing model individually some elements will be investigated jointly in the 
leading Chapters. These are identified clearly below and will be re-iterated at the 
points of re-introduction as they occur within the case studies. In all cases, the 
activity had already been outsourced and therefore the validation plan will reflect 
this by eliminating the “Why Outsource (Expectations)” portion of the model. As 
this portion will effectively be reviewed in “Why Outsource (Verification) 
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within Step 3 this is seen as only a minor deviation from the preferred 
application of the model. 
 
C
a
s
e
 S
tu
d
y
 1
Relative 
Chapter No:
8.1 to 8.3
9.1 to 9.9 
U
n
iq
u
e
 I
n
d
ir
e
c
t 
S
tu
d
y
 t
h
a
t 
in
v
e
s
ti
g
a
te
s
 p
a
te
n
t 
a
c
ti
v
it
y
 t
o
 d
e
te
rm
in
e
 o
u
ts
o
u
rc
in
g
 s
tr
a
te
g
y
C
h
a
p
te
r 
5
6.1 to 6.3 
6.4 to 6.10
7.1 to 7.7
Why Outsource
 (Verification)
Low Specificity end 
product
C
a
s
e
 S
tu
d
y
 3
C
a
s
e
 S
tu
d
y
 2
ValidationPlan.xls
What to Outsource
When to Outsource
Outsource
Why Outsource
 (Verification)
High Specificity end 
product
C
a
s
e
 S
tu
d
y
 4
 
Figure 4.4: Visualised Validation Plan of Outsourcing Decision Model 
Identifying Chapters Relative to the Specific Elements of Model and Case 
Studies 
 
4.7 Summary: Chapter 4 
 
Within chapter 4 the generic outsourcing decision model has been developed and 
based upon research from academic and industry level papers. It has been 
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evident throughout that whilst industry level opinion particularly that derived 
from the subject OEM within case studies is real and valid it is already captured 
by other papers within the research. 
The Outsourcing Decision Model generated has been developed so that it can 
easily be followed at industry expert level i.e. all terms that may be unclear are 
explained in normal industry level terminology (e.g. Specificity). It also uses 
well known and established processes. A high level model that requires much 
reading to understand its application may be useful for academic research 
purposes but other than this would be of little value on its own. Hence the model 
has been developed as a simple tool for industrial application to act as a real 
guide for the people that would execute a real outsourcing situation. 
The next Chapters will be involved in validating the derived Outsourcing 
Decision Model.  
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Chapter 5: CASE STUDY 1- REVIEW OF FORD 
MOTOR COMPANY FUEL SYSTEM OUTSOURCING 
STRATEGY WITH THREE MAJOR COMPETITORS 
 
This first case study provides a logical start in validating the researched 
outsourcing decision model in that its indirect approach, comparing OEM's 
activity regarding outsourcing of fuel system intellectual competence, reinforces 
and triangulates with those subsequent that utilise a direct application to the 
outsourcing decision model. Additionally it provides a foundation for the reader 
to understand the background of the industrial environment within the following 
case studies. It compares Ford Motor Company Ltd, the subject outsourcer with 
three of its major competitors in its strategic view of the outsourced entity (Fuel 
System Intellectual Competence). The companies selected for comparison are all 
major competitors within Europe. Each was selected to provide a broad range of 
major global OEM's. Toyota was selected as the major competitor who within 
the period of research between 2002 and 2007 (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2003a, 
2007) climbed from fourth to first in the world's production volumes (9.7 
million) compared to Ford in third (7.7 million). Volkswagen, also a major OEM 
ranked fifth (5.7 million) with a similar global presence to Ford was selected as a 
median competitor. PSA, ranked eighth (3.4 million), was selected as a smaller 
competitor. 
A review of literature did not disclose the strategic intent regarding outsourcing 
of fuel systems intellectual property any of the fore-mentioned OEMs. To 
 124 
understand how the OEMs treated this outsourcing it was necessary to look 
indirectly through alternative means. 
In order to achieve this, a study of patent activity and corporate strategy within 
the automotive industry was made. This was necessary to understand if Ford 
Motor Company was alone in their adopted approach of outsourcing of 
intellectual competence regarding fuel systems. The added benefit from this 
exercise would also be to provide some indication on the level of expertise 
within the OEMs and suppliers, the outcome of which would be used to provide 
further input to the developed outsourcing model. 
 
5.1 Patent Activity within Automotive OEM as an Indicator of Corporate 
      Strategy 
 
Any OEM can determines its individual outsourcing strategies based upon its 
own strengths and weaknesses, similarly, whilst one facet of outsourcing may be 
core to one OEM it may be viewed as non-core to another. This part of the thesis 
covers the investigation of the differing outsourcing policies between four 
OEMs, all of which in recent years having been identified as leaders in the 
industry. This investigation compares known outsourcing activities with patent 
activity based upon the assumption that patents are used to protect company 
intellectual property which in turn by definition must be based upon a high 
degree of intellectual competence. 
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5.2 Global Patent Activity of Four Major OEMS – All Patents 
 
Figure 5.1 indicates the overall Global patent activity of the four OEMs by 
showing the total patent applications and filings between 1991 and 2005 in the 
major global markets. 
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Figure 5.1: Total Patents Published by Toyota, Ford, PSA Peugeot Citroen and 
Volkswagen from 1991 to 2005 
 
Difference in patent activity and overall trends between these large OEMs is 
clear. Toyota globally applied for and filed 2630 patents in 1991, far in excess of 
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the next closest Ford with 597 patents, and increased patent activity very rapidly 
to over 9000 patents in 2005. 
Volkswagen, Ford and PSA Citroen Peugeot all indicate minor increase in patent 
activity throughout the period. Regarding absolute levels of activity within any 
period, the graphs show that Toyota is very focussed upon the importance of 
patents with Ford and Volkswagen showing comparable levels to each other at a 
much lower rate. PSA indicated the lowest activity. 
At this point, the overall patent activity in the graph gives no clue to whether 
activity is based upon core or non-core intellectual property and one would 
logically assume that elements of both may be included however the graphs do 
indicate the importance of patent safeguards particularly identified by Toyota's 
activity. On this basis the trends may be further investigated as a means to 
identify some correlation between patent activity and core competency. 
In order to focus a little more directly onto the case study specifics, the analysis 
was also conducted upon the European as opposed to the previously described 
global activity. 
 
5.3 European Activity of Four Major OEMS – All Patents 
 
In contrast to Figure 5.1, in Europe, Figure 5.2 shows Volkswagen to have 
greater patent activity than the other three. Volkswagen is only marginally ahead 
of Toyota in the overall rate of increase through the period. Both Ford and PSA 
whilst showing similar rate of increase are both separated substantially with Ford 
indicating a patent activity of more than double that of PSA. Within the Case 
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Study territory (Europe) there is a clear trend that both Toyota and Volkswagen 
are showing increased activity in patents compared to their rivals. 
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Figure 5.2: Major OEM Total European Patent Application/Filings 1991-2005 
 
5.4 Global and European Patent Activity of Four Major OEMs – 
     Fuel Tank. 
 
A fundamental part of any automotive fuel system is the fuel tank. As this 
component is normally car specific, being dependent upon under-body 
construction with many other variable design criteria and vehicle attributes, 
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Figure 5.3: Global Patents Granted to Ford and Major Competitive OEMs 
Relating to "Fuel Tank" Search in Title or Abstract of Patent Text Between 1991 
& 2005 
 
OEMs have unique designs independent of each other. Based upon this, a further 
patent investigation was carried out to establish if the OEMs were assigning the 
associated intellectual competence to suppliers or not. On this basis a patent 
search was conducted using “Fuel Tank” as the word search criteria within the 
title or abstract of the patent descriptions. 
Figures 5.3 and 5.4, as before identify the patent activity of the four major OEMs 
both globally and at European Level 
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Major OEM European Patent Applications & 
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Figure 5.4: Patents Granted to Ford and Major Competitive OEMs in European 
Activity Region Relating to "Fuel Tank" Search in Title of Patent Text Between 1991 
& 2005 
 
Comparing Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4, it can be seen that patent activity is much 
less in Europe compared to Global. At the more detailed level of patent 
searching, the number of patents is reduced and becomes much sparser. This 
makes it much more difficult to identify trends as shown in the European Patents 
(Figure 5.5) where Ford shows the maximum level in any one year of sixteen 
patents in 1994. 
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On the basis of the results presented in Figure 5.4, Table 5.1 provides a summary 
of the findings regarding relative patent activity of the four compared OEMs 
with respect to fuel systems. This is based upon the global patents due to the 
greater volume of patents and greater clarity regarding trends compared to the 
reduced volume of the European patents alone. Whilst this case study is focussed 
on European OEMs, the diversion in order to provide sufficient data through a 
Global view was justified in that all the OEMs are global in their activities. 
 
Table 5.1: Patent activity status of Toyota, Volkswagen, PSA Citroen Peugeot 
and Ford relating to Fuel Systems. 
OEM Fuel System Patent Activity 
Toyota High-Increasing 
Volkswagen Low-Increasing 
PSA Citroen Peugeot Low-Increasing 
Ford Motor Company Moderate-Increasing 
 
 
5.5 OEM Patent Activities in Comparison to Financial Performance 
 
In order to rule out the extent of corporate finances affecting patent activity of 
the OEMs some snapshots were taken of the affected OEM's net income margin 
for 2002 (Figure 5.5) and research and development budget as a percentage of 
revenue (Figure 5.6). 
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Figure 5.5: Comparison of Major European OEM Net Income Margin-2002 
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2003) 
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Figure 5.6: Vehicle Manufacturer Research and Development as a Percentage of 
Total Revenue-2002 (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2003) 
 
Figure 5.5 identifies that Ford’s income margin in 2002 was markedly lower than 
its competitors and was in fact negative; however this did not appear to cause a 
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major differential in research and development budget over the same period 
where Ford still exceeded Volkswagen and PSA development budget as a 
percentage of revenue. This indicates that Ford regards research and 
development into new products very highly. Similarly, whilst the patent activity 
in 2002 does show a pronounced dip (Figure 5.4), it is still within a trend of 
slowly increasing patent activity. 
The research and development budget of the major OEMs would typically be the 
budget that funds the technological competence necessary to invent novel 
concepts necessary to base patents upon. It would appear therefore that patent 
activity is not driven by company profits but something deeper within the 
company. In order to progress and understand this, a comparison was conducted 
in relation to the various OEM’s patent activity on fuel systems, their core values 
and outsourcing strategies. 
 
5.6 OEM Patent Activities in Comparison to Core Values and Outsourcing 
     Strategy 
 
The following compares the patent activity for fuel systems compared to core 
values and outsourcing strategy for each OEM in turn to observe if the trends 
identified correlate to the individual OEM sourcing strategies. 
 
Toyota 
Auto Business Ltd (2002a) paints a clear picture of Toyota's views on core 
competency by stating that traditional core development and manufacturing 
activities are only handed over to suppliers where there are clear and lasting 
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gains to be secured. Toyota is unwilling to transfer too much to suppliers and 
instead emphasise joint development to retain key expertise. Toyota is reluctant 
to give suppliers “black box” responsibility and associated power through 
knowledge. Parts should be made internally if the company has the necessary 
knowledge and finances. This helps Toyota to retain knowledge to better 
understand the quality of similar bought in parts. There is also a resistance to 
further outsourcing due to Toyota's dependence upon "keiretsu" network of 
suppliers, a group of suppliers in which Toyota has minority holdings that 
effectively enables them to retain external expertise, internally. 
A further clarification of Toyota's core values can be developed from their 
official website site (Toyota, 2002), “Through Monozukuri – manufacturing of 
value – added products” and “technological innovation, Toyota is aiming to help 
create a more prosperous society. To realize this, we are challenging the below 
themes” 
1. “Be a driving force in global regeneration by implementing the most advanced 
environmental technologies.” 
2. “Creating automobiles and a motorized society in which people can live 
safely, securely and comfortably”.  
The above comments were be summed up by Deutsche Bank (2002) as “One of 
the world leaders in automobile technology including safety and environment”. 
Included within the above comments, environment and safety are clearly key 
attributes highlighted by Toyota and although fuel systems remain unmentioned 
their consideration is very implicit in both. 
Clearly Toyota are reluctant to give up any traditional core competency in 
general and for fuel systems this is indicated clearly by their fuel system patent 
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activity and supported by the implicit nature of fuel systems within the safety 
and environmental aspects of their core values. In relation to this Toyoda Gosei, 
a part of the Toyota seeks to position itself to being one of the three largest 
suppliers of fuel tank modules by 2010 (Toyoda Gosei, 2004). 
Table 5.2 illustrates the findings relating to Toyota and patent activity and Core 
Fuel Competency based upon this discussion. 
 
Table 5.2: Toyota’s Patent Activity Trends and Core Fuel Competency Status 
OEM Fuel System Patent 
Activity 
Core Fuel Competence 
Toyota High-Increasing In-house 
 
Volkswagen 
According to Auto Business Ltd (2002b) Volkswagen has no fixed policy for 
outsourcing and all decisions are made plant by plant. Volkswagen expects 
suppliers to provide significant technological input and wants core competency 
in design, vehicle integration and systems control to remain in-house. It 
continues to develop in-house capabilities for developing and assembling 
modules as part of its platform strategy. 
The official website Volkswagen (2005) provides no major indication to whether 
or not fuel systems are considered core competency, “It is the goal of the Group 
to offer attractive, safe and environmentally friendly vehicles which are 
competitive on an increasingly tough market and which set world standards in 
their respective classes”. Fuel systems do provide a focal role within safety and 
 135 
environmental attributes and therefore could be viewed as a fundamental core 
element in offering the defined attributes. 
The above indicators do not show a clear strategy towards viewing fuel systems 
as a core competency; however Volkswagen manufactured fuel tanks in 1996 
(ITB Group Ltd, 1996) and were still doing so up until 2002. therefore it is 
highly likely that they at the very least want to retain some competency within 
the company. On this basis the low but increasing patent activity does show 
some correlation with the above quoted Volkswagen goal. 
 
Table 5.3: Volkswagen’s Patent Activity Trends and Core Fuel Competency 
Status 
OEM Fuel System Patent 
Activity 
Core Fuel Competence 
Volkswagen Low-Increasing In house 
 
PSA Citroen Peugeot 
According to Auto-Business Ltd (2002c), PSA prefers co-operative ventures 
with Suppliers and other OEMs to develop new technologies. They use between 
100 and 150 Suppliers for joint development and other suppliers provide 
products based upon PSA development. Outsourcing decisions are based upon 
technical resources and emphasis on return on capital. Where internal resources 
cannot be justified they endeavour to avoid "shadow engineering", the practice of 
an internal engineer replicating the work of a supply engineer, so as not to 
duplicate costs although this is countered with a fear of losing certain core 
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engineering competency for ever and the need to gain competitive advantage 
through the increasing need for innovation. 
This last comment is echoed within PSA Citroen Peugeot's official web-site 
PSA-Peugeot Citroen (2003a) “success lies in the carmaker's ability to bring out 
original and innovative vehicles in rapid succession.” 
The following is also from PSA Citroen Peugeot's official web-site (PSA-
Peugeot Citroen, 2003a): 
"Innovation and areas of excellence; The Group is seeking to establish itself as a 
leader in the key areas of automotive technology, notably those linked to 
environmental issues, safety and comfort. 
Group Strategy: Four strategic areas of innovation: 
1. Improving all aspects of safety 
2. Reducing fuel consumption and protecting the environment 
3. Offering on-board experience and greater sensorial comfort. 
4. Developing new vehicle concepts." 
Similarly to Toyota and Volkswagen there is also a strong emphasis on safety 
and attention to environmental issues is also mentioned with PSA Citroen 
Peugeot. 
The evidence above compared to patent activity does not clearly identify whether 
Fuel systems are a core competence of PSA Peugeot Citroen however their 
unwillingness to lose certain competences may indicate that they do maintain at 
least a moderate level of competency. 
PSA are keen to capitalise on their intellectual prowess by the fact that they 
advertise that they file more than 300 patents every year, (PSA-Peugeot Citroen, 
2003b) 
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Table 5.4: PSA’s Patent Activity Trends and Core Fuel Competency Status 
OEM Fuel System Patent 
Activity 
Core Fuel Competence 
PSA Citroen Peugeot Low-Increasing Moderate In house 
 
Ford Motor Company 
The term Full Service Supplier (FSS) was instigated by Ford Motor Company in 
Ford USA and was further rolled out to Europe in over the period 1998-2000. 
The term reflected new roles for the suppliers that go far beyond the normal role 
of manufacturing systems, commodities and products. 
 
Definition of Full Service Supplier; (Ford Motor Company Ltd b 1998)  
 
"The Full Service Supplier has expertise in the design, development and 
manufacture of a commodity considered non-core to Ford. Non-Core 
commodities include those Ford believes are designed and developed with better 
understanding and efficiency by the supply base." 
 
Responsibilities of a Full Service Supplier 
 
The intent of using Full Service Suppliers is to “fully utilize supplier expertise in 
product development" in a partnership where the supplier performs “product 
design, engineering, validation, testing and manufacturing activities to support 
global programmes. In order to be recognized as a FSS, Ford Motor Company 
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requires the Supplier CEO to commit to principles and Roles & Responsibilities 
listed …” (Ford Motor Company Ltd, 2000e) 
The roles and responsibilities, designated as either Supplier, Ford or shared, are 
identified as to specific phases in a vehicle programme and include the full 
spectrum of engineering disciplines. 
This new FSS process effectively meant that Ford was outsourcing the 
intellectual competence to their suppliers based upon a core/non-core decision. 
The definitions used for Core and Non-core are re-stated as below (Ford Motor 
Company Ltd, 1999). 
 
Core Commodity Definition 
"# Commodity expertise is exclusive to Ford; and facilities do not exist or are 
highly limited outside of Ford. 
# Commodity cannot be designed, developed & engineered outside of Ford at 
a comparable level of expertise & efficiency 
# Commodity expertise must remain inside Ford due to strategic business 
and/or technical considerations." 
 
Non-Core Commodity Definition 
"# Commodity expertise is not exclusive to Ford; resources and facilities exist 
outside of Ford Motor Company 
# Commodity Suppliers have technology and product development capability. 
#Commodity can be designed, developed and engineered with greater 
expertise & efficiency than at Ford." 
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In theory, the fuel system or any other system or components could be 
outsourced to a Full Service Supplier if it met the specific criteria. 
Referring back to Mitzberg et al. (1985), the Full Service Supplier sourcing 
strategy appears to be a deliberate strategy that has developed into an emergent 
strategy within Ford Europe after initial rollout in the United States. 
Ford considered that the fuel system was non-core and adopted FSS on fuel 
systems in Europe; however, the last definition relating to expertise and 
efficiency could only be verified through either outsourcing experience or 
through extensive benchmarking. Table 5.5 summarises the results of Ford’s 
patent activity and outsourcing position, by adopting Full Service Supplier, 
regarding fuel systems. 
 
Table 5.5: Ford Motor Company’s Patent Activity Trends and Core Fuel 
Competency Status 
OEM Fuel System Patent 
Activity 
Core Fuel Competence 
Ford Motor Company Moderate-Increasing Outsourced 
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5.7 Global Patent Activity of Suppliers to OEMs – Fuel Tank 
 
To provide a comparison of supplier to OEM regarding fuel system competency, 
further data was gathered using the same “Fuel Tank” search criteria for a total 
of seven major Tier one fuel system suppliers. 
During the period of assessment, 1991–2005, some consolidations took place 
within the suppliers resulting in total of four. These four suppliers together share 
a global market share of 46% and almost 100% of the automotive polymeric fuel 
tank business, (Inergy Automotive Systems 2003). These consolidations were 
taken into account within the assessment by accumulating the results for the 
suppliers that were taken over and adding them to the sums for the final 
consolidated company. 
The resultant companies identified after consolidation were Kautex Textron, 
Inergy, TI Group and Visteon. Inergy was the result of mergers of Plastic 
Omnium with Solvay and TI Group from the merger of TI with Walbro. All 
suppliers identified were key suppliers of fuel tanks and major related 
components. Figure 5.7 identifies the patent activity of the four resultant 
suppliers between 1991 and 2005. Despite limitations of observations due to low 
numbers of patents, without exception all suppliers are becoming increasingly 
active in filing patents. 
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Figure 5.7: Patents granted to major Tier One Fuel System Suppliers relating to 
"Fuel Tank" search in Title or Abstract of patent text between 1991 & 2005 
 
5.8 Summary of Patent Activity Related to Corporate Strategy 
 
Table 5.6 compares the trends of patent activity between the major Automotive 
OEMs investigated and the affected suppliers derived within Case Study 1 
Comparing the global fuel tank patent activity of Toyota and Ford with the 
leading suppliers (Figures 5.3 and 5.7) it is clear that the two OEMs are much 
more pro-active than the supplier groups. This is a somewhat contradiction to the 
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evidence suggested by Narula (2002). Toyota’s peak performance was 484 fuel 
tank patents in 2004; Ford’s was 156 in 2003 and 2004 both in different orders of 
magnitude to TI Group who peaked at 29 patents in 2005. The patent activity of 
the identified suppliers is similar in level to that of Volkswagen and PSA 
Peugeot Citroen. 
 
Table 5.6: Patent activity status of OEMs compared to Suppliers. 
OEM Fuel System Patent 
Activity 
Core Fuel Competence? 
Toyota High-Increasing In-house 
Volkswagen Low-Increasing In-house 
PSA Citroen Peugeot Low-Increasing Moderate In-house 
Ford Motor Company Moderate-Increasing Outsourced 
Fuel Tank Suppliers Low-Increasing In-house 
 
The data suggests that Ford was unique within its approach compared to the 
three major competitors listed. Despite evidence identifying that Ford was a 
leader in publishing intellectual property through patent filing it was adopting an 
approach of outsourcing its intellectual competence of fuel systems under the 
realms of the Full Service Supplier strategy. 
Case Study 1 indicates that Ford was out of step with its major competitors 
relative to the outsourcing of fuel system intellectual competence and therefore 
at this point it would be hard to understand why Ford would be different to other 
OEMs. 
 
 143 
Chapter 6: OUTSOURCING OF FUEL SYSTEM 
INTELECTUAL COMPETENCY RELATING TO 
“WHAT” AND “WHEN” CRITERIA 
 
Chapter 5 highlighted the difference in strategic intent regarding the outsourcing 
of fuel system intellectual competency in comparison to three of its major 
competitors. Whilst Ford differs with the other OEMs, it has not yet been 
established whether or not this different approach is justified through individual 
test cases applied to the outsourcing model. 
In order to ensure the relevance of this Chapter, Figure 4.4 has been reproduced 
as Figure 6.1 and highlighted to show the relevant parts within this Chapter. 
The particular company represented is the Ford Motor Company Ltd, Europe 
which produces cars and small vans in manufacturing plants located all around 
the world. Despite this global manufacturing capability, most of the base 
engineering to design and develop these vehicles is based within Europe in 
Germany and the United Kingdom. Manufacturing volumes are in the order of 
1.5-2.0 million vehicles per annum with some specific model lines approaching 
one million units at peak production.  
Because at the time of research the outsourcing activities within case studies 2 
and 3 was already in progress their application to the researched outsourcing 
decision model could only be fulfilled if the early criteria are investigated 
retrospectively. For instance, Step 1: Investigate and Step 2: Action as shown in 
Figure 4.2 would already have been implemented. However, the approach 
adopted for the two case studies was to review “What to Outsource” and “When 
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to Outsource” as part of Step 1: Investigate and concentrate on the “Why 
Outsource” (Verification) part of Step 3 to assess any benefits.  
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Figure 6.1: Outsourcing Decision Model Validation Plan highlighting aspects to 
be covered in Chapter 6 
 
The two case studies relate to high and low specificity (Chapters 2.3.2 and 2.3 3) 
end products which is a unique factor that has not been addressed evidence, i.e. 
despite the outsourced entity (fuel system intellectual competence) having low 
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specificity, the end products that are ultimately bought in relating to this may 
possess either high or low specificity. 
Common elements relating to “What” and “When” to Outsource for Case Studies 
2 and 3 will be dealt with first within this Chapter. 
 
6.1 What: Greater External Expertise 
 
In order to establish if the expertise within the supply base was greater than that 
of the outsourcer, a competency measurement was devised in order to provide a 
basis for decision. The following describes the approach used at Ford Motor 
Company. 
 
6.1.1 Competence rating of suppliers 
 
A survey by using questionnaires was made of four major internationally 
represented suppliers. Of these suppliers, one was totally new to the OEM and 
part of a recent merger between two competitors, two were partially utilised 
historically and one was a commonly used partner in many programmes over 
previous years. The survey was used to establish the following: 
 
(a) Are they competent to deliver a fully engineered fuel system. 
(b) Do they have particular competence weaknesses that may need additional 
expertise provision, by Supplier or OEM. 
(c) A benchmark to compare relative competence of competing suppliers. 
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6.1.2 Basis of supplier rating 
 
The four suppliers were all rated on the basis of the matrix shown in Appendix 
10, whereby they were requested to measure themselves within a rating scale of 
1 to 5 (5 meets all requirements and 1 equals no experience) against a range of 
fuel system attributes e.g. fuel filling, delivery & storage (FUEL FUNCTIONS 
TO DELIVER) versus the competency/resources available within the supplier to 
enable delivery of specified attributes (ABILITY TO DELIVER FUNCTIONS). 
The attributes listed comprise those required to deliver a complete fuel system. 
The competency/resources comprise a list of expected knowledge, skills and 
facilities known to deliver the attributes with some additional requirements 
required specifically to interface with Ford. The matrix format (Appendix 10) 
was devised originally by Ford Motor Company in North America for similarly 
related purposes and was proven to be a useful tool. From the perspective that 
comparisons could be eventually made with European and American experiences 
it could provided synergies if fully utilised it in its full form with one minor 
addition. Within Europe, the automotive industry feeds an increasing demand for 
diesel powered vehicles, a situation that is different to the USA where gasoline 
vehicles pre-dominate. Due to this, the addition of particular attributes related to 
diesel fuel was seen as a necessary addition to the rating format. 
 
6.1.3 Supplier selection 
 
Many OEMs cultivate strong relationships with their suppliers forming long 
lasting relationships at all corporate levels and within numerous related 
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disciplines. This is the case for Ford as well but from the perspective of suppliers 
being able to supply a broader portion of a total fuel system compared to 
individual components it was necessary to review not only new suppliers but our 
current suppliers as well to ascertain their capabilities at the broader level. A fuel 
system comprises many components (Figure 6.2) often designed by OEMs and 
components/sub-systems supplied by smaller companies. 
Within Ford, the fuel system was broken down into major 
subsystems/components all engineered with individual suppliers with Ford, in 
most cases providing the intellectual lead. The following is a list of such 
components that would have been supplied by individual suppliers: 
 
Fuel Filler Cap 
Fuel Filler Pipe 
Fuel Tank 
Fuel Delivery Module/Sender Unit 
Fuel Tank straps 
Fuel/Vent Lines 
Fuel Filters 
Carbon Canisters 
 
In view of the complexity of the fuel system it is not surprising that not all 
suppliers stepped forward to take on the potential role of full service system 
suppliers, not only taking on their original historical roles but also taking on new 
responsibilities for co-ordinating the resources of other supportive suppliers (Tier 
Two) in a lead integration role. These lead suppliers provided the focus for 
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investigation and are referred to as Tier One Suppliers. The resultant Tier One 
suppliers (jointly self and Ford nominated for potential engagement) were all 
global fuel tank manufacturers reflecting the logistics necessary in matching the 
co-ordinating activities with Ford and the central role the fuel tank has in 
delivering the function of a fuel system. 
A summary of the four suppliers selected for the survey is shown in Table 6.1. 
For future confidentiality of both suppliers assessed and resultant performance 
level the suppliers are referred to numerically. The table also provides a brief 
background summary of supplier's historic interface with Ford which will help in 
understanding aspects of performance in the context of the survey. 
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Figure 6.2: Typical Automotive Fuel System. 
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Table 6.1: Identification of Suppliers used in Survey 
SUPPLIER Background 
1 Recently merged with another Tier One. 
Minor historic interface with OEM. 
2 Much historic interface with OEM. 
3 Some recent historic interface with OEM on specific 
technologies. 
4 Much historic interface with OEM on very specific 
technologies. 
 
6.1.4 Results of supplier survey 
 
Within the duration of the survey it was disclosed that a merger would be taking 
place between two of the pre-determined suppliers. Therefore prior to 
formalisation of the independent results, further reviews were undertaken to 
provide a better indication of effects on the resultant new Tier One supplier 
beyond the date of the merger. The supplier review therefore reflects the results 
of only four Tier One suppliers thereby recognising the merged companies. 
Appendix 10 provides a combination of all four Supplier surveys with further 
columns shown indicating subsequent work where abilities and deliverable 
functions were averaged. 
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6.1.5 Observations from supplier survey (Appendix 10) 
 
The supplier ratings reflected greater strength based upon their historical core 
competency related to manufactured products i.e. historic fuel tank 
manufacturers showed a high competence level in functions related to fuel 
storage and re-fuelling. 
In contrast, expertise within commodities that are new to the suppliers was low.  
 
Supplier 1 historically is a market leader where diesel powered vehicles are very 
popular and this is reflected in their engineering skills. In contrast to this, 
supplier 4 a long-standing supplier to OEMs for some key evaporative emission 
components provides the lowest average competence level (3.2) for vapour 
management. 
Ford Motor Company Ltd (1999) states that a non-core commodity in the hands 
of an appropriate Full Service Supplier can be designed, developed and 
engineered with greater expertise & efficiency than at Ford. For a clearer picture 
of supplier performance one must look at OEM performance. In doing this, the 
same questionnaire distributed to the suppliers was given to three fuel system 
experts within the Ford fuel system department to provide a comparison to the 
suppliers. Using the same process as the suppliers, questionnaires were 
completed independently by the experts no overview of each other's results The 
three individual results were combined and an average assessment was reviewed 
individually and then further compared with the Supplier’s ratings for 
comparison (See Appendix 11). 
 
 152 
6.1.6 Comparison of supplier and OEM survey results (Appendix 10 & 11) 
 
The overall OEM competency averaged at 4.3 compared to the Supplier average 
of 4.1 identifying that OEM had a marginally superior competency level overall. 
Within this assessment, the OEM competency relating to "OEM dedicated 
manpower was omitted so as not to provide an unfair advantage. 
Two factors that provide a shortfall of OEM compared to suppliers, resulting in 
average ratings representing a “some experience” category were Development 
Test Facilities and Target-setting assistance. Whilst OEM test facilities were 
rated moderately low, the Development Test Experience category was rated very 
highly and equal in result to the Suppliers which identifies that high development 
test experience remains independent of having in-house test facilities.  
 
6.1.7 Kepner-Tregoe analysis – Level of importance of competency used in 
supplier survey 
 
In order to provide greater clarity of survey data, a Kepner-Tregoe Analysis was 
carried out on the results. The basis of this method is that all listed competency 
within the survey chart (1-12) are numerically rated and compared with each 
other by a team of four fuel system experts in order to obtain a hierarchy of 
importance compared for further analysis i.e. if "Target Setting" was seen as 
being equal importance to "Depth of Talent", it would be given a relative 
weighting value of 1, and if greater or lesser importance it would be rated as 2 or 
0 respectively. The final outcome of the analysis (Appendix 12) provides a 
relative weighting of each competency once the sum of individual competency 
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ratings are added together and compared with the maximum potential rating of 2 
for every comparison. The final weightings can then be multiplied by the 
supplier ratings (1-5) in thereby providing not only a competency level but a 
combined competency/importance of competence level identifying extremities of 
zero experience of low importance competency to meeting all requirements of a 
highly important competency (See Appendix 13). Finally the individual supplier 
weighted competency levels were plotted on a graph for comparison (Figure 
6.3). 
 
6.1.8 Discussion of survey results 
 
The graphs (Figure 6.3) identify that Supplier 4 has a lesser competence than the 
other three who appear to be very similar in performance. 
A significant drop off can be clearly seen in the competence of all suppliers 
regarding competency 12 (Knowledge of Customer/OEM). Whilst this aspect 
could be weighted either way, between knowledge of OEM and Knowledge of 
end customer i.e. the person who buys/drives the final car the rating from 
supplier 3 in this category was rated 3 on fuel tank storage. This supplier as 
identified earlier has a high knowledge of plastic fuel tanks and has been a long 
term partner to and subsequently is also very knowledgeable of Ford, therefore 
the shortfall must be attributed to end customer knowledge. 
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Figure 6.3: Individual Tier One Supplier, Weighted Competency Levels. 
 
The shortfall is really in the end customer knowledge (Competency 12). This 
knowledge/competence as indicated through the Kepner-Tregoe analysis must be 
important for any supplier if they are to exhibit greater expertise & efficiency 
than their Ford based counterparts (Ford Motor Company Ltd 1999). End 
customer requirements derived from direct contact feedback is a key driver to the 
design of any fuel system and without this key information the supplier must be 
at a disadvantage. Dependency on the OEM to provide this interface can 
potentially eliminate the opportunity for a supplier to gain pre-eminence through 
obtaining first hand data in order to optimise new designs. 
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6.1.9 Direct comparison of supplier and OEM weighted competency level 
 
The comments in Chapter 5.1.9 regarding competence 12 (Knowledge of 
Customer) related to a higher performance of OEM versus Supplier. Being more 
directly connected to the customers through various business interfaces at vehicle 
level provides the OEM with a distinct advantage. Figure 6.4 shows the weighted 
ratings of the three best suppliers 1, 2 and 3 and the OEM. 
Referring to Appendix 13, the average overall weighted competency of OEM 
(2.18) compared to the best supplier average were (2.07) showed the OEM did 
have a minor advantage. 
Comparative competence level within the OEM could be improved through 
enhanced performance data gathering of competitor system/component 
performance and also enhanced development facilities that would help resolve 
the former. Supplier performance would need to be improved through exposure 
to end customers in order to attain a first hand holistic view of their products in 
order to address a total engineering situation. 
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Figure 6.4: Competency Levels of Best Three Individual Tier One Suppliers 
Compared to OEM 
 
In order to provide a measure of expertise in the Outsourcing Model using the 
resultant competency levels, the resultant average OEM weighted level was used 
against the best of the suppliers. This provides an advantage of +5% in favour of 
the OEM and therefore, on its own would not suggest that outsourcing is 
justified. 
For inclusion in the outsourcing model, the suppliers were therefore seen as 5% 
inferior to OEM with respect to "Greater external expertise" i.e. minus 5%. 
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6.2 What: Low Specificity 
 
It is important to re-iterate what is being analysed here regarding specificity. It is 
the outsourcing of intellectual competency regarding fuel systems since 
outsourcing of the actual commodities was already in place. It is however, 
necessary to explain the detail of the fuel system in order to understand the 
specificity of the competency that is necessary to design and develop it. 
The fuel system of a motor vehicle plays an extremely small part in a decision to 
buy a particular model. The interface between a customer and the fuel system is 
solely between the filler cap and filler pipe during the process of refuelling and 
the level of fuel represented on the fuel gauge within the instrument control 
panel. Despite this, there are inherent dependencies the customer may have on 
the fuel system that are unknown to the average person represented in various 
attributes within a vehicle. The below list provides some of these dependencies. 
Safety: Within crash conditions, a customer needs the fuel system to withstand a 
high degree of integrity from leakage. 
Evaporative emissions: A vehicle needs to meet stringent fuel evaporative 
emission requirements at various levels in various global territories. The vehicles 
must not only meet these requirements when the vehicle is new but also 
throughout its life and therefore the auto manufacturer must ensure the systems 
are relatively foolproof and robust to environments and market conditions. 
Fuel Economy: Fuel system design does have a part to play in fuel economy, 
albeit a small part. The power consumption of fuel pumps must be optimised to 
ensure they only provide power at minimal levels. 
Cost: Fuel systems like any other part of a vehicle must be cost effective. 
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The above points indicate that there is some minor specificity that may affect 
fuel system commodities but not all are affected to the same degree. Taking 
crash testing for example, whilst all commodities must provide a high degree of 
robustness to leaks in a crash, some are less likely to be affected than others, 
dependent upon their vulnerability.  
This point is relevant to all OEMs. Location of fuel system components within a 
vehicle in combination with individual corporate specifications is a driver for 
numerous unique system architectures across and within the OEMs. 
 
6.2.1 Summary of fuel system specificity 
 
The above comments indicate that the specificity of fuel systems is potentially 
very high in individual components within the final delivered product. The 
requirements that drive this however are normally very generic in their nature. 
Primarily because it is not a major system that affects a customer purchasing 
decision the system only has to meet specific packaging and functional 
specifications laid down by the OEM. Whilst OEM specifications may vary and 
not follow a common standard, the generic differences are generally well 
established, well known by both OEMs and Suppliers. Whilst individual end 
products (components) may be highly specific to an OEM or vehicle, the 
intellectual competency necessary to engineer the systems is more generic if 
supported by OEM and legal requirements. 
Therefore as shown in Table 6.3 the “Low specificity” will be defined as yes, 
i.e. (+100%) 
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Table 6.3: Resultant advantage regarding “Low Specificity” associated with 
outsourcing of fuel system external expertise. 
  Conditional Criteria 
 
Pre Outsourcing Status 
 
Met 
 
Outsourced Status 
= +100% 
 
6.3 Summary of “What” 
 
The “What” criteria have all been covered within this Chapter with the exception 
of “Expertise is non-strategic”. As this has been covered within Case Study 1 it 
is repeated here in the same format as others within this Case Study for 
completeness (Table 6.4) 
 
Table 6.4: Resultant advantage regarding “Expertise is non strategic” associated 
with the outsourcing of fuel system external expertise. 
  Conditional Criteria 
 
Pre Outsourcing Status 
 
Met 
 
Outsourced Status 
= +100% 
 
 
Based upon Table 4.2, the non-core competency drivers that would support an 
outsourcing decision and the evidence within this chapter and Chapter 5 (Case 
Study 1), Table 6.5 summarises the evidence so far regarding the outsourcing of 
fuel system intellectual competency. 
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Table 6.5: Evidence to Support “What to Outsource” Relating to Fuel System 
Intellectual Competence 
Non-Core Competency 
Driver 
Evidence Supporting 
the Decision to 
Outsource 
Reference 
Greater external expertise -5% Chapter 5.1 
Expertise non- strategic 100% Chapter 4.6  
Low specificity 100% Chapter 5.2 
 
6.4 When to Outsource Fuel System Engineering Intellectual Competence 
 
Since within the case studies the decision to outsource fuel system intellectual 
competency had already taken place it was decided to eliminate the reasons 
“Why” at this point in order to concentrate on “When”. Since the reasons why 
would be reviewed within Step 3 of the Outsourcing Decision Model (Figure 
4.2) in order to verify if outsourcing was successful or not it has not been omitted 
overall. Normally the reasons to outsource would be established and known prior 
to outsourcing but the case studies represented within this Thesis are all 
retrospective. On this basis it now remains necessary to establish if the “When” 
criteria are positive in support of outsourcing. Reflecting upon the stages of 
industry life cycle (Appendix 2), (Lynch, 1997) it is tempting to align the 
outsourcing of intellectual competence immediately with either the Maturity or 
Decline phases as many aspects defined would provide a good match. Since the 
case is particular though, a review should be made relative to the facts associated 
with the subject matter i.e. outsourcing of intellectual competence related to fuel 
systems engineering in Ford Motor Company Ltd. The following looks at the 
individual points in more detail. 
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6.5 When Risk Intensity is Low 
 
The risk in question here is related to the technology. Fuel systems have changed 
significantly over recent years but now within the global context there is a 
variety of system technologies available within most OEMs including Ford to 
provide a system that meets most of the foreseeable technology shifts in the 
future regarding evaporative emission levels, safety and other aspects relating to 
legal directives and/or customer requirements based upon conventional gasoline 
and diesel technologies. With the increasing pressure on environmental issues 
many OEMs are researching developments of electric cars and hybrids that could 
ultimately remove the need for fuel system as used on current vehicles. The 
strongest contender of these new technologies is the fuel cell which is an 
electrochemical device that converts a fuel’s energy directly into electrical 
energy (Deutsche Bank, 2002a), removing the need for a conventional fuel 
system. Technology issues, the necessary infrastructure in the form of filling 
stations for Hydrogen or Methanol provide limitations on the introduction of fuel 
cell passenger cars in the and even in the next 20 years, significant penetration 
rates are expected to be low (Deutsche Bank, 2002a). 
Whilst OEMs are looking at new cleaner methods of powering cars for the future 
they are predominantly dependent upon new technologies, not developments of 
current technologies i.e. conventional fuel systems. In this respect, technology is 
not expected to change significantly and therefore the risk intensity associated 
with losing or reducing fuel system knowledge and outsourcing intellectual 
competence must only present a minor risk therefore “Risk Intensity is low” is 
positive and supports outsourcing (+100%) as shown in Table 6.6. 
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Table 6.6: Resultant advantage regarding “Risk Intensity is low” associated with 
the outsourcing of fuel system external expertise 
  Conditional Criteria 
 
Pre Outsourcing Status 
 
Met 
 
Outsourced Status 
= +100% 
 
6.6 When Internal Transaction Costs are high 
 
In Chapter 2.4.3 Leuliette, (2002) makes the point that the "traditional big three" 
which includes Ford are high cost producers carrying cost penalties in 
management overhead, labour and benefits. According to Noe, (2005), Industry 
experts estimate that for every car sold by a US carmaker, $1500 is paid out in 
healthcare benefits which climbs to $2000 when pensions are included; (Noe, 
2005). Both Delphi and Visteon, individually spin-offs from General Motors and 
Ford are major suppliers of automotive fuel systems. Wages at Visteon are 
currently on par with Ford Motor Company due to a spin-off agreement, but 
these wages are seen as too high compared to similar competitors such as 
Johnson Controls Inc where compensation is just over half of that paid by 
Visteon; (Bloomberg, 2006). These examples show that despite having high 
internal costs, an OEM may not necessarily gain an advantage by outsourcing as 
it would be highly dependent upon whom the selected supply is and confusion 
with company accounting practices can make this comparison very difficult 
(Humphreys et al. 2002)  
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With these facts in mind, the high internal cost question regarding the 
outsourcing of intellectual competence for fuel systems must be very variable 
and therefore not a convincing case. The model will reflect this decision as 
Neutral i.e. 0% for high internal costs as identified in Table 6.7. 
 
Table 6.7: Resultant advantage regarding “high internal costs” associated with 
the outsourcing of fuel system external expertise. 
  Conditional Criteria 
 
Pre Outsourcing Status 
 
Neutral 
 
Outsourced Status 
= 0% 
 
6.7 When Technology is Moving too Rapidly 
 
Chapter 6.6 described a situation whereby the technology is relatively static, 
however in the case of fuel cells or any other alternatives eventually taking over, 
it would be likely that an OEM would look to reduce its fuel system competency 
levels and either concentrate on the new technologies and build up a resource 
with relevant expertise or alternatively let suppliers and competitors carry out a 
high proportion of the initial development. Any new developments may 
inevitably have some development dead ends where technology is proven 
unviable or infeasible. Whilst these efforts may boost knowledge and ultimately 
pave the way for a more acceptable alternative, the effort may still be very 
costly. 
Former Chairman and Chief Executive Officer William Clay Ford, over the 
duration of this research project was publicly known for his positive views on 
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environmental issues. Ford Motor Company is actively looking at developing 
hybrid gasoline power-packs, partial hybrid technologies, Hydrogen internal 
combustion engines and Hydrogen fuel cells; (Ford Motor Company Ltd, 2006). 
In a speech in Dearborn, Michigan, USA relating to innovation on hybrid engine 
technology William Clay Ford made the comment “Whenever technology has 
been available, Ford has a strong history of sharing it with others to benefit the 
community” (Ford, W., 2005). This is exemplified by the joint development of 
fuel cell technologies with Daimler Chrysler; (Ford Motor Company Ltd, 2006)  
A reflection of the comments above to the major changes potentially coming in 
power technology does indicate again, a positive situation for “Fast moving 
technology” supportive of outsourcing (+100%) as identified in Table 6.8. 
 
Table 6.8: Resultant advantage regarding “Fast moving technology” associated 
with the outsourcing of fuel system external expertise. 
  Conditional Criteria 
 
Pre Outsourcing Status 
 
Met 
 
Outsourced Status 
= +100% 
 
6.8 When There is a Chance of a Strategic Block 
 
A strategic block may develop unbeknown to the decision makers associated 
with outsourcing i.e. there may always be a situation whereby a competitor or 
supplier comes up with a new invention that provides some major cost or 
technical advantage. This possibility must always present an element of risk. 
However, the previous chapters do portray a system that is very mature in its 
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development and therefore the chance of a strategic block must be low, 
indicating a further positive indicator for outsourcing with small chance of a 
strategic block (+100%) as identified in Table 6.9. 
 
Table 6.9: Resultant advantage regarding “chance of a strategic block” relating 
to outsourcing of fuel system external expertise. 
  Conditional Criteria 
 
Pre Outsourcing Status 
 
Met 
 
Outsourced Status 
= +100% 
 
6.9 When Volatility is High 
 
In 2003, Ford Motor Company celebrated 100 years of automotive manufacture; 
(Banham, 2002). This came at a time when there was much competition within 
the automotive industry in general. There is a constant drive to maintain profits 
in a time of intense pressure from developing low cost car producers from abroad 
(Shirouzu, 2003) and an underlying excess manufacturing capacity above ten 
million vehicles per annum (Figure 6.5).  
Within this period, businesses have also been hit by increased oil prices, a 
weakness in global demand and a slump in equity markets Ford, W., (2003). To 
combat this, many manufacturers resorted to incentives in order to sell vehicles, 
a mature market phenomenon, shifting the basis for competition to pricing rather 
than product. For example, the monthly Alliance & Leicester Car Price Index 
identified that the price of average car cost fell from £13,600 to £12,000 in the 
period 1998 to 2003 (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2001). Taking inflation into 
account this indicates a decline of 20.4% in real terms (Johnston, 2003). The 
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Figure 6.5: Global Light Vehicle Assembly and Capacity 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2003a) 
 
burden of supporting excess capacity and intense pressure on pricing has also 
affected Ford Motor Company who in the two years preceding May 2003 lost $6 
billion (Fonda et al. 2003).  
Within this period, many automakers are also consolidating in order to gain 
efficiencies (Figure 6.6). In 2002 global mergers and alliances reached a total of 
621 transactions with deals totalling $35.1 billion (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
2003) including major takeovers of large OEMs involving the likes of Nissan, 
PSA and General Motors. This is illustrated by the fact that in the 40 years 
preceding 2002 independent automobile manufacturers have dropped from 52 to 
12 (Deutsche Bank, 2002b). 
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Figure 6.6: Global Automotive Mergers and Alliances 1998-2002 – 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2003) 
 
Summarising the above, volatility was extremely high for Ford Motor Company 
making the possibility of shedding some internal resources to the supplier base a 
tempting proposition in order to reduce losses and increase shareholder value. 
Indeed, the “When?” to outsource is very clearly positive regarding volatility 
(+100%) as identified in Table 6.10. 
 
Table 6.10: Resultant advantage regarding “volatility is high” associated with 
the outsourcing of fuel system external expertise. 
  Conditional Criteria 
 
Pre Outsourcing Status 
 
Met 
 
Outsourced Status 
= +100% 
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6.10 Summary of “When” 
 
Chapter 6 covered the common aspects, "What" and "When" of Case Studies 2, 3 
and 4 relating to the outsourcing of fuel system related intellectual competency. 
So far the evidence identified that the suppliers have marginally less expertise. 
As stated at the beginning of the Chapter, the outsourcing had already been 
started prior to the start of this research and therefore its potential destiny was 
already set. Using the suggested method of display as described in Chapter 4, the 
summary of results from this Chapter is illustrated in Figure 6.7. 
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Figure 6.7: The completed “What” and “When” Criteria for Outsourcing of 
Intellectual Competence for Fuel systems 
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Chapter 6 has covered the common “What” and “When” elements within the 
developed Outsourcing Decision Model of Case Studies 2 and 3 relating to high 
and low specificity end products respectively. 
The following Chapters 7 and 8 will cover the specific “Why” elements for each 
of the two fore mentioned cases studies bearing in mind that in both case studies 
the outsourcing was already underway. 
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Chapter 7: CASE STUDY 2 – OUTSOURCING OF 
INTELLECTUAL COMPETENCY RELATING TO A 
HIGH SPECIFICITY END COMMODITY 
 
So far within Chapter 6 the outsourcing decision model process Step 1, “What” 
and “When” fields have identified that outsourcing should not progress. The 
investigation will now follow into the “Why” field to understand if the results of 
outsourcing were positive despite this finding. 
Similar to Chapter 6, for clarity, Figure 4.4 has again been reproduced and  
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Figure 7.1: Outsourcing Decision Model Validation Plan highlighting what has 
already been covered in Chapter 6 and what will be covered in Chapter 7 
relevant to Case Study 2 
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highlighted to identify what has been accomplished so far for Case study 2 and 
what Chapter 6 will be covering. 
 
7.1 Why: Costs 
 
From an engineer’s perspective, costs are very difficult to ascertain accurately. 
Whilst an engineering organisation must work to achieve optimal costs at the 
same time as meeting product functional targets it is the purchasing organisation 
that directly handles and controls costs. For example the purchasing organisation 
may increase piece cost in order to reduce a tooling charge or may increase the 
price of one product line in order to reduce another. This makes life very difficult 
to offer definitive costing evidence. However the results of an initiative 
involving Ford Motor Company and three of its brands namely Jaguar,  
Land Rover and Volvo provided some clues as to the company viewpoint as to 
whether or not the resultant Full Service Supplier initiative provided reduced 
costs. This initiative was based upon a drive to find synergies between the brands 
in order to optimise combined use of resources, product performance and cost. 
Team composition comprised of key engineering and purchasing experts from all 
brands aligned with appropriate part time experts as required. The two examples 
used are both fuel system commodities, both with low specificity but are not 
identified here for reasons of confidentiality.  
 
Product One: 
Based upon cost estimates derived by specialised cross-brand representatives of 
the OEMs, it was estimated that the gaps between current bought prices and 
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estimated value was between 14% and 20% above estimates dependent upon 
brand and supplier. Despite the three brands using product technologies that 
differ in specification and execution these gaps are significant.  
When looking at these figures is important to understand how the economies of 
scale influence the prices particularly when comparing a low volume Land Rover 
derivative with a high volume Ford. To answer this, it must be understood that 
the products are of low specificity and are supplied not only to the fore-
mentioned automotive brands but to other auto-makers globally. Whilst 
manufacturing of these products may be localised to Europe, overheads of 
product design and development are shared at a potentially global level. 
A further look at Price/Volume curves provided by two key suppliers of a similar 
and interchangeable component identified two totally different trends (Figure 
7.2). The only difference between the two commodities is the technology, both in 
design concept and manufacturing processes; however both meet the same 
specifications. 
Supplier one shows no variation between cost and given production volumes. 
This may be an exhibition of the fact that commodity is generic, shared between 
other car manufacturers and therefore given volumes have zero effect on the 
price. 
Supplier two indicates a 22% reduction in cost dependent upon volume. Whilst 
this product cost does indicate a potential to eliminate the identified cost gaps, its 
origin is somewhat questionable for the same reasons identified for the previous 
suppliers trend line. 
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Figure 7.2: Piece Cost/Volume Relationship, Product One 
 
Product Two: 
This commodity is generic; however it is tuned to provide variants suitable for 
individual ranges of products. The total production volumes as indicated below 
in Figure 7.3 represent the total of all variants. 
A benchmarking study based upon offerings from current suppliers and some 
major competitors identified cost gaps of between 9% and 20% compared to 
current prices dependent upon supplier and brand.  
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Commodity Two Price/Volume Trend
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Figure 7.3: Piece Cost/Volume Relationship, Product Two 
 
The price volume trend offered as an example by one of the suppliers involved 
(Figure 7.3) identified savings of 5% based upon potential volumes which was 
far short of even the smallest gap of 9%. 
Further engineering activity between the respective Ford brands ultimately came 
up with a combined plan to improve engineering performance of product two 
with cost reductions of 20% overall. 
 
7.1.1 Summary: Costs 
 
The outcome of both initiatives identified with products One and Two both 
identified considerable cost opportunities, ones that were agreed by the involved 
suppliers prior to formal announcement by the team. In all cases, the exercise 
followed a period of Full Service Supplier involvement, however the savings, 
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and potential product improvements would not have been achieved without 
intense pro-activity within the OEM teams. 
The success of the activities shown and those by other teams show similar 
advantages whether the commodities are based upon fuel or any other 
commodities. 
With the limited data presented the outsourcing of intellectual competence to 
suppliers, in the cases identified, costs were not reduced to a level that is 
competitive based upon the benchmark cost of the newly introduced competitor 
supplier. This shortcoming could potentially be due to a lack of willingness or 
competence. 20% cost disadvantage was used as input to the Outsourcing 
Model based upon the higher cost Product 2 as identified in Table 7.1. 
 
Table 7.1: Resultant Disadvantage regarding “Costs” associated with the 
outsourcing of fuel system external expertise. 
  Resultant Outsourcing 
Advantage/Disadvantage 
 
Pre Outsourcing Status 
 
 
 
Outsourced Status 
-20% 
 
 
7.2 Why: Quality 
 
In line with the respondents reasons for outsourcing illustrated by Elmuti et al. 
(2000) shown in Appendix 5, improved quality is seen as a major advantage 
gained from outsourcing. 
 176 
Within the realms of fuel systems, the outsourcing of design, test, development 
and verification responsibilities provides a further facet of increased 
responsibility that should be measured to assess the level of any quality 
improvement. This is a very difficult aspect to measure directly for many 
reasons. Varying task complexities from programme to programme, increased 
technical requirements resultant from advanced customer legislative 
requirements and varying amount of OEM assistance all combine to provide a 
system that is very difficult to assess for meaningful comparative performance 
data. 
The way this was tackled to provide suitable quality metrics was by selecting a 
component and associated function often needs a great deal of fine tuning during 
development to eliminate fuel filling issues. For this purpose, the fuel filler pipe 
and the associated fuel filling process was selected to provide the benchmark of 
supplier quality.  
 
7.2.1 Fuel filler pipe design and performance factors 
 
A fuel filler pipe (Figure 7.4) has a simple function in that it is designed to 
deliver fuel from a filling dispenser gun at a service station forecourt direct to the  
fuel tank without prematurely stopping or splashing the customer. The fuel filler 
gun should automatically stop flowing when the rated fuel tank capacity is 
achieved. There are many different fuel filler gun styles (Ellaflex Ltd, 1988), 
(Figure 7.5) and geometries that must all be considered. 
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Figure 7.4: Fuel Filler Pipe 
 
Additionally, the flow rates are not standardised and may be set anything 
between 30 & 60 litres/minute, at the discretion of the service station operators. 
The end customer will also have the ability to control gun location within the 
filler pipe aperture or speed of flow by variation of pressure on the gun release 
leaver. Also, similar designs have to cope with either petrol or diesel fuels that 
have different formulations from refinery to refinery with various seasonal 
blends. 
All these factors combine to make a high number of potential variable conditions 
that can significantly alter the quality of the fuel filling experience including 
severe blow back of fuel over the customer or premature and persistent cut-off of 
fuel flow. 
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Figure 7.5: A selection of Fuel Filler Guns from the Range of One Manufacturer 
(Ellaflex Ltd, 1988) 
 
Each programme has to meet strict guidelines in order to meet the various 
customer and safety requirements associated with the fuel filler pipe system, 
notwithstanding the specific routing path that must be achieved from a safe 
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customer friendly filler cap location through the suspension geometry to the tank 
location. This must be achieved not only for the main fuel feed tube but the 
smaller diameter sensing tube as well in order to allow displaced gas to vent to 
the atmosphere. 
The fuel filling development task despite being relatively low tech' in its 
development provides a task that requires much iterative testing that can 
highlight major differences in overall performance based upon development 
resources and diligence. 
 
7.2.2 High density polyethylene versus steel filler pipes 
 
An additional facet that will be investigated later in analysing the "Quality" 
criteria within this case study is the effect of two very different filler pipe 
manufacturing processes: 
Blow moulded High Density Polyethylene (HDPE) 
Cold rolled Steel 
The blow moulded HDPE filler pipe is a lower cost option used in many earlier 
products that has slowly been replaced by cold rolled steel variants in order to 
deliver improvements in other attributes. Whilst the blow moulding process 
enables much greater flexibility within design/development through the 
possibility to optimise package space and complex shapes, the manufacturing 
process can provide significant variability of the wall thickness with resultant 
changes to internal cross Chapteral profiles, increasing the possibility of fuel 
filling performance variability. 
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By contrast the steel tube filler pipes have very precisely controlled internal 
dimensions but provide greater restriction in adapting to available package space 
or changes of cross Chapteral form. 
 
7.2.3 Phases of outsourcing and variables to be compared 
 
Quality data from eight car product lines (programmes) within Ford Europe were 
compared for the assessment. In addition to the comparison of two technologies 
the assessment also included many other phases of outsourcing that may not be 
readily apparent. The implementation of outsourcing passes through many 
incremental phases commencing with the OEM "in-house" competence whereby 
experienced engineers (experience of at least are vehicle development 
programme relating to the filler pipe commodity) in control of design and 
development to a final scenario whereby the OEM experience is low (first 
programme with this commodity) and totally dependent upon the supplier pool 
of experience. In between these extremes lies a variety of migration scenarios 
whereby none of the two extremes are fully represented. 
An important factor also considered within the data analysis must also be the 
amount of "newness" in the filler pipe design i.e. a 100% carryover fuel filler 
pipe may be expected to perform much better than one that is totally new 
because sufficient time has elapsed to eliminate all known quality issues. 
Summarising the above, (Table 7.2), provides an overview of the individual case 
study programme combinations used within the quality assessment. 
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Table 7.2: Combinations of New Filler Pipe Programmes Associated with 
Engineering Lead and Percentage New Development available for Analysis. 
Filler Pipe 
Technology 
Estimated 
Percentage new 
development 
required. 
Engineering 
Lead 
Supportive 
OEM 
experience, 
(High/Low) 
Programme 
Designation 
Steel  100% OEM N/A 1A 
Steel 100% Supplier High 1B 
Steel  100% Supplier High 2 
Steel  20% Supplier Low 3A 
Steel  90% Supplier Low 5 
HDPE 100% OEM N/A 3B 
HDPE  100% OEM N/A 3C 
HDPE  0% Supplier Low 4 
 
In order to develop a prediction of logical performance ranking, the tabulated 
combinations were subjected to a Kepner-Tregoe analysis (Table 7.3). The 
process of comparing quality influential factors associated with each programme 
combination and apportioning their respective weighting values would provide a 
ranking of quality potential. It must be pointed out that in the "Filler Pipe 
Programme" columns, weightings are omitted in programmes that are not 
associated with individual "Quality Influential Factors". This ranking would be 
useful in the analysis of actual quality metrics obtained from the Ford 
computerised Analytical Warranty System. 
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Table 7.3: Kepner-Tregoe Analysis of Automotive Filler Pipe Programmes and 
Factors Influencing Fuel Fill Quality. 
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Test Facilities 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
Steel Filler 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 4 4 4 4 4 4
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Totals 21 26 29 29 29 30 32 32
Ranking 5 4 3 3 3 2 1 1
2=Greater advantage,1=Same advantage, 0 lesser advantage
Quality Influential Factors Filler Pipe Programmes
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The Kepner-Tregoe analysis shown in Table 7.3 provides the potential quality 
influential ranking for each programme based upon the various combinations of 
technology, carry-over content and supplier/OEM lead and experience. The main 
purpose of conducting the Kepner-Tregoe analysis is to be able to put resultant 
quality results into perspective. 
Results from the Kepner-Tregoe analysis show equal rankings for some car 
development programmes. For example programmes 1A & 1B the highest 
ranked were both led by an experienced OEM team using steel filler pipe 
technology that could theoretically, based upon the discussion in Chapter 6.2.2, 
provide improved performance over the HDPE counterpart. The lowest ranked 
programme is programme 5, a programme with minor carryover content, led by a 
supplier team and supported by a lower experienced OEM team. The Kepner  
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Tregoe process was particularly useful in this investigation as it was able to 
compare and rank filler pipe technology to OEM/Supplier engineering lead 
which otherwise would be very difficult to compare. 
 
7.2.4 Quality analysis 
 
Using the Ford Analytical Warranty System as described in the Methodology, 
data was analysed based upon the various progressively evolved phases of 
outsourcing identified in Table 7.2 and subsequently subjected to the Kepner-
Tregoe analysis (Table 7.3). The Analytical Warranty System (AWS) provides a 
sophisticated database available for comparing Repairs/1000 quality metrics. 
Additionally it is a system that contains data on vehicle programmes from 
current date where they were executed totally by suppliers back to programmes 
covered solely by the OEM. Whilst there are databases that cover other aspects 
of quality, they are not able to provide data comparisons due to their more recent 
introduction to Ford. However where other databases can provide data that 
provides relevance either in strengthening or disputing AWS data they would be 
used. 
 
7.2.5 Ford analytical warranty system (AWS) 
 
The initial investigation into Ford Motor Company's fuel filling quality concerns 
was conducted by searching the Analytical Warranty System for metrics 
associated with the designated fault codes "Slow Fuel Tank Fill/Spit-back". 
These codes were those entered in Ford's warranty analysis system by the 
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mechanics in the Ford dealer network. The codes were associated with the 
customer complaints that need to be rectified. Each claim had its own fault codes 
associated with it so that concerns could be compartmentalised and matched with 
associated dealer costs (part and labour). The particular fault code above is one 
that is always associated with fuel filling i.e. the customer has difficulty in filling 
the tank at some time in the fuel fill process. With the exception of fuel 
indication, fuel filling is only fuel system related attribute that has direct first 
hand customer impact. Typically if fuel filling issues are present they cause the 
customer much dissatisfaction. 
 
7.2.6 Analysis of high specificity end commodity 
 
An initial investigation of Repairs/1000 where all cases of “slow fuel tank 
fill/spit-back” where reported provided inconclusive results as it was clear that 
misreporting had included repaired items that had no direct association with the 
reported issue. In order to rectify this, a filter was applied within the data that 
identified repairs including Fuel tank and/or filler pipe (Figure 7.6). 
Figure 7.6 provides an indication of some trends. Whilst the OEM led 
programmes (white traces) are grouped together in the lower order of repairs per 
thousand, the Supplier lead programmes cover a greater spread including the best 
and worst results, trace 4 and trace 5. 
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Figure 7.6: Fuel Tank and Filler Pipe repairs due to "Slow Fuel Tank Fill and 
Spit-back" 
 
A further search was carried out concentrating on the fuel filler pipe and “slow 
fuel tank fill/spit-back” fault. The resultant search (Figure 7.7) identifying that 
the filler pipe provided an approximate 70% contribution to fuel concerns in 
service. Despite the difference in contribution to the fault, the relationships and 
trends programme to programme are similar in both fuel tank and filler 
compared to fuel filler pipe only. 
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Figure 7.7: Fuel Filler Pipe repairs due to "Slow Fuel Tank Fill/Spit back". 
 
Based upon this similarity, the filler pipe only data (Figure 7.7) was compared 
with expected performance identified by the Kepner-Tregoe analysis identified 
in Table 7.3. The result of this, Table 7.4 provides a visual comparison between 
the two sets of results i.e. expected performance (Kepner-Tregoe) versus actual 
performance (AWS). 
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Table 7.4: Comparison of Supplier/OEM Lead Fuel Filler-pipe Programmes 
Showing Expected Quality Performance Level and Actual Performance Level 
Ranking. (Programmes Identified in Actual Performance Level Ranking Order) 
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A major conflict in expected versus actual quality data was that high density 
polyethylene (HDPE) filler pipes, whether under a supplier or OEM engineering 
lead, provided a clear advantage in fuel filling quality compared to their steel 
counterparts. This was an unexpected result which required further investigation. 
Whilst the supplier lead HDPE filler pipe (Programme 4) clearly split the 
performance levels of the two OEM lead programmes (3B & 3C), little can be 
judged on comparative performance because the supplier lead\programme was 
almost totally carryover from a previous OEM lead programme. If this result was 
eliminated, the only supplier lead programme that exceeded an OEM lead 
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programme was that of designation 1B. This programme was heavily supported 
by a highly experienced OEM engineer using OEM located facilities for 
development testing and this scenario was very similar to a total OEM executed 
programme in that only the test operatives were different. In both cases the test 
engineers would be subject support from responsible OEM staff. 
Following this up by comparing the two suppliers lead steel filler pipe 
programmes which were supported by highly experienced OEM engineers, from 
Figure 7.7 it can be seen that there is an approximate 6 to 1 proportional 
detriment in Repairs/1000 at 12 months with Programme 2 compared to 1B. The 
main differences between development is that programme 1B was developed at 
OEM facilities by the supplier who manufactures the filler pipe whereas 
programme 2 was developed away from the OEM by a supplier who does not 
manufacture the filler pipe.  
As predicted by the Kepner-Tregoe analysis, the weakest quality level resulted 
from a Supplier led programme with low experienced OEM support despite 
being tested at the OEM location. 
As stated in Chapter 7.2.5, the AWS is a comprehensive warranty data base that 
provides historic data on various car product lines that sufficiently cover the 
various levels of outsourcing. A subsequent search of additional metrics using 
Global Quality Repair System (GQRS) of Things Gone Wrong provided limited 
data but was sufficient to confirm that programme 1B provided lower quality 
issues than either 3A or 2 which was in accord with the results already presented. 
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Based upon this investigation on High Specificity commodity development being 
led by either Supplier or OEM the following summary was made with respect to 
fuel filling quality: 
 
1. OEM lead provided highest quality level 
2. Supplier lead with experienced OEM support improved quality level 
3. Using test facilities close to the OEM and/or allowing the responsible 
manufacturing supplier to carry out develop provided quality 
advantage in conjunction with experienced OEM support. 
4. Supplier lead with inexperienced OEM support provided lowest 
quality. 
5. High carryover content that requires less development provided 
greater quality advantage. 
6. HDPE filler pipe provide improved quality over their steel 
counterparts. 
 
7.2.7 Relative supplier/OEM quality performance over time 
 
The indication that within the automotive industry, quality is getting better 
(Reitzle, 2000) can be reviewed in comparing supplier & OEM performance. 
Assuming this is the case, the quality performance characteristics measured on a 
representative spread of supplier and OEM led programmes over a period of 
years may be optimistically biased towards the more recent Supplier led 
programmes relating to Fuel Tanks and filling. In order to address this, the fuel 
tank & filler pipe quality performance was totalled for 11 years of production 
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(1992-2003). Based upon 12 months accumulated Repairs/1000 for both tank 
and filler pipe independently. 
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Figure 7.8: Trend line Showing Average Annual Repairs/1000 on Fuel Tanks & 
Fuel Filler Pipes Related to Fuel Filling Issues for Total Single OEM Population 
from 1992 through to 2003 Model Years. 
 
Figure 7.8 shows that the fuel tank quality improved markedly in 1993 model-
year coincident with the phased introduction of polymeric fuel tanks replacing 
those previously manufactured from steel. Additionally the fuel filler pipe 
quality was nominally at zero Repairs/1000 up until 1997 which coincides with 
the phased introduction of steel filler pipes replacing polymeric filler pipes. 
Where the estimation was that fuel filler pipes contributed an approximated 70% 
towards the concern of "Slow fuel tank fill/spit-back" (Figure 7.7), Figure 7.8 
indicates this may be true from 1999 but prior to this period the trend was the 
other way round with fuel tanks providing the major quality issues. 
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To complete the picture relating to historic progress and improvements in quality 
the independent graphs of both fuel tank and filler pipe repairs/1000 were plotted 
alongside the previously shown specific programme repairs/1000 for first year of 
production after programme launch (Figures 7.9 and 7.10). 
 
7.2.8 Supplier/OEM fuel tank - Time based quality performance 
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Figure 7.9: Trend line Showing Average Annual Repairs/1000 on Fuel Tanks Related 
to Fuel Filling Issues for Total Single OEM Population from 1992 Through to 2003 
Model-Years with Individual Programme 12 Months in Service Repairs/1000 Shown 
Individually. 
 
The time based quality improvement (Figure 7.9) shows that improvements have 
been made in the fuel tank. The first twelve months in service usually represents 
the worst case and so it is remarkable to see that most programmes were better 
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than the average of existing programmes. This may have been due to new 
developments based upon lessons learned from existing programmes, 
particularly for OEM lead programmes. The only exceptions were the two 
Supplier led programmes 3A and 2. 
 
7.2.9 Supplier/OEM fuel filler pipe - Time based quality performance 
 
The phased introduction of steel filler pipes in 1997 (Figure 7.10) preceded the 
introduction of supplier lead programmes by one year. The increased 
repairs/1000 indicates that the steel filler pipes contributed to the overall 
decrease in quality from that date. Two supplier lead programmes (4 and 1B) 
provided higher quality levels (lower repairs/1000) than the general production 
trend however programme 4 was a programme based upon very minor changes 
to a previous design. Programmes 3A, 2A and 5 progressively get much worse in 
quality levels  
From the OEM lead programmes, one observes that two programmes (3C and 
1A) provided lower quality than the general trend however programme 1A was 
the first steel filler pipe for Ford in recent history and therefore Ford was new to 
this alternative technology. Despite being a pilot steel filler pipe programme for 
Ford, the first 12 months post launch Repairs/1000 were only marginally higher 
than the first major supplier lead programme, three years later and would 
comfortably be within the general quality trend following greater progressive 
introduction of steel filler-pipes. 
Programme 3C whilst being outside of the average level zero trend shows much 
better quality than the two latter programmes 2 and 3. 
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The phased introduction of steel filler pipes identified by programme 1A (OEM 
led) slightly precedes the introduction of supplier led programmes which with 
the exception of programme 4 are all steel filler pipes. One can see that 
following the OEM led programme (1A), the subsequent supplier led 
programmes provide lower quality levels as time progresses after programme 1B 
as OEM support decreases. 
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Figure 7.10: Trend line Showing Average Annual Repairs/1000 on Fuel Filler 
Pipes Related to Fuel Filling Issues for Total Single OEM Population from 1992 
Through to 2003 Model-Years with Individual Programme 12 Months in Service 
Repairs/1000 Shown Individually. 
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7.2.10 Quality performance after 12 months in service 
 
Within the first 12 months of launch of a new car model, early life failures often 
occur which are rapidly resolved to ensure that accumulated customer concerns 
do not deter the overall public perception of the new product's quality level and 
the response to revised designs should be reflected in the following year's quality 
levels. An investigation into the subsequent 12 months in service Repairs/1000 
(12-24 months after launch) was made to evaluate how an OEM led programme 
would compare with a supplier led programme. The results, again established by 
using the Analytical Warranty System are shown in Figure 7.11, from which it is 
clear that the three OEM led programmes all indicated a resolution of the "Slow 
fuel tank fill/spit-back" concern description. All three programmes 1A, 4 and 3B 
reduced to a nominal zero repairs/1000 status.  
The supplier performance however was more confused with two programmes, 2 
and 3a showing positive improvements and programme 1B that showed good 
performance in the first 12 months of production then providing deterioration in 
quality. It may have been significant here that the experienced OEM support was 
transferred to another programme after the launch of programme 1B leaving the 
supplier to resolve concerns with more inexperienced individuals. 
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Figure 7.11: Comparison of OEM and Supplier Led Repairs/1000 of Filler Pipes 
Related to Fuel Filling Issues. 
 
Whilst the rate of quality improvement is clear in both suppliers 2 and 3A the 
outcome of changes over the second year are far in excess of that of the OEM. 
The greater quality improvement of Supplier 2 over 3a may be attributed to the 
fact that experienced OEM support was still available with shared equity in 
concern resolution for the two years beyond programme launch. 
 196 
7.2.11 Summary of supplier/OEM quality performance on high specificity 
           end commodity 
 
1. Experienced OEM support appears to be a positive factor in accelerating 
supplier lead programme concern resolution. 
 
2. Despite identifying some positive efforts by suppliers, the general 
observation is that supplier lead performance falls behind that of an OEM lead 
programme based upon a high specificity end commodity. 
 
Whilst different quality metrics have been examined here to ensure they are not 
conflicting, the one selected for the Outsourcing Model is those based upon 
Figure 6.7. The Average Repairs/1000 after 12 months in service of OEM lead 
programmes was a fifth of the Supplier lead programmes. Whilst the calculated 
deterioration in performance is minus 400%, the resultant ranking within the 
model must therefore be minus identified by a 100% decrease in quality 
levels identified on supplier lead programmes. 
 
7.3 Why: Technology 
 
In Chapter 6.1, when ascertaining the expertise of the Supplier versus OEM it 
was established that expertise was almost equal between the two parties. 
Additionally the investigation into patent activity showed a clear lead in relevant 
activity of Ford Motor Company related to the individual Tier One Suppliers. 
Before Full Service Suppliers within fuel systems the relationship was more or 
less “make to print” but after, the supplier was more empowered to bring on new 
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technology if it was available and potentially enhance total competence. In order 
to investigate this, the following relate to two examples of innovation introduced 
on Ford products. 
 
7.3.1 Example one: Focus fuel filler pipe insert 
 
The first example is an insert, legally required to fit into the filler pipe at its entry 
point in order to stop diesel fuel filler nozzles being inserted and used in a lead 
free gasoline fuelled vehicles. This provides added complexity in both 
manufacturing and final assembly plants. Typical technologies include the insert 
being mechanically located, usually welded into the filler pipe opening during 
the manufacture of the filler pipe at the suppliers. 
This process has some disadvantages. 
 
1. If the incorrect filler pipe is fitted in the OEM assembly plant, correction 
is very time consuming. 
2. The allocation of a Lead free gasoline filler pipe is defined early in the 
manufacturing process thereby reducing flexibility to change product 
mixes required by the OEM at short notice. 
3. The early inclusion of the inhibitor within the filler pipe during the 
supplier’s process is not suited to just in time deliveries. Ideally its 
inclusion should be later in the process to allow maximum flexibility 
within the process till last minute. 
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The works of Ricardo et al. (2000) and Alderson (1950) regarding postponement 
of customisation provided the background theory to improving production 
processes and hence the basis for a Ford based proposal for the adoption of an 
insert that could be fitted either at the end of the filler pipe production process or 
at the assembly plant.  
The supplier intention prior to any discussion on this topic was to use 
conventional fore-mentioned technology. After some meetings initiated by Ford, 
the suppliers were finally convinced of the potential of such designs and agreed 
to pursue the introduction of a suitable concept. The net result was that the 
supplier developed and introduced the inhibitor in line with the proposal with a 
considerable resultant cost saving. 
 
7.3.2 Example two: Misfueling inhibitor 
 
This example was conceived and introduced during the course of this research 
and provides a further example of technology led by Ford. It comprises 
technology that can detect the difference between a diesel and lead-free gasoline 
fuel filler gun and inhibit discharge of the incorrect fuel into the fuel tank. Its 
first introduction was on the 2008 model-year Mondeo. 
 
Leading up to this time many suppliers were working on new technology of cap-
less fuel systems. In the meantime within the media, there were high numbers 
reported of customers of many brands misfueling their vehicles (Qureshi, 2007 
and Kemp, 2005) which resulted in some patent activity within Ford but no 
suitable production solution. However, the new cap-less technology being 
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developed by the enabled the adoption of this inhibition technology. It was 
uncertain if the suppliers would have considered combining these technologies 
or even of introducing some form of diesel/gasoline filler gun inhibition without 
the encouragement of an OEM i.e. Ford and the result was that the suppliers 
were able to devise appropriate technologies suitable for production. 
 
7.3.3 Summary: Technology 
 
The two examples identified do show benefit from to the collaboration between 
suppliers and the OEM. Both examples were developed by the suppliers without 
input from both parties. The work of Momme et al. (2002) and Schrader et al. 
(1996) related to customer specifications would suggest that it may be unlikely 
that many companies would push beyond immediate commitments to work out 
ideas that may benefit the relationship as a whole.  
The following points have been identified for specific comments related to the 
outsourcing model: 
 
 In both cases the OEM, having identified the fundamentals of the new 
technologies, given adequate resources could have developed them unilaterally. 
 In both cases the suppliers did not think about the two technology advances 
before being presented with them by the OEM. 
 Patents were secured by the suppliers which caused inability of the OEM to 
use common technologies with other suppliers. 
 
 200 
The effect on the outsourcing model would be that if all intellectual competency 
was removed from the OEM, this technology would possibly not have emerged. 
The resultant outcome regarding access to technology is viewed as neutral in 
the outsourcing model. 
 
7.4 Why: Resources 
 
Resources within the realms of fuel system engineering comprise two main 
components: 
 
1. Human resources needed to design & engineer the product to a level 
suitable for mass production and customer usage. This would normally 
involve a combination of designing products to meet new model package 
requirements, assessing the designs to ensure they have the capability of 
meeting corporate and legislative specifications followed by sign-off and 
confirmation. These tasks fall into the hands of design engineers 
(draughtsman), component & test engineers. 
2. Facilities associated with the delivery of the tasks identified above e.g. 
draughting facilities (CAD workstations), test facilities and associated office 
space. 
 
Prior to the Full Service Supplier initiative, the main task of the supplier was to 
manufacture feasible reliable designs to a given component specification. When 
things go wrong e.g. a component failed in a durability test it would have been 
Ford’s responsibility to lead the investigation into failure, find a solution and 
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issue a design change whilst negotiating with suppliers to accommodate the new 
design and assuring part meets the durability requirement prior to production. 
Following FSS, Ford was losing many tasks but gaining new ones mainly related 
to the management of the new arrangement. 
The above is an outline of the theoretical situation. In order to substantiate what 
the real effect in manpower and facilities one would need access to an array of 
confidential budget data and detailed programme descriptions. In order to 
provide an indicator of the resultant resource situation, the manpower and 
facilities will be discussed independently: 
 
7.4.1 Human resources (manpower) 
 
The reasons outlined above identify that there would be some difficulty in 
obtaining absolute data regarding manning levels associated with FSS. For 
example, since the introduction of FSS, Ford Motor Company has increased the 
global production of many products with extra resources being needed to 
facilitate new suppliers in other parts of the world. This increase may offset any 
decrease offered by the introduction of FSS. Figure 7.12 shows an indication of 
the headcount in fuel system engineering and the total chassis draughting/CAE 
team for the periods 1991 to 2003. Some years are omitted because they were 
unavailable. The data is based upon organisation plans from the individual years 
identified. The organisation plans were reviewed with detailed knowledge of 
individuals and their roles but one must be warned of a potential plus/minus 10% 
variation indicated on the data shown due to people moving roles within years or 
covering multiple tasks. 
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For clarification, the chassis draughting/CAE headcount is a pool of people to 
support all chassis related work. In reality fuel systems would normally account 
for about 15% of the identified headcount. 
As can be seen from Figure 7.12, there appears to be an increase of fuel system 
engineers over the transitional period however and without specific and detailed 
programme/budget details the true situation cannot be assessed accurately. 
Likewise with the draftsmen/CAE there has been dramatic change in headcount. 
The decline in draughtsman at the time of Full Service Supplier activities was 
dramatic, particularly to detail draughting activities, however the overall 
packaging of designs into the systems has remained. Along with this remnant 
there has also been a rapid improvement in CAE analytical techniques  
 
 
Figure 7.12: Ford Europe Fuel System, Design and Engineering Resource Trend 
1991-2003 
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that enable improved performance in analysis of production feasibility, crash 
performance etc that have necessitated new headcount. The net balance again 
requires detailed analysis of confidential budget/programme specific data. 
Outside of the manpower requirements already identified, another major effect 
has been on test personnel; however, because high level vehicle/system testing is 
still retained within Ford, some capability in the form of facilities and manpower 
to run them is still required. In the absence of any facilities due to FSS 
efficiencies, Ford would have to offset the lack of capability by procuring the 
services externally either through the suppliers or other agencies. 
 
7.4.2 Resources (facilities) 
 
As mentioned in the human resource changes, there has been some change in 
headcount with a resultant effect on facilities associated with the tasks e.g. CAD 
workstations. However part of the initiative is supported by Ford supplying 
facilities for any supplier engineers required to be within a Ford facility. On this 
basis there must be a great deal of substitution of heads which combined with the 
2003 headcount figures identified would provide an assumed increase in the 
resultant quantity of draughting/CAE facilities. 
From the testing point of view, the reduction in Ford in-house facilities was 
achieved over the period providing a clear and significant reduction in resources. 
Whilst this shows a clear advantage on paper, any testing still within Ford’s 
responsibility would still have to be procured externally and would provide a 
negative offset to any advantage achieved. 
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7.4.3 Summary: Resources 
 
The data provided above provides no clear picture to any accrued resource 
advantage with the exception of the elimination of the Ford test facilities 
although here the advantage is unclear unless compared with the external costs 
that have developed since the elimination. 
Clearly, the transfer of major responsibilities to suppliers has resulted in larger 
dedicated teams within the various supply bases so a combined headcount would 
be much higher than before outsourcing. 
The only clear elimination of resources that has been identified so far is that of 
the fuel test facilities. Whilst a representative from Ford testing department may 
clearly state that the FSS initiative clearly provided savings, the overall picture 
described paints an unclear picture when looked from a wider viewpoint. Figure 
7.13 shows the main influential factors discussed.  
Bold influences are not resultant of outsourcing but affect resources
New roles resultant from 
Outsourcing (FSS)
Management and budget for Ford 
role testing
Globalisation of Manufacturing
New Engineering tools
Increased programme content
Outsourcing (FSS)
Reduced programme 
content
Resources1.xls
Facilities for supplier engineers
Efficiencies from new 
engineering tools
 
 
Figure 7.13: Influential Forces Affecting Resources within Ford Fuel System 
Engineering. 
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Unfortunately whilst some advantages may be clear, they are not clearly capable 
of being measured within the availability of data and therefore must be left as an 
open question and therefore identified as “Neutral” as an outcome in the 
outsourcing model. 
 
7.5 Why: Capital Funding Rationalisation 
 
The full Service Supplier programme that instigated some actions regarding 
outsourcing was coincident with further initiatives that passed more of the tool 
ownership to suppliers of commodities. Costs for tooling would ultimately be 
recovered as amortization within the piece price (Automotive News, 1999, 
Ford.com 1999). Similarly with tooling it would be normal practice for any 
supplier to recover any additive engineering costs necessary to design and 
develop the new products and again this would have to be within piece cost 
amortization. It may be that there is some minor advantage if any of the potential 
savings that may be achieved through reduced resources and associated 
overheads within the outsourcer exists. If this is the case then it would show up 
within reduced resources. On this basis this aspect will be excluded within the 
decision model for this particular case study. 
 
7.6 Why: Competitive Position 
 
The period of Full Service Suppliers for the fuel system included many major 
regional and global influences that had or are having major effects on the 
worldwide environment. “The automotive industry worldwide is currently in the 
midst of wholesale restructuring with continuing consolidation and a fair number 
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of distressed situations” (PricewaterhouseCoopers, (2005). Like many other 
companies this has affected Ford Motor Company resultant in a “spin-off” of 
their electronics division now called Visteon in June 2000 (Visteon, 2000a) and a 
more recent admission by Bill Ford, following the publicity surrounding the 
potential merger discussions between General Motors and PSA that anything is 
on the table for Ford also, (Maynard, 2006). In Ford’s homeland in USA, overall 
US car sales fell one million from 17.7 million in May 2005 to May 2006. This 
fall in sales was the 12th straight decline for Ford and the fourth in a row for GM 
(BBC News, 2006). 
This distressed state has come about through many factors, many of which are 
influenced by global factors which are not only hitting OEMs but suppliers also. 
The filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy by the massive Delphi organisation; (The 
Economist, 2005), a major player in fuel systems amongst many other products 
is a typical high publicity case being observed with interest and followed by 
many others. 
 
7.6.1 Global influences and effects on the automotive industry 
 
According to PricewaterhouseCoopers (2006), the challenges facing the 
automotive business relate to higher raw material costs, minimal profit margins, 
more knowledgeable consumers and new market entrants. The same source also 
lists the challenges faced by most OEMs in their home markets. 
1. Downward pressure on vehicle transaction prices 
2. Supplier instability 
3. Drive for shareholder value 
 207 
4. Mounting legacy costs 
5. Difficult labour relations 
 
The challenges listed are numerous and whether on an industry or home market 
scale many of the items are inter-related. 
Taking some of these items one at a time, the massive industrial growth within 
China (Figure 7.14) is not only causing a massive drain on global commodity 
resources but also providing increased competition within the automotive sector. 
This has a twofold effect of increasing pressure on established OEMs to reduce 
prices and effectively increases costs by providing great competition in the 
purchasing costs associated within the manufacture of the vehicles. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.14: Sources of Global Growth (2005-2010) 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2006) 
 
 208 
Oil price trends over recent years have been turbulent and generally increasing 
(Figure 7.15). In July 2006 crude oil prices peaked at $77.35 a barrel (Morrison, 
2006) 
Although this most recent surge was caused by potential hurricane damage in the 
Gulf of Mexico and potential fears of conflict in Lebanon the chart attached 
identifies increased demand within Asia as the biggest factor in increased oil 
prices. These factors do not only affect the business of manufacturing cars, it 
also affects peoples buying decisions. With increasing fuel costs, customers are 
more likely to look at buying cars that are more economical to run. Mixed in 
with this is the effect on customers of increasing global terrorism; (Glasser, 
2005) and the worries of global warming; (BBC News, 2006a) 
The threat of pension legacy costs is shown clearly in Figure 7.16 whereby more 
and more established businesses are showing deficits in their financial 
obligations to retired workers. Supplier Delphi with future pension obligations of 
$8.5 billion has only $4.2 billion to fund them (The Economist (2005). To put 
things into perspective General Motors, the largest OEM in the world has legacy 
costs of $1,525 for health care and $675 for pension costs on every car they sell; 
(Hammond, 2006).
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Figure 7.15: World Events and Crude Oil Prices 2001-2005 (WTRG Economics, 2006) 
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Figure 7.16: The Funding Status of Standard and Poor’s Top 500 Companies 
(The Economist, 2005) 
 
7.6.2 Supplier response 
 
The response by the suppliers within fuel systems is to often follow the lead 
indicated by Ford Motor Company and other OEMs. Typically all major Tier one 
suppliers have manufacturing facilities in all the major regions of the world 
supportive of Ford manufacturing location (Ford Motor Company Ltd, 2006a). 
The spread of manufacturing bases effectively provide two benefits i.e. 
providing products for local markets and also allowing OEMs to capitalise on the 
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low cost country sources in order to compete with the new entrants from these 
locations and others. Typically of this is that exemplified by the regions occupied 
by Kautex Textron, a leading fuel system supplier (Figure 7.17). 
 
 
Figure 7.17: Kautex Textron Sites Worldwide (Kautex, 2007) 
The key benefit of course is that the OEMs can source components from varying 
locations with a degree of confidence that the commodity will be of similar 
quality to that produced in the developed western countries but at the lower cost 
afforded by lower wages. 
Within the realms of outsourcing, this response of multi-national activity cannot 
be seen as an advantage afforded by the outsourcing of intellectual competence 
as once commodity has been developed once in the western world it only needs 
to be reproduced in other locations with no additional expertise required beyond 
normal manufacturing competence. It must be assumed some engineering 
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intellectual competence support would be necessary to support but this would 
also have been included within any headcount efficiencies already discussed. 
Ford’s response to customer worries of global warming and escalating fuel costs 
has been to implement in a £1 billion investment in new technologies related to 
drastically increasing the economy of diesel and gasoline engines plus 
development of hybrid technologies; (Booth, 2006). This action, whilst not 
necessarily effecting fuel system technology to a major degree may ultimately 
have some effects particularly for example if Ford went 100% to electric cars 
which could make fuel system competence redundant. The Ford strategy as 
mentioned whilst including some degree of new hybrid technology would have 
no major effect on the fore-mentioned Chassis Fuel System. 
 
7.6.3 Summary: Competitive position 
 
The comments and evidence provided related to the outsourcing of intellectual 
competence within the field of Chassis Fuel Systems provides little advantage in 
exposure to competitive position in the truly global sense. Both suppliers and 
OEMs are under similar and related pressures and whilst a supplier may collapse 
through financial difficulty, the OEM can only respond by re-sourcing or 
providing financial backing to the failed supplier. In the short term, the only 
solution would be the latter as even a change of supplier would need a 
development programme to confirm performance and durability targets are 
maintained. In conclusion, the resultant input to the case study outsourcing 
model will be neutral for competitive position. 
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7.7 Summary: Case Study 2  
 
The completed case study for a high specificity end product (Figure 7.18) shows 
that no positive benefit has been gained through the outsourcing case presented 
with an increase in costs and reduction in quality levels. Following the fact that 
Chapter 6 identified that the outsourcer had greater expertise than the suppliers 
this final conclusion may have been expected, however final discussion will take 
place after case study 3 (Chapter 8). 
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Figure 7.18: Resultant Outsourcing Decision Model Study for Outsourcing of 
Intellectual Competency Based Upon a High Specificity End Product 
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Chapter 8: CASE STUDY 3 – OUTSOURCING OF 
INTELLECTUAL COMPETENCY RELATING TO A 
LOW SPECIFICITY END COMMODITY 
 
Following similar practice to Chapter 6 and 7, for clarity, Figure 4.4 has again 
been modified to identify what has been accomplished so far for Case study 3 
and what Chapter 8 will be covering. 
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Figure 8.1: Outsourcing Decision Model Validation Plan highlighting what has 
already been covered in Chapter 6 and what will be covered in Chapter 8 for 
Case study 3 
 
 216 
Similar to selecting the fuel filler pipe and related concern "slow fuel tank 
fill/spit-back" as a means of comparing available quality data on both OEM and 
Supplier lead programmes on a high specificity end commodity, a similar 
commodity was selected to provide comparisons for low specificity end 
commodities. The component selected was a sender unit, an electro-mechanical 
component that is mounted in the fuel tank to provide an electrical signal to the 
gauge mounted on the vehicle dashboard to allow the driver to know the level of 
fuel in available when driving. 
As with fuel filling, the fuel level indication system of which the sender unit is a 
major part is one that has high impact on customers and therefore one that 
provokes immediate dissatisfaction responses if not meeting customer 
expectations. Variability within the associated components combined with 
relative fragility of sender units and that the system represents the efforts of 
many departmental organisations, both electrical and mechanical also provides 
an environment for more issues to arise. 
The low specificity of the sender unit as a commodity is defined by the fact that 
although it is a final customised component, built to suit only one application it 
is however manufactured similar to other competitive parts as a mildly 
customised combination of generic components used across the automotive 
industry. Please see Figure 8.2, a typical sender unit.  
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Figure 8.2: Typical Fuel Tank Sender Unit. 
 
Similar again to the high specificity case identified earlier whereby the early life 
failure concern description used was "Slow fuel tank fill/spit-back", there were 
similar related descriptions within the Analytical Warranty System related to fuel 
filling. In the case of the sender unit, the concern description used as part of the 
AWS database search facility was "Fuel gauge troubles". Again linking this 
search with appropriate components, in this case the sender unit provided a 
representation of the quality level of this part and its contribution level to the 
particular concern. 
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8.1 Common Fields of Investigation between Case Studies 2 and 3 
 
In order to avoid repetition of work, the following Case Study 3 will use much of 
the data provided by Case Study 2 where relevant. In most cases, absolute data 
on individual commodities is confidential and/or confused. In case study one, 
many inputs were provided based upon generic data with argument to support. 
On this basis, within the following Case Study 3, the only input that will be 
investigated to provide a unique input to the outsourcing model will be that for 
improved quality within the Positive Outcomes? field. 
 
8.2 Why Outsource: Quality 
 
To lay out the foundation of quality investigation of the sender unit, an initial 
search was made covering four cases for one year service in each model year 
from 1992 to 2003 for the total European population of Ford vehicles. Three 
major searches were included: 
 
1. All indication Repairs/1000 which includes all components that could be 
included. 
2. All sender repair/1000 which would include faults other than "Fuel gauge 
troubles". 
3. Sender Repairs/1000 associated with "Fuel gauge troubles". 
4. Fuel Tank Repairs/1000 associated with "Fuel gauge troubles". 
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The reason for this combination of results was to ensure that the sender unit was 
a major impact on fuel level indication quality and also to ensure a level of 
confidence in the AWS system providing data that represented a plausible and 
acceptable logic i.e. sender units provide a major contribution to fuel indication 
issues. 
Figure 8.3 provides the graphs of data obtained from the initial searches within 
the database. 
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Figure 8.3: Total OEM European Fuel Level Indication Related Repairs/1000 12 
Months Post Vehicle Launch. 
 
With the exception of fuel tank related to fuel level indication issues, there was a 
strong correlation between searches one to three above. Furthermore it appears 
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that indication issues provide the major contribution to general sender issues and 
also that sender units are a major contributor to indication issues in general. All 
this was expected with no surprises; however the sender unit does provide other 
functions that could have shifted the relative quality levels. 
On the basis of the initial search, the plan was set to compare individual supplier 
and OEM lead programmes quality performance levels on selected programmes  
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Figure 8.4: Trend-Line Showing OEM Total Production Average Annual 
Repairs/1000 on Sender Unit Related to Fuel Level Indication Issues from 1992 
through to 2003 Model-Years Compared to Equivalent Individual Programme 
Data 
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of 12 months accumulated Repairs/1000 after initial launch. The search was 
based upon the fore-mentioned "Fuel gauge troubles" linked to the sender unit. 
Once established, these data points were plotted in relationship to the total 
European Ford population of annual repairs/1000 for the same search criteria. 
Figure 8.4 provides the results of this task. 
The relationship between the OEM and supplier shown in Figure 8.3 is perhaps a 
little unusual. One could say that the supplier and OEM are the same but in fact 
that is not true. The situation is that Ford initially had knowledge and design 
expertise available "in-house" responsible for sender units. This part of the 
organisation although not within the responsibility of the fuel tank engineering 
team worked in parallel to engineer a total system. One could say that they were 
an internal supplier to the fuel tank area however they did also have 
responsibility for the fuel indication attribute. When Ford divested itself of 
various competences to an organisation that eventually was known as Visteon, 
some, but not all employees followed the migration to effectively become an 
independent supplier thereby taking away the expertise from the parent Ford 
organisation. The graph above therefore represents a full transition from OEM 
lead through to independent supplier with many disturbance factors in between 
associated with new personnel, change of attitudes, re-location of people and 
establishment of new facilities. 
If supplier lead programmes 2 and 5 were ignored it would be easy to assume 
that supplier lead programmes were definitely not as effective as OEM lead, 
however the later performance of supplier (programmes 2 and 5) indicate a 
major shift towards positive performance. 
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In the cases studied, OEM experience migrated to the supplier and therefore 
initially after the transition, OEM experience was extremely low and therefore 
very dependent upon supplier expertise. As time progressed towards programme 
2 and 5, one can assume a settling down of the supplier coincident with an 
increased supportive element of experience from the OEM. 
Programme 1B, the worst programme exemplifies the worst theoretical scenario 
whereby a disrupted team of suppliers perhaps also with some initial motivation 
issues were working in conjunction with inexperienced OEM engineers to the 
detriment of quality. 
One may also speculate that the increased competitive environment due to 
separation from the OEM to an external competitive supplier environment may 
have also helped the Supplier to increase its performance to a greater level than 
before. 
 
8.2.1 Quality performance after first 12 months in service 
 
The following graph (Figure 8.5) identifies the quality performance from 12 to 
24 months after product launch. 
You will note that programme 5 is omitted from the graphs due to the non-
availability of data. Because the previous graph (Figure 8.4) identified 
programme 5 as a high performing programme on behalf of the suppliers it is 
unfortunate that it is not included but one can clearly see that the supplier lead 
programmes were all positive in the post 12 monthly period. The OEM lead 
situation was however more inconclusive with two positive quality improvement 
trends compared to one negative. 
 223 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
1 2
Years in Service post launch
R
e
p
a
ir
s
/1
0
0
0
1B
3A
3B
1A
3C
2
AWSInd.xls3
Black = 
Supplier
White = OEM+
 
Figure 8.5: Fuel Indication/Sender related Repairs/1000 for 1 & 2 years in 
service after programme launch 
 
Similar to case study 2, some quality metrics were taken using some of the more 
comprehensive indicative measures collected. Figure 8.5 was used for the basis 
of metrics whereby a direct comparison between the average 12 months 
Repairs/1000 Supplier lead programme was detrimental to that of the OEM 
lead programme represented by a 24% decline of quality. 
 
8.3 Summary: Case Study 3 
 
As illustrated in Figure 8.6 Supplier led programmes based upon the example of 
Low specificity commodity identified a detriment in performance over OEM 
lead programmes.
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Figure 8.6: Final Completed Outsourcing Decision Model Study for 
Outsourcing of Intellectual Competency Related to a Low Specificity End 
Commodity 
 
8.4 Discussion: Case Studies 2, 3 and Outsourcing Model 
 
Within the two case studies provided the resultant evidence does not providing a 
compelling argument to support the outsourcing of fuel system intellectual 
competence. Without exception, all Positive Outcomes within the Model were 
either neutral or negative. If the Outsourcing model was used at the time of the 
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initiatives in the case studies, theoretically the outsourcing should have not 
occurred or at least the investigation would promote further investigation. The 
reduced level of external expertise is an important factor in a complex system 
involving many vehicle attributes and on balance some detriment in overall 
performance should have been expected. The additional factor regarding fuel 
systems strategic expertise was also a key factor that differentiated Ford from its 
competitors within the research (Case Study 1).  
It is timely that whilst this study was in the latter phases Ford published a halting 
of Full Service Supplier activities (Ford Motor Company Ltd, 2003) 
accompanied with an additional push to increase competence within the OEM 
i.e. in-sourcing. 
Whilst many of the criteria for outsourcing were met by the Full Service Supplier 
initiative in the case study, there were many critical factors that were clearly not. 
The combination of external expertise and whether or not expertise is strategic is 
very important. 
 226 
Chapter 9: CASE STUDY 4 – EVALUATION OF THE 
INTRODUCTION OF A SECOND SUPPLIER INTO A 
SINGLE SOURCING SITUATION 
 
The three case studies already investigated were provided to validate the 
developed outsourcing model. Whilst the following Case Study 4 does use key 
elements of the model it is included to identify if an outsourcing action, once 
implemented can be developed to provide greater performance advantage to the 
outsourcer i.e. if after following the decision making process within the 
researched outsourcing model, the resultant performance is marginal, is there any 
possibility that performance can be enhanced by a modification to the process? 
Case Study 4 looks at dual sourcing as a potential means of enhancing 
performance. 
Figure 9.1 identifies what aspects of the outsourcing model will be covered 
within Case study 4. 
Discussion within the research suggesting the link between specificity and 
commonality provides the basis of the following case study. By reducing 
specificity in a commodity by definition means that it becomes closer to being 
generic both within an OEM but also potentially outside as well. Once a 
commodity becomes generic (low specificity) there is a greater market and 
potentially more competition within the supply base. At this point it may be 
advantageous either to single source a commodity in order to obtain greater 
economies of scale or perhaps consider dual sourcing to increase 
competitiveness between the selected suppliers. 
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Figure 9.1: Outsourcing Decision Model Validation Plan highlighting what will 
be covered in Chapter 9 relevant to Case Study 4 
 
The following Case Study 4 provides an insight into a single and dual sourcing 
situation to identify which is most beneficial for the outsourcer. 
The view of Arnold (2000) can be assessed on a low specificity component 
bought over many years from a known supplier. Whilst the component is a 
generic component, as in many cases, Ford specifications provide some minor 
tuning to meet internal specifications and specific vehicle requirements. The case 
provided identifies the resultant commercial effects relating the addition of 
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Supplier B2 as a direct competitor to established Supplier A1 who originally 
supported 100% of Ford European production. 
 
9.1 Description of Outsourced Competency End Commodity 
 
There is a high level of standardisation of the end commodity within the industry 
with a minor degree of customisation for Ford and a further minor degree of 
customisation for differing markets and vehicle models. Similar components are 
made by other competitors but typically are offering slightly different levels of 
customisation. 
 
9.2 Description of Supplier A1 
 
The Supplier A1 is predominantly based in the USA and is the largest supplier of 
the commodity within its home base. High standardisation of product aligned 
with massive production volumes has enabled the company to develop a highly 
automated manufacturing process providing potential benefits of economies of 
scale. 
The company also has a substantial development capability that has enabled it to 
develop a highly marketable product that is able to meet the close but diverse 
requirements of its OEM customers. The supplier is also very proactive and 
innovative in developing new ideas and concepts that has provided a distinct 
competitive advantage in recent years. 
Historically the supplier served the US automotive home base but in recent years 
started to market in Europe which further justified a small localised 
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manufacturing base that providing greater European cost effectiveness through 
the elimination of significant shipping costs involved with shipping US 
manufactured components to European automotive manufacturing plants. 
 
9.3 The Supplier’s Competitors 
 
In recent years there were four competitors but one was taken over by the fore-
mentioned (Supplier A1) at the time of entering the European market. Prior to 
this takeover Ford successfully operated with two suppliers i.e. Supplier A1 and 
the company they took over. The takeover of this competitor was the salient 
factor that caused an immediate elimination of a competitive source within Ford 
products at that time. The resultant independent European competitors to 
Supplier A1 are limited and both predominantly Europe based. One (Supplier 
B1) has very similar capabilities to Supplier A1 and is a leading European 
Supplier in related products and Supplier B2 is the smaller of the group with 
limited development facilities but strong commercial relationships with a large 
OEM.  
 
9.4 Introduction of Additional Supplier B2 
 
Following design reviews, plant visits and various meetings, Supplier B2 was 
offered Ford business on a moderate production volume vehicle and 
subsequently became a second supplier. 
Based upon standardisation principles and the drive for commonality within 
Ford, the specifications of the component were enhanced both in performance, 
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package and customer interface aspects to ensure that the part met a new 
standard enabling it to be interchanged with Supplier A1 component at short 
notice with minimal disruption to Ford production. This entailed a greater 
workload in Ford than normal, not only in defining the new specifications for the 
component but ensuring the respective model line packaging requirements were 
compatible and focussed towards commonality. The result provided Ford with a 
degree of purchasing and engineering freedom it did not previously have with no 
compromising of quality standards. 
 
9.5 Cost Effects of Introducing Supplier B2 
 
The cost effects of introducing a second supplier are clear to see (Figure 9.2). 
Result average component costs were lowered ultimately in excess of 18%. Even 
before quarter seven it can be seen that dialogue between suppliers and OEM had 
a distinct effect in making Supplier A1 commence reducing costs with the 
perceived threat of a competitor. Beyond the period of introduction (Quarter 9) 
further savings were cumulatively made through further efficiencies. To date, the 
newly introduced supplier is obviously very happy that they have made a 
foothold as a supplier to Ford albeit a minor foothold. They are also in accord 
with Ford purchasing in that the new Ford business is seen as commercially 
advantageous to both parties. 
As mentioned earlier the subject component is small but not only that, it 
represents less than 1% of the sale price of an average car. Assuming a notional 
cost price of an automobile to be £10,000, an 18% average cost saving on all 
components could provide a significant cost advantage. 
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Figure 9.2: Effect of Average Component Cost due to Introduction of Second 
Supplier. 
 
The resultant effect of introducing a competitor into the business has provided 
mixed responses by Supplier A1, the original supplier. Of course they see the 
new supplier as a threat that they would rather not have. Despite this they are 
confident they can compete and win in the future. This view is similar to the new 
supplier also. Both suppliers are very confident about their own abilities that 
both would rather see a fair competitive situation whereby the "best supplier" 
would be offered 100% of the business. This comment signifies that each are 
happy with the current benefits of supplying to Ford with the implication that 
they can provide further individual advantage in becoming more efficient 
producers than their competitors. 
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9.6 Effects of Quality 
 
One might assume that a lower cost producer may increase the risk of a 
detriment in quality level of the bought component. As mentioned earlier, 
Supplier A1 was already in the process of retooling their component in a more 
convenient location and thereby providing a rare opportunity to compare quality 
data on a like for like basis in comparison to their newly adopted competitor. 
Both suppliers were providing a similar component to their own generic designs 
with customisation to suit Ford Motor Company specifications with associated 
new tooling and also introducing them at similar dates in similar markets. 
Figure 9.3 shows the various performances of the two suppliers within the same 
model year. The data provided is based upon service warranty claims against the  
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Figure 9.3: Quality Comparison of Existing Supplier A1 & New Supplier B2 in 
Year of Commodity Launch 
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actual component. Despite similar start dates, they were not totally co-incident 
but for the basis of comparison, the data was aligned to provide a direct 
comparison. Both suppliers performance was marred by early life failures that 
were rapidly detected and fixed. Within the first model year the established 
supplier A1 showed inferior performance to the new contender Supplier B2 with 
a factor of two over the new competitor. The conclusion of first model-years 
production leaves both suppliers approximately equal. 
Figure 9.4 shows the performance of the same two suppliers during the following 
years production when some stabilisation of quality levels had occurred. Here we 
see the trends indicated at the year of launch had reversed and show the existing 
supplier has a twofold quality advantage over the new supplier. 
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Figure 9.4: Comparison of Existing Supplier A1 & New Supplier B2 in Year 
Following Commodity Launch. 
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9.7 Other Tangible Benefits 
 
The previously mentioned commercial benefits are clear but the use of two 
suppliers also provides an advantage in that potential development resource is 
increased along with the broader spread of experience gleaned through suppliers 
of other OEM experiences. The latter, not necessarily through suppliers 
disclosing competitor secrets but more through improvement of base designs 
through broader experiences i.e. Ford benefits from other OEMs experiences. 
There is also the obvious down side to this, whereby Ford competitors may 
benefit also from Ford experiences. 
The development potential has provided direct benefits in that competitive 
suppliers look at different ways of resolving design issues and broaden the OEM 
base knowledge. This factor is also evident in that despite standardisation of 
design, the designs are not the same and respond differently to new unexpected 
concerns, environments or legislation. Whereas one design may behave badly 
under a new circumstance and require investment and added function to 
improve, the alternative supplier's part may show no such issues and need no 
revision. The outcome is that the supplier of the inferior part cannot 
automatically resolve the issue and increase prices. The supplier must review 
himself against his competitor and look at ways to add function without cost. 
This is purely a case of normal competition. 
The dual approach also enables the OEM engineer and buyer to consider supplier 
cost increases through the ability to consider two contending opinions rather than 
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one i.e. the OEM has less of a policing role if each supplier is effectively 
unofficially policing the other. 
It may also be that one suppliers component provides greater advantage on a 
particular model line compared to the competitor due to location, component 
performance or other reasons and again as with the commercial argument, two 
suppliers does provide some potential opportunities. 
 
9.8 Negative/Cautionary Issues 
 
In the case cited above, both suppliers are highly competent in manufacturing 
and engineering their products under the direction of an OEM. Where both lack 
knowledge or pro-activity is in the area of final customer acceptability of their 
products i.e. in event of a customer issue (OEM or end customer) the suppliers, 
in both cases the amount of support needed by Ford is high and variable with the 
surprising factor to note is that sometimes the supplier with the highest 
development resource do not necessarily perform to the highest level. Suppliers 
like OEMs are looking for commercial advantage to maximise profits and this is 
understandable and normal accepted practice but an OEM must take some 
safeguards ensuring intellectual property gained through a joint OEM/supplier 
development does not result in the supplier raising a patent that effectively locks 
out competition. Within the supplier group discussed there has been speculation 
that patents applications have effectively halted competition in some aspects to 
the extent that some suppliers do not even want to compete through fear of legal 
actions being taken against them. It bears repeating that this is normal business 
but it is here that an OEM must apply some self-protection through legal 
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contracts or further actions. The saying "Necessity is the Mother of Invention" is 
very true; the OEM has direct contact to end customers and is aware of up 
coming legislation and other effects that may influence design. Additionally the 
OEM is aware of unique issues posed by carline package issues including the 
surrounding components and interfaces. The OEM with aligned competence and 
awareness to these potential issues is in a unique position to assess and raise 
patents before the supplier is even aware of the issue. Any review of patents 
indicates that some highly restrictive patents may be raised on very simple ideas 
often seen as worthless to many engineers. 
A final negative issue relating to the above case is that in order to implement 
standardisation, the task is much easier when utilising one supplier. When co-
ordinating the activities of two suppliers, greater effort is necessary to establish 
the ideal direction for standardisation i.e. what features/dimension to become 
part of the base design specification. Once this path is established the task gets 
easier. 
 
9.9 Summary: Case Study 4 
 
It is clear that in the low specificity case identified and the restricted supply base 
that having two suppliers provides many advantages in cost, technical capability 
and flexibility. The competitive scenario also reduces the required OEM internal 
engineering resource but this in turn needs to be redirected to control the 
standardisation process and provide some form of protective surveillance 
regarding intellectual property. Overall the case identified provides a win 
situation for the OEM and generates a healthy competition within the supply 
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base. This is born out by Toyota who has a long standing two vendor policy that 
dictates two suppliers for a similar commodity to enable some interaction in 
quality concerns and knowledge transfer controlled flow of intellect. (Auto 
Business Ltd, 2002d) 
 
 
 238 
CHAPTER 10: DISCUSSION 
 
The understanding of core and non-core competency of an organisation was 
found to be the dominant factor in deciding whether to outsource an entity or not. 
In defining this, expertise and its strategic value provided logical drivers but low 
specificity, a secondary driver was also clearly identified as a further important 
factor in ascertaining what to outsource.  
Advantages, disadvantages and risks were numerous and as varied as the 
numerous situations outsourcing can be applied to. This variation really 
identifies the importance in not only clearly identifying metrics associated with 
potential gains but also those of where things could be disadvantaged. The 
importance of establishing good metrics cannot be over emphasised. Without 
good metrics related to the situation before and after outsourcing it would be 
impossible to quantify whether or not outsourcing was successful or not.  
Whilst the outsourcing decision model was developed to be a single source of 
information, providing an informed pathway towards an outsourcing decision, 
clearly the former comment identifies that a high degree of knowledge is 
necessary to gain and manipulate appropriate organisational data to support the 
model’s successful application. 
 
10.1 Outsourcing Decision Model 
 
A key objective of this research was to provide an outsourcing decision model 
that required no further research other than gathering the necessary evidence for 
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individual cases. The finalised outsourcing decision model presented within this 
thesis (Figure 4.2) meets this objective by providing a summary of relevant 
criteria with sufficient guidance to ensure a potential outsourcer understands 
what data to gather in making an informed decision. Within the research process, 
it was important to focus on the inclusion of only the major criteria for 
outsourcing. This was important not only for the sake of developing a model that 
was easily comprehensible but in recognition that each criterion requires a 
significant amount of data acquisition in order to satisfy an informed outsourcing 
decision. Whilst more data may provide greater accuracy it also would have the 
potential of slowing down the process and wasting an outsourcer’s resources. In 
spite of this focus on major criteria, the work necessary in applying to real life 
would still take a high degree of effort and resource; however, this is justified as 
the penalty of making an un-informed decision may be unacceptable. 
Within the research in Chapter 2, three alternative models were found and 
subjected to analysis in Chapter 2.12. All, whilst providing similar conciseness 
to that developed within this thesis, did not have the same flow path approach. 
Similarly they also did not include the potential metrics and evaluation method. 
Clarity in operation and guidance through to the decision process and beyond 
was seen as a key to developing a model that could be used as a practical tool at 
industry level rather than one that describes outsourcing decision criteria in the 
form of a research paper. The model presented within this thesis and its 
supplementary tables provided the necessary clarity and guidance to not only 
ascertain the criteria necessary in making a correct outsourcing decision but also 
to understand where and what to gather in the form of suitable metrics necessary 
to quantify ultimate success or failure. 
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Whilst the model developed has been designed for display within this thesis, a 
further enhancement, enabling greater ease of use would be to develop the model 
into a knowledge based system that not only leads the user through the process in 
a manner determined by earlier inputs, but one that can also display resultant 
performance data and comparisons to understand more comprehensively the 
levels of performance achieved, before and after outsourcing. This process 
would also inevitably aim to reduce subjectivity within the inputs. Whilst this is 
a desirable development of the model for business purposes, it was not necessary 
to develop to this level within the thesis. Ideally, if this was to be achieved it 
would be through further validation in alternative case studies with operators 
other than the Author. 
Subsequent validation through case studies did not highlight any further 
necessary changes to the outsourcing decision model presented in Chapter 4. 
The outsourcing decision model developed and subsequently validated through 
this research has clearly demonstrated its potential as a practical tool that could 
be applied at both an industry and academic level. As previously mentioned, 
whilst a further enhancement could be developed through establishment of a 
knowledge based system to simplify the process further and eliminate 
subjectivity, the tool has still demonstrated its usefulness and clarity in focussing 
upon an appropriate decision. 
 
10.2 Case Study Validation of Outsourcing Decision Model 
 
The validation method selected through case studies provided the most 
comprehensive coverage feasible without major organisational support. 
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Whilst a greater number of case studies would undeniably provide a more 
comprehensive validation of the developed outsourcing decision model, those 
selected represent the influential environments acting upon on industry (Global, 
and Industry environments). Additionally the case studies whilst based upon an 
outsourcing strategy that had already commenced were able to demonstrate a 
means of assessing the fulfilment of the varying criteria without knowing the 
eventual outcome, therefore eliminating any potential bias in trying to make the 
model fit a known outcome. The case studies were comprehensive in their 
application, accessible regarding necessary detailed knowledge and unbiased 
towards any final outcome and therefore represent a sound validation of the 
derived model. 
Despite the above comments, there is a minor deviation to the validation plan 
that would resolve a minor issue regarding the application of the model. Whilst 
the object was to derive a model that was simple to follow, with no further 
academic reading necessary, the case studies were all developed by the Author. 
This was necessary in that the nature of the studies and time involved could only 
be supported by the Author with minor additional help. To ensure the integrity of 
the “simple to follow” aspect, ideally the case studies would have been 
investigated by independent operators, however this was not possible.  
Case study 1 in isolation did not provide validation in any shape or form to the 
developed outsourcing decision model. It was devised as an independent analysis 
that provided triangulation to strengthen the validation derived through case 
studies 2 and 3. Within the context of the thesis, case study 1 did indeed 
strengthen the validation by providing an outcome in accord with both case 
studies 2 and 3. 
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The method of using patents in understanding the competitive position within 
Case Study 1 did provide synergies when comparing levels of expertise within 
Case Studies 2 and 3 thereby providing greater efficiency within overall 
research. 
 
10.3 Specificity of End Commodity within Outsourcing 
 
Within case studies 2 and 3, the evidence presented shows very little difference 
within outcomes regarding whether the end product is high or low specificity. 
Because the availability of potential case studies enabled the possibility to 
conduct this minor detour within research it was thought that it may be of 
interest; however whilst it is clear that specificity is a very important factor 
relating to what is actually being outsourced, evidence based upon the results of 
Case Studies 2 and 3 suggest that it is not significant further within associated 
items already outsourced. 
 
10.4 Benefits of Introducing a Second Supplier into a Single Sourced Supply 
Situation 
 
Case Study 4 provides a good illustration as to how some of the cost and quality 
deficiencies identified in Cases Studies 2 and 3 may be remedied. Whether 
through supplier opportunism or lower expertise, the introduction of a second 
supplier into a single sourcing situation does provide benefits. Within Case 
Study 4, both the quality and cost of the existing supplier were improved. To 
some extent the additional supplier provides the benefit of offering alternative 
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technical solutions, hence providing some degree of technical governance within 
both suppliers which is particularly important when capability has been depleted 
in a given outsourcing organisation. Whilst dual sourcing has advantages, in 
order to gain major benefit for the outsourcer, the outsourcer would need to 
maintain some expertise to provide an overview of technology and to act as a 
mediator in assessing and controlling competitive technologies. 
Within Case Study 4, a strict specification for the product was provided to allow 
total interchange-ability from one supplier to the next with no physical changes 
within the commodity necessary. This was seen as a very important to assist 
purchasing leverage. Any relaxing of specification to allow deviation away from 
interchangeable parts would have diluted the leverage and resultant benefits. 
 
10. 5 The Link Between Specificity, Commonality and Platform Sharing 
 
Chapters 2.14 and 2.15 identify links between Specificity, Commonality and the 
modern trend of Platform Sharing. Whilst these aspects form a minor part of this 
Thesis, they have important implications in that there are synergies between 
outsourcing, platform engineering and commonality. Within Case Study 4, the 
commodity in question was one specified by Ford. Any supplier could change 
the design so long as it met the specification. Effectively the two parts were 
totally interchangeable. On this basis the specificity is related to the knowledge 
captured within the specification, although the outsourcer would not be too 
involved in the design of the commodity he would be concerned about its 
function; however the more a potential outsourcer leans away from 
specifications, the commodities can become more generic, perhaps using the 
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same parts as a competitor. Once this has been achieved, effectively the 
commodity becomes more like a piece of hardware that can be sourced from a 
multiplicity of suppliers. A generic commodity is one that potentially has a high 
degree of commonality and therefore lends itself to greater platform sharing. It is 
clear therefore that within the Case Studies presented, a lesser grip on internal 
specifications (lower specificity) would have the potential of enabling greater 
commonality and platform sharing. 
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Chapter 11: CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
11.1 Conclusions 
 
In order to provide clarity of conclusions aligned to purpose within the thesis, the 
order of aims and objectives within Chapter 1.2 will be used as the basis for the 
conclusions presented. 
 
1. The researched generic outsourcing decision model identified in Chapter 
4, Figure 4.2 provided a concise decision making tool for outsourcing. In 
addition, its application as identified in Case Studies 2 and 3 showed that 
it's application required no additional research necessary to provide 
guidance in ascertaining the necessary criteria in making an informed 
outsourcing decision.  
 
It must be pointed out that although the guidance is provided within the model, 
the ascertaining of relevant criteria and final assessment within any given case 
must be carried out by individuals with sufficient expertise and responsibility 
within a potential outsourcing organisation. This factor is important in that many 
of the metrics require detailed expert analysis that may not be generally 
available. Typical examples of this are costs and quality data. 
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2. The approach of triangulating case studies 1 with 2 and 3 identified a 
clear validation of the outsourcing decision model. This was 
subsequently further endorsed by the case study outsourcer’s action to 
independently reverse its sourcing decision in line with that identified by 
the findings of the model application. Effectively, case study 1, case 
studies 2 and 3 and further literature review relating to the parent case 
study company provided three independent pieces of evidence in support 
of the outsourcing decision model. 
 
Case study 1 provided validation by using corporate strategy as a means of 
comparing the outsourcer used in case studies 2 and 3 with three of its major 
competitors and case studies 2 and 3 were directly applied to the outsourcing 
decision model. In all three case studies the evidence was provided that did not 
support an outsourcing decision.  
 
3. Whilst an outsourced entity should ideally be of low specificity, evidence 
shown within case studies 2 and 3 identify that specificity was of no 
significance further down the chain with respect to what product or 
service the outsourced entity relates. 
 
The conclusion above must be taken in the context of the case studies provided 
understanding that the conclusion is true as written bearing in mind that the 
ultimate result of outsourcing within the case studies was negative, both in 
justification to outsource and resultant performance. 
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4. Evidence provided by case study 4 identified that performance can be 
enhanced both within quality and cost advantage through multiple 
sourcing in a previously single sourced situation. This case study using 
selected performance elements ("Why Outsource") of the developed 
outsourcing decision model identifying that the model can also be 
adapted for other purposes. 
 
Whilst research identified various models relating to the criteria applied to an 
outsourcing decision, none were usable in their given form to be used as a single 
entity for the purposes of deciding upon a decision to outsource or not. Each 
model researched lacked a combination of sufficient breadth of high level criteria 
or detail necessary to be used without further guidance to a potential outsourcer. 
The outsourcing model developed within this research was provided in order to 
provide a working tool to be utilised at industry level without additional 
guidance or reading necessary to utilise in a real potential outsourcing scenario. 
Other models uncovered during the research did provide overlaps regarding 
criteria but were insufficient to use as a workable tool without much extra 
reading. Effectively in developing the decision model, this research has 
completed this extra reading and complemented it further by rationalising criteria 
and providing further metrics. 
Case studies 2 and 3 identified that the suppliers had less expertise than the 
outsourcer. Under normal circumstances, the decision model would have 
directed a halt in the outsourcing process as it was a key criterion for outsourcing 
that a potential supplier has greater expertise; however, because the model was 
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applied retrospectively in the case studies, the outsourcing had already 
proceeded. 
The above comment would have indicated that potentially there would be some 
detriment in overall performance at a later date after outsourcing and this was the 
case, both case studies 2 and 3 identified a drop in performance with an increase 
in costs. The application of the outsourcing decision model in highlighting that 
the suppliers had lower expertise combined with the resultant drop in 
performance provided validation of the model in that it uncovered evidence to 
suggest that this outcome would be likely. If the model was applied and adhered 
to prior to the outsourcing it is likely that performance would not have reduced. 
 
Case Study 1 also provided confirmation that Ford's approach differed with 
major competitors as none of the three additional OEMs investigated appeared to 
be outsourcing their fuel system intellectual competency. 
 
Summarising the above comments, the developed outsourcing model was 
positively validated in Case Studies 1, 2 and 3. 
 
Case Study 4 identified that both quality and cost improvements are achievable 
in introducing a second supplier into a single sourcing situation particularly 
where specificity within the outsourced commodity or service is low. Whilst the 
research identified this outcome, the reasoning to why this was actually the case 
was not ascertained. For the purpose of this research, the analysis was sufficient 
but a deeper understanding would clearly clarify a purchasing strategy that 
clearly has positive potential. 
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Whilst the model has been validated addressing one of the major elements within 
this Thesis, there is clearly still a question in what could be changed within the 
potential outsourcer/supplier relationship in order to ensure a positive outcome in 
the strategies described in Case Studies 2 and 3. Supplier expertise was identified 
as the cause of lower subsequent performance. Further work to understand 
possibilities to address this by training, collaboration, improved management or 
some other means would provide a key to a developing a positive outcome in the 
future. 
 
As can be seen by the case studies provided, it is necessary to gather and analyse 
much data in order to decide whether or not to outsource. The case studies 
provided do indicate that the outsourcing model does work but in order fully to 
verify its greater generic application it would need to be further researched with 
new cases containing different potential outsourcing scenarios. 
The latter work that introduces the link between commonality/standardisation in 
relationship with specificity is a very interesting subject in its own right and 
further work that can identify the links to aid an outsourcing scenario would be 
of great interest offering much potential for industry. 
 
5. Through literature review (Chapter 2.13 and 2.14) a link between 
Specificity, Commonality and Platform Sharing was identified which 
further lends itself towards platform engineering. It follows therefore that 
by re-engineering to decrease specificity in a commodity provides a 
positive edge to provide more competiveness through commonality. In 
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addition the reduction in specificity also increases the scope for further 
outsourcing. 
 
6. Patent activity within an organisation can provide a means of indicating 
corporate strategy relating to particular entities. 
 
Within Case Study 1, without the direct knowledge of particular OEMs 
outsourcing strategy with regard to a particular entity an alternative method was 
adopted to establish this by comparing patent activity as a measure of innovation 
with high level corporate statements. These comparisons provided good 
correlation and provided high confidence understanding of each OEM's 
strategies identifying that they both could be used as independent means if 
necessary. This work, adapted from the work of Pakes et al (1984) and Liker et 
al (1996) particularly strengthens the statements of the latter. Based upon the 
work of Parasuramen et al (1983), Franko (1989) and Morbey (1989), whilst 
Research and Development budget could also have been used as another means 
of establishing the strategy, it could not be applied in this case as the R&D 
budget of these companies could not be broken down to ascertain the budget for 
particular entities. 
 
11.2 Recommendations for Further Research 
 
Comments within Chapter 10 provide the basis of further research that could 
enhance that already covered within this thesis. In principal this comes down to 
two aspects; 
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1. Develop the outsourcing decision model into a knowledge based system 
in the form of a computer based questionnaire that leads the operator 
through the process, providing necessary guidance at appropriate times in 
a direction provided by answers already provided by the operator. This 
programme whilst reducing subjectivity would also, clearly identify the 
key metrics that support a decision and provide guidance into identifying 
appropriate metrics to monitor after outsourcing.  
2. Apply case studies to the outsourcing model using various individuals in 
order to uncover any areas where greater clarity in process direction may 
be required. 
 
Whilst both the above further developments would be useful, from the 
perspective of this thesis, the research is complete in that the model has been 
developed to a clear working level and validated through comprehensive case 
studies. 
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 Introduction Phase Growth Phase Maturity Phase Decline Phase 
Customer Strategy  Early customers may 
experiment with product 
and will accept some 
unreliability 
 Need to explain nature of 
innovation 
 Growing group of 
customers 
 Quality and reliability 
important for growth 
 Mass market 
 Little new trial of 
product or service 
 Brand switching 
 Know the product well 
 Select on the basis of 
price rather than 
innovation 
Research and 
Development Strategy 
 High  Seek extensions before 
competition 
 Low   
Company Strategy  Seek to dominate market 
 Research and Development 
& production particularly 
important to ensure product 
quality 
 React to competition 
with marketing 
expenditure and 
initiatives 
 Expensive to increase 
market share if not 
already market leader 
 Seek cost reductions 
 Cost control particularly 
important 
Impact on 
profitability 
 High price, but probably 
making a loss due to 
investment in new category 
 Profits should emerge 
here but prices may 
well decline as 
competitors enter 
market. 
 Profits under pressure 
from need for 
continuing investment 
coupled with continued 
distributor and 
competitive pressure 
 Price competition and 
low growth may lead to 
losses or need to cut 
costs drastically to 
maintain profitability. 
Competitor strategy  Keen interest in new 
category 
 Attempt to replicate new 
product 
 Market entry (if not 
before) 
 Attempt to innovate and 
invest in category 
 Competition largely on 
advertising and quality 
 Lower product 
differentiation. 
 Lower product change 
 Competition based 
primarily on price 
 Some companies may 
seek to exit the industry 
Appendix 2 : The industry life cycle and its strategy implications – a conventional view (Lynch, 1997)
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Author  Definition of Outsourcing 
Hiemstra & van Tilberg, 
1993 quoted by Fill & 
Visser (2000) 
 “subcontracting custom-made articles and 
constructions, such as components, sub-
assemblies, final products, adaptations and/or 
services to another company” 
Kepler & Jones, 1997 
quoted by Waterson et al. 
(1999) 
 “contracting out certain manufacturing processes 
and sub-processes to other companies (rather than 
making everything in-house) 
Gordon and Gordon 
(1996) 
 “to contact out certain peripheral functions of core 
business to companies specialising in that 
particular field 
Antonucci et al. (1998)  “IT outsourcing is defined as contracting with 
outside vendors to do various IT functions such as 
data entry, data centre operations, application 
maintenance and development, disaster recovery 
and network management and operations” 
Greaver (1998)  “is the act of transferring some of the company’s 
recurring internal activities and decisions to 
outside providers, as set forth in a contract” 
Lankford & Parsa, (1999)  “the procurement of products or services from 
sources that are external to the organisation” 
Ettore, (1999)  “is subcontracting a piece of business outside the 
company” 
Mariotti, (1999)  “ a strategic decision to obtain goods or services 
from independent organisations outside of a 
company’s legal boundaries; to purchase goods or 
services instead of making or doing them” 
Lonsdale & Cox, (1998)  “the process of transferring an existing business 
activity, including the relevant assets, to a third 
party” 
 
Appendix 3: Outsourcing definitions (Baines et al. 2000) 
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Quality Actual capacity is temporarily insufficient to comply with 
demand. The quality motive can be subdivided into three 
aspects: increased quality demands, shortage of qualified 
personnel. Outsourcing as a transition period. 
Cost  Outsourcing is a possible solution to control increasing costs 
and is compatible with a cost leadership strategy. By 
controlling and decreasing costs a company can increase its 
competitive position. 
Finance A company has a limited investment budget; The funds must 
be used for investments in core business activities, which are 
long-term decisions. 
Core Business Core business is a primary activity with which an organisation 
generates revenues. To concentrate on core business activities 
is a strategic decision. All subsequent activities are mainly 
supportive and should be outsourced. 
Cooperation Cooperation between companies can lead to conflict those 
activities that are produced by both organisations should be 
subject to total outsourcing 
 
Appendix 4: Drivers for Outsourcing (Beulen et al. 1994) 
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Rank Factor No of 
respondents 
1 Cost reduction 156 
2 Quality Improvement 152 
3 Increase exposure to worldwide technology 150 
4 Delivery and reliability improvements 148 
5 Use resources that are not available internally (e.g. inability 
to hire employees) 
136 
6 Gain access to materials only available abroad 122 
7 Establish a presence in a foreign market 104 
8  Maintain sufficient flexibility to respond to market 
conditions 
92 
9 Reduce the overall amount of specialised skill and 
knowledge needed 
76 
10 Make capital funds available for more profitable operations 64 
11 Combat the introduction of competition to the domestic 
supply 
60 
 
Appendix 5: Reasons for global outsourcing as perceived by survey respondents 
(Elmuti et al. 2000) 
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No of 
respondents 
Goals selected Attained 
goals 
Projected 
percentage of 
improvements 
Achieved 
percentage of 
improvements 
70 PERFORMANCE 
(e.g. profit margins: return on 
investment; sales per 
employee; and higher stock 
values to investors 
55 15-20 10-15 
63 COST SAVINGS 
(e.g. Cost per unit of product 
or service compared to 
competitors) 
40 20-25 5-10 
40 PRODUCTIVITY 
(e.g.; efficiency rate, 
percentage of hours spent on 
production and output 
produced divided by input 
used) 
24 5-15 5-10 
30 CYCLE TIME 
(e.g. cycled time/asset 
turnover) 
20 10-15 10 or less 
24 CUSTOMER SERVICE 
(e.g., Customer satisfaction 
rates, repeat purchase, and 
retention rates 
18 10-15 5-10 
23 MARKET SHARE 
(e.g. Compared to past years 
and competitors) 
16 less than 5 5 or less 
20 QUALITY 
(e.g. percentage defects) 
12 5-10 5 or less 
 
Appendix 6: Specific goals for global outsourcing activities (over one year) 
(Elmuti et al. 2000) 
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Quality Determined By Buying Decision Influenced By
1. Well known name 1. Price
2. Word of mouth 2. Quality
3. Past experience 3. Performance
4. Performance 4. Word of mouth
5. Durability 5. Well known name
6. Workmanship
7. Price
8. Manufacturers reputation
1. Price 1. Price
2. Well known name 2. Quality itself
3. Appearance 3. Appearance
4. Durability 4. Durability
5. Past experience 5. Well known name
6. Quality itself 6. Design and style
7. Performance
1. Well known name 1. Performance
2. Performance 2. Price
3. Easy to use 3. Easy to use
3. Durability 4. Design and style
4. Price 5. Well known name
QualityPerceptionASQC.xls
United States
West Germany
Japan
 
Appendix 7: Consumer Definitions of Quality: Summarized Results from 
American Society for Quality Control (ASQC/Gallup, 1991) 
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Successful Organisations 
Fear of job loss and fear of change 
Poor choices of outsourcing partners 
Not enough training/skills needed to deal with type of global sourcing 
alternatives 
Inadequate comprehensive plans 
Cultural, legal and economics issues 
Decline in the morale and performance of the remaining employees 
Lack of supporting infrastructure 
Unclear expectations/unclear objectives 
Cross-functional political problems 
Poor organisational communication 
Problems can arise regarding confidentiality, security and time schedules 
Not enough high level management support 
Over emphasis on short term benefits 
Uncertainties in the environments 
Hidden costs and risks 
Inadequate control systems 
Lack of flexibility and keeping contract short 
  
Unsuccessful Organisations 
 
Unclear expectations/objectives 
Inadequate comprehensive plans 
Fear of job loss and fear of change 
Not enough training/skills needed to deal with type of sourcing methods 
Not enough high level management support 
Cultural, legal and economic issues 
Poor choices of outsourcing partners 
Decline in morale of the remaining employees 
Inadequate control systems 
Over emphasis on short term gains 
Lacking of supporting infrastructure 
Cross-functional political problems 
Poor organisational communication 
Problems – confidentiality, security and time schedules 
Lack of flexibility and keeping contract short 
Uncertainties in the environments 
Hidden costs and risks 
 
 
Appendix 8: Factors affecting Global |Sourcing Projects in Successful and 
Unsuccessful Organisations (Elmuti et al. 2000) 
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Criteria Measurement 
Technology Total quality supplier performance survey  
Manufacturing technology audit 
Investment in R&D 
Quality Parts per million defects 
Process quality index 
ISO 9000 accreditation 
Responsiveness to 
changes in demand 
Process change notifications 
Production control and capacity plans 
Delivery Lead times 
On time shipment performance 
Environment Environmental Improvement policy 
Environmental improvement plan  
Financial stability Credit ratings 
 
Appendix 9: Hewlett Packard’s Supplier Accreditation and Performance Criteria 
with Examples of Metrics (Lonsdale, 1999) 
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Appendix 10: Tier One Supplier Competency Evaluation 
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Appendix 11: OEM Competency Evaluation
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Factor 
No: 
Competence 10 6 4 1 7 5 11 8 9 12 3 2 Total Weighting 
10 
 
Design "Know How" 1 1 2 2 2 2 0 1 1 0 2 2 16 0.67 
6 
 
Target setting 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 2 15 0.62 
4 
 
Development Test expertise 0 0 1 2 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 8 0.33 
1 
 
Development Facilities 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 4 0.17 
7 
 
Depth of Talent 0 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 15 0.62 
5 
 
OEM dedicated manpower 0 1 1 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 9 0.38 
11 Ability to manage interfaces 
that effect function 
2 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 17 0.71 
8 
 
Communication 
Effectiveness 
1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 15 0.62 
9 
 
Knowledge of Regulations 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 15 0.62 
12 
 
Knowledge of 
OEM/Customer 
2 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 19 0.79 
3 Knowledge/Execution of 
OEM Documents/Analysis 
0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 6 0.25 
2 
 
CAD,CAE,CAM 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 5 0.21 
 
Memo: 2=greater importance, 1= equal importance, 0=lesser importance.                                                                     Kepner.doc 
Appendix 12: Kepner-Tregoe Competency Weighting Analysis 
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Competency Weighting Supplier 
1 
Supplier 
2 
Supplier 
3 
Supplier 
4 
Combined Supplier 
Competency (Average) 
Combined OEM 
Competency (Average) 
10. Design "Know How". 
 
0.67 2.77 2.79 2.87 2.14 2.64 2.88 
  6. Target setting. 
 
0.60 2.7 2.48 2.57 1.8 2.39 1.8 
  4. Development Test 
      expertise. 
0.33 1.54 1.38 1.51 0.92 1.34 1.45 
1. Development Facilities. 
 
0.17 0.74 0.7 0.85 0.37 0.66 0.53 
  7. Depth of Talent. 
 
0.62 2.79 2.68 2.57 2.11 2.54 2.60 
  5. OEM dedicated 
      manpower. 
0.38 1.39 1.39 1.46 1.22 1.37 N/A 
11. Ability to manage 
      functional interfaces. 
0.71 3.55 2.84 3.19 2.13 2.93 3.34 
  8. Communication 
      effectiveness. 
0.62 2.48 2.48 2.37 1.98 1.83 2.54 
  9. Knowledge of 
      Regulations. 
0.62 3.1 2.9 3.1 2.36 2.87 3.10 
12. Knowledge of 
      OEM/Customer. 
0.79 2.37 2.76 2.37 3.0 2.63 3.63 
  3. Knowledge/Execution of 
     OEM Documents/Analysis 
0.25 0.75 1.0 0.75 1.0 0.88 1.25 
2. CAD, CAE, CAM. 
 
0.21 0.63 0.84 0.49 0.71 0.67 0.84 
Individual Supplier/OEM Combined 
Competency (Weighted Average) 
2.07 2.02 2.01 1.65 1.94 2.18 
 
Higher numbers in brackets represent a combination of higher performance & higher importance of competency.                                  Kepner2.doc 
Appendix 13: Kepner-Tregoe Analysis comparing Competency of Tier One Suppliers to OEM 
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